Pro Patria Series

CONFEDERACY OF INDIA

By

"A PUNJABI"

گفتند جهان ما آیا بتو می سازد؟

گفتم که نمی سازد! گفتند که برهم زن!

اقبال

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DEDICATED

in gratitude to the memory of the late Sir Muhammad Iqbal and the late Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain. The influence of the one inspired my mind while personal contact with the other trained it. May their souls rest in peace!

PREFACE

I may humbly state that I have no axe to grind and no party politics to serve. I earn a little by hard work and that is sufficient for me. I want no more and have no personal ambition to satisfy. I may be in my grave long before the Muslims achieve the ideal, the possibilities of which I have explored and presented to them in this book. I, therefore, say what I honestly feel and my feelings arise from the very depths of my soul. And my soul gained some wholesome influences by a spiritual communion which a happy chance established between me and the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain, the most farsighted and sincere statesman whom my nation has produced in these tense times. He died, betrayed, heart-broken and lonely. It was his death that forcibly brought home to me the fact that glory, power, ambition and influence are not something abiding; life is short and one must hasten to accomplish the little one can in the brief span of time left, before one is gathered to one's ancestors. Also one should do one's duty undaunted. I believe that an individual's victory lies in the performance of his duty, exerting and straining his soul to the utmost in the service of his

God. Success or failure rests with Him. A mere knowledge of these facts is one thing and to perceive them with the full force of one's personality is quite another. I have no pretensions beyond this.

I may also state that I have the greatest faith in my nation and its future. It was this faith that sustained me during the period of black depression which overwhelmed me soon after the death of that great leader, Sir Fazl-i-Husain. It is this faith that resuscitates me every time I show signs of exhaustion. It inspires me with confidence and gives me hope of our nation's glorious future. Nations take no time in ripening. It is quite possible that our nation may, with a jerk, throw off its lethargy and rise to its full heights. It is also possible that it may continue to sleep for decades to come. But I know that it will ultimately rise, quite refreshed after its long sleep. It is only a question of time. Most of our national decrepitude is due to a few self-centred, self-interested individuals who are at present at the helm of affairs. I feel sure that such times will soon come when these "misfits" will be replaced by "fit ones" of whom there is no dearth among the Muslims. I fully believe in the potentiality of the Muslim masses who constitute the Muslim nation, My Nation.

Seth Sir Abdullah Haroon and Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, sincere colleagues and faithful friends of the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain are worthy of our gratitude. Each one of

these gentlemen very generously offered to bear the cost of the publication of this book and although the first offer came from the former, the argument of the latter that the Punjab had a preferential right to the honour of serving the Muslims in this respect prevailed and his offer was, therefore, thankfully accepted. I must mention that I am also much obliged to K. B. Haji Rahim Bukhsh who has been my moral support throughout and to Dr. M. D. Taseer and Mrs. Christabel Taseer who very kindly revised the manuscript before it was sent to press. I also wish to thank Maulana Ghulam Rasul Mehr and Dr. S. M. Akhtar for their valuable suggestions. I shall be failing in my duty if I do not express my gratitude to Mrs. Akhtar for her very kindly outlining the maps. In addition to the above-named persons I wish to thank my relatives and innumerable friends who must remain unnamed. Their cöoperation was of immense help to me.

It is proposed that an Urdu version should also be brought out and distributed among the Muslim masses free of cost. I am in these days engaged in translating it into Urdu and hope to finish it soon. I may mention here that our programme will not finish with the bringing out of the English and Urdu versions of this book. For the purpose of creating an intellectual revolution among the Muslims and before undertaking the stupendous task of their organization on modern lines, dissemination of some more literature of this kind, among them,

is very necessary. I hope our yeomen of the Pakistan Majalis, who are already at work, will produce it within a short time and Almighty God will help us to see it through the press and to distribute it among His people gratis. After creating an awakening among the Muslim masses, we hope, the work of their organization will become much easier than it is at present. Sir Fazl-i-Husain's untimely death was a great loss to the nation. So was the death of the late Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the father of the nation. The death of the former upset the programme which he intended to carry out for the benefit of the Muslims. It was the will of God that that first programme should be buried along with him. And it is well that it was buried. It was not ambitious enough to satisfy the high aspirations of the Muslim nation in India. Sir Fazl-i-Husain and Sir Muhammad Iqbal are dead. But their spirit is still alive, young and energetic. God is willing to help the Muslims. There is no reason why they should not show willingness to help themselves and be ready to accept thankfully God's help.

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CONFEDERACY OF INDIA

INTRODUCTION

THE aim of Muslim politics in India is twofold: Firstly, to maintain the integrity of the Muslims as a separate community and secondly, to secure their economic welfare.

Maintenance of their integrity as an independent community depends upon keeping intact the Muslims' faith, that is Islam, their civilization, culture and languages, which are the four constituents of their separate existence as a community by themselves. They are all interlinked and interdependent: Religion imparts a particular stamp to civilization, civilization reflects itself in culture and culture takes expression in language. Each of them, therefore, is equally required to be preserved and looked after in the interests of their integrity as an independent community. None of them can be discarded or ignored without adversely affecting some important aspect of their national existence.

The economic welfare of the Muslims in India can be secured by legislation and pacts between them and the non-Muslim communities with a view to check the latter from accumulating all the wealth and means of production of the country in their own

hands to the detriment of the former. But ultimately the securing of economic interests serves merely as a means for the achievement of cultural ideals. A community, after it satisfies its primary needs, tends to seek self-expression by the realization of cultural and religious ideals dear to it. The main object of Muslim politics is, therefore, to safeguard the separate existence of the Muslims as an independent community for the sake of their cultural and religious ideals.

Legislation and pacts may help an economically weaker community to secure its economic interests, against an economically stronger community, but they can never form a guarantee against the subtle influences, which the culture of the latter continuously exercises on the former. Mostly such alien influences work invisibly and gradually mould the mentality of the economically weaker community until it becomes uniform with that of the economically superior community, resulting in the complete absorption of the former by the latter. To safeguard its separate entity as based on its particular culture, the economically weaker community has, therefore, to get rid of the close contact and neighbourhood of the economically superior community so that by having free access to the economic means required for consolidating its position separately, it could assert itself as a cultural entity, against the economically superior community. Their close contact can only be broken by a geographical separation, *i.e.*, separation of their

respective regions. So long as separation does not take place between them, the economically superior community maintains its superior position on account of the access it enjoys to the means which happen to be necessary for establishing its superiority over the other. The economically weaker community, because of the lack of such means, is always handicapped and can never effectively check the other community from exploiting it economically, throwing it into the background culturally, and ultimately absorbing it completely.

So far the Indian Muslims have been trying to secure their economic position as well as cultural interests by the help of legislation and pacts concluded with the Hindus. They have been resorting to these means in order to have their rights and privileges recognized by the Hindus in the Indian nation which at present is supposed to be comprised of them both.

In the following pages we have tried to show how both of these methods have failed in assisting the Muslims to secure their objectives, that they do not hold out any prospects of success even in the future and that after the failure of these methods the only alternative left to the Muslims is that of separating from Hindu India. After establishing the necessity of separation between Hindu India and the Muslim Regions and more specially the Muslim North-West, we have shown how separation is important for the Muslims both economically as well

as culturally. A few pages have also been devoted to the discussion of various aspects of separation and the likely objections that can be made against it.

In this book the communal problems which the Sikh minority and the Hindu minority present in the Punjab have also been taken up. In the parts, dealing with the Sikhs and the exclusion of the Eastern Hindu tracts of Ambala Division, etc., from the Punjab, we have tried to bring home to the reader the various results that can be achieved by the exclusion of the Sikh areas and the said Eastern Hindu tracts or the latter alone from the Punjab, both with exchange of population as well as without it and their bearing on the communal problem which exists so acutely in the province.

As the main theme of this book is the separation of the North-West Muslim Block from India, we have made only a passing reference to the Muslims of other parts of the sub-continent, to show how by mere separation of the North-West Muslim Block and the Muslim Bengal and Assam, without even resorting to exchange of population, 48,714,657 Muslims can escape Hindu domination. If these Muslim zones constitute themselves into two separate states, there would be 28,963,343 Muslims left out in Hindu India. In the interests of the further spread of Islam in India, we do not look with favour on their immigration. We emphasise the need of separation, because the balance of communal powers, under the present scheme of things, is too much shifted to the

side of the Hindus and except "communal equilibrium", there is no other solution of the complicated Hindu-Muslim problem.

The problem facing the Muslims in India is like the three-headed monster, Cerberus. Its three heads being,

(1) the present Muslim politics are full of puzzles, paradoxes, contradictions and conflicts of loyalties on account of which the Muslims are divided amongst themselves and are leading an agitated life which can no longer be endured;

(2) the strength of the Muslim majorities is not reflected in the legislatures of their provinces as clearly as the strength of the Hindus is reflected in the Hindu provinces; and

(3) in a common India, the Muslims being economically and numerically weaker than the Hindus, their cultural and economic interests are open to serious dangers at the hands of the latter.

The worth of any scheme claiming to provide a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem should be judged according to the measure of relief it promises in respect of the above-mentioned dangers and difficulties. There are a few such schemes. Most prominent among them are four. They are all to a greater or lesser degree based on the principle of separation. We would not be digressing far from the main topic of our discussion, in making a brief reference to them to find out their worth according to the above-mentioned criterion. The first scheme

is the one put forward by Syed Abdul Latif, generally known as the Cultural Zones Scheme. From the theoretical point of view this scheme is perfect but on the practical side it is open to serious objections some of which are as follows :—

(1) It involves exchange of population on so large a scale that at least two-third population of the whole of India will be affected by it. In many cases inhabitants of one part of the country shall have to be shifted to another, over prohibitive distances.

(2) It ignores the fact that climatically India is diversified and in the event of exchange of population the climate of one region may not suit the inhabitants of another.

(3) Indian revenues cannot bear the expenditure involved in exchange of population as contemplated under the scheme.

(4) It suggests that some British areas and a large number of British subjects inhabiting them may be exchanged with some state areas and state subjects. There is no moral justification why a people who have so far been governed by the democratic principle should be passed under autocratic rule.

(5) The author has conveniently closed his eyes to a few realities, namely, the All India National Congress and the well-awakened Hindu community while suggesting that a long strip of the country extending to the port of Madras and

a large area around Calcutta, which are prominently Hindu tracts, may be included in the Muslim zones of Hyderabad and Bengal, respectively.

(6) It aims at the complete withdrawal of Muslim population from Hindu zones, a factor which is detrimental to the further spread of Islam in India.

(7) Last but not the least if the Muslim North-West zone is created on the lines suggested by the Syed Sahib, canal heads of some important Irrigation Projects of the Punjab, will be left out in the adjoining Hindu zone.

We can only say that some features of the scheme are not practicable while others have no moral justification. In its nature the scheme is quietly aggressive.

The second scheme of some importance is that which is generally known as the Regional Federation Scheme. We are not sure as to who is the author of this scheme. But some people, as we understand, ascribe it to some dignitaries of the Punjab Unionist Party. In any case the scheme is stratospherical in its origin. As it is still shrouded in the clouds, we are not in a position to criticise it, to find out its worth. We cannot even say with exactitude what are its prominent features. Somehow or other it has leaked out that its author proposes to treat the Punjab inclusive of Hindu tracts of the Ambala Division, Kangra district, Una and Garhshankar tahsils of the Hoshiarpur district and all the non-

Muslim Punjab states as one regional unit. We also understand, that he claims that by his scheme the control of the centre over the regional units will become very much reduced, by means of which the Muslims will escape Hindu domination. So far as the Muslim North-West, which is the main subject of our discussion is concerned, we fear that with the inclusion in it of the Non-Muslim Hindu areas of the Eastern Punjab our difficulties would enormously increase. We must consider whether under such a scheme we should have to coax and pamper these non-Muslim states continuously in order to win their good-will on every issue that might arise between the Hindus and the Muslims. Even if we concede that their economic interests are common with us and that on economic issues they would stand with us, would not their sentiments go with the Hindus of the rest of India on cultural and communal questions? Would it not divide the allegiance of these non-Muslim states and areas between the territorial unit to which they would belong politically and the social whole of which they form a part culturally? We seek simplification of our politics. Inclusion of these non-Muslim tracts in the Muslim regional unit of the Punjab would mean retention of a permanent element of friction within our body-politic. It would amount to consenting to grant the present puzzles and paradoxes of Muslim politics a further lease in agitating and poisoning the life of the Muslim

community. We should aim at securing an overwhelming Muslim majority in our parts of the country and this can only be done by diluting the non-Muslim minority as much as may be practicable. The regional federation scheme does not promise to reduce the minority strength in the Muslim North-West. It sounds more like a suggestion for jumping out of the frying pan into the fire than a promise of salvation. Under this scheme, in the regional unit of the Punjab, while the population percentage of the Muslims will fall to about 53 from the present 56·7, that of the Hindus and Sikhs will rise from 24 to 26 and 12·9 to 15, respectively.

Moreover, the scheme is apologetic in its nature and fails to remove or even reduce the difficulties which are facing the Muslims at present. The worth of any scheme claiming to provide a solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem, must be judged according to the test we have laid down, namely, it must simplify our politics, it must reduce the clash of loyalties from which we are suffering in a common India, it must restore the balance of communal powers, and it must guarantee our cultural and economic interests.

The third is Mr. Asadullah's scheme. It aims at giving the Northern India to the Muslims and the Southern India to the Hindus. The author recommends that whole of the Hindu population inhabiting the Northern India may be relegated to and crammed in the Southern India and the Muslim

population of the Southern India be withdrawn into the Northern India. This again means exchange of population on a very large scale, which as we have pointed out in the case of Syed Abdul Latif's scheme, is not a practical proposition. Like the Syed Sahib's scheme, it is also aggressive and has no moral justification in its support.

The fourth scheme which claims our attention is the result of the combination of our proposal of a tripartite confederation of three federations, namely, the Muslim North-West, the Muslim Bengal and the Hindu India, and the improvement suggested upon it by Nawab Sir Mohammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, which is to the effect that two more federations, one comprising the Rajistan states and the other constituded by some of the Deccan states, may also be created in addition to the three federations mentioned above so that there may be a quinquepartite instead of a tripartite confederacy. According to this scheme, the present sub-continent of India can be split up into various countries on the following lines and reassembled in a confederacy of India:—

(1) The Indus Regions' Federation, with the Punjab (minus its Eastern Hindu tracts), the Sind, the N.-W. F. P., Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala and Malirkotla as its federal units.

(2) The Hindu India Federation with the

United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar with some portions of Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay and the Indian states other than the Rajistan and Deccan states included in the States' Federations, as its federal units.

(3) The Rajistan Federation with the various states of Rajputana and Central India as its federal units.

(4) The Deccan States' Federation comprising the Hyderabad, Mysore and Baster states.

(5) The Bengal Federation: The prominent Muslim tracts of the Eastern Bengal and Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam as its provincial unit and Tripara and other states lying within the provincial unit or cut off by its territories from the Hindu India, as its state units.

Reshaping the map of the Indian sub-continent in accordance with the above suggestion would necessitate:—

(1) either creation of a new province consisting of the Ambala Division, Kangra district, Una and Garhshankar tahsils of the Hoshiarpur district, and the Chief Commissioner's province of Delhi, etc., or inclusion of all these Hindu areas in the United Provinces;

(2) inclusion of the prominently Hindu parts of the Western Bengal in Behar or Orissa;

(3) inclusion of the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam in the Muslim Bengal;

(4) leaving a corridor in the North of the


present district of Goalpara of Assam in order to connect the Hindu province of Assam with the Hindu Federation of the Hindu provinces;

(5) giving a similar corridor to the Deccan States' Federation through the Hindu Federation in order to link Hyderabad State with Mysore State; and

(6) giving a corridor to the Rajistan Federation to connect with it, its federal unit of the Patiala State. Half ot this corridor can be taken from Hindu India and the other half from Indusstan.

All these changes involve only alteration of some of the provincial boundaries. Compared to Syed Abdul Latif's scheme it is simpler and can be carried out more easily. It involves no injustice to any party or any breach of the canons of justice. It promises to restore the balance of communal powers, which is at present too much shaken in favour of the Hindus, without being in any way aggressive; to ensure Muslim interests, whether cultural or economic against all dangers at the hands of the said community and to simplify politics on both sides.

In a confederation of India on the lines chalked out above, each federation joining it can have a governor-general with the governors of its provincial units under him, responsible to the central confederal authority in relation to the confederal subjects and matters relating to the rights and obligations of the Crown in respect of the Indian states within the



MAP SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF INDIA ON THE BASIS OF QUINQUEPARTITE CONFEDERACY.

federation. The confederal authority can be vested in the Viceroy, assisted by a confederal assembly consisting of members drawn from the various Indian Federations. The number of such members to be drawn from a federation can be fixed according to its importance judged from the point of view of its significance to the confederacy as regards its geographical situation in the sub-continent, population, area and economic position, etc. Foreign relations, defence, and matters relating to water-supply from the common natural sources, and rights and obligations of the Crown in relation to the Indian states (which may join any of the British provinces' Federations), can be entrusted to their governor-generals, who will be responsible to the Viceroy. The various federations joining the confederacy can either directly contribute towards the revenues of the confederacy or assign some portions of their revenues from some specific heads towards its expenses.

We may also point out here that under no circumstances should the Muslim-North West consent to assign customs as a source of the confederal revenues. Such an assignment would mean no control over the tariff policy. In the case of the customs remaining a central subject the Muslims of the North-West would permanently ruin all their future prospects of industrialization. It would also adversely affect their other economic interests.

This idea of a binational, trilingual and quinque-

partite confederation, may be novel and unprecedented in history but it is not impracticable. Strange maladies yield to stranger remedies. The political problem of India is unique. The solution, therefore, must also be unique. A reduced Hindu minority and Kashmir State with a Muslim population and a Hindu Raja in the federated North-West, will form a guarantee, for the security of the Muslim minority and Hyderabad State with Hindu population and a Muslim Nizam in Hindu India and *vice versa.* By it the Muslims can hope to enjoy perfect security against Hindu aggression in their own parts, the Hindus can have their own regions fully reserved for themselves and most of the native states who are at present hesitating to join the Indian Federation as contemplated in the Act of 1935, on account of the fear of too much control from the centre (in other words control of the Congress over them), can be immune against it in their own federations. It will not appeal only to that party which may have designs against the other or others. In all the other countries of the world where the communities failed to live together, peacefully seperation was ultimately resorted to as the safest course. It is recent history that Ulster was separated from the rest of Ireland. The break up of the Empire of Austria-Hungary is another case in point. The splitting up of Syria by the French was also due to similar reasons. And we know that the English also wanted to apply the same principle of separation to the case of Palestine and to divide it

among the Arabs and the Jews. The same principle worked over the disappearance of the Czech-Slovak union and put Czechoslovakia under the Germans.

The principle of separation, if judged impartially, laying aside all vanities, is beneficial for all parties concerned, the English, the Hindus, the Muslims and the rulers of the various Indian states. It is a defensive measure and not an offensive step against the Hindus. It does not mean breaking up the geographical unity of the Indian sub-continent by tearing it up into pieces and assigning them to the communities on the population and cultural basis. It simply means internal partition effected between the various members of a joint-family without breaking their mutual bond of relationship. Consequently separation means assigning different parts of the sub-continent to different communities on a cultural basis and their reunion in a confederacy. The purpose of separation in this sense is not division but union, to be achieved by the simplification of the present complicated political situation, in which each community is too much in the way of the other's cultural and economic progress. Separation will allow the communities a wider range of opportunities to develop and to achieve their respective cultural ideals by reducing the chances of mutual jealousies, interference and communal friction.

It is open to the Hindus to agree or to disagree with the proposal of a confederacy of Hindu India and Muslim India. But certainly they are not entitled

to oppose separation of the Muslim Regions from Hindu India. Confederation depends upon the will of the parties concerned but in case one of them happens to disagree with the plan of confederation, this does not mean that it is morally within its rights in standing in the way of the other's seeking complete separation of its regions. Self-determination in their own regions is the birthright of the Muslims. Constitutionally as well as morally no power can deprive them of this right. In the case of there being unreasonable opposition even to the separation of the Muslim Regions from Hindu India, the Muslims will be within their rights in going to all extremes and in trying all methods open to them to achieve it.

The English have realized that they cannot keep India under them for all time to come. Now strategy and diplomacy only help them in getting their lease over India extended by decades and not by centuries, as was the case in the beginning of the British rule. The Muslims, therefore, should be ready for any emergency at any time and should not depend upon the English, for all time to come, to protect them against Hindu aggression. If the English had been sure of their strength against the Hindus, certainly they would not have let down the Muslims, in the way, they did, when the 1935 Constitution was being framed. In a way the 1935 constitution is a bargain between them and the Hindus at the cost of the Muslims. By it the Hindus

(British subjects and state subjects) secured control against the Muslims at the centre and the English secured the aid of the Indian states in insuring an abiding influence over India.

We should also make it clear to those Muslim separationists, who want separation in order to link their destinies with states outside the Indian sub-continent, that in demanding separation we should not be inspired by any such extra-territorial ideals, ambitions, or affinity. We should be separationists-*cum*-confederationists, and if the Hindus disagree with the idea of a confederacy of Hindu India, and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India without any link between them. We should desire separation simply because we want to evolve a happier and more contented India, whether it be by separation of the Hindu cultural zones and Muslim cultural zones to be linked together in a confederacy, quite independent of and separate from each other except for the confederal bond, or complete separation in order to constitute our regions into federated states independently and separately from Hindu India. The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it. And it is for this reason that we have abstained from using the word "Pakistan" and have instead used the word "Indusstan" to denote the North-West Muslim

Block. "Pakistan" is a term which has somehow or other, gathered round itself some unwholesome and alien associations which are far from our mind.

We should also warn the Muslims that in the beginning of every movement, there always creep in political adventurers, who exploit the movement for their own personal ends and objects. If it happened in our case also then it would mean playing into the hands of the intermediary apes who may tantalize and procrastinate for an unconscionably long time. We must be on guard against political opportunism.

Times are changing fast and before long self-assumed leaderships and self-styled organizations will not count. Nothing will be of any avail unless the Muslims really become a well-knit, compact body represented by a party having its roots in their very hearts. Mass contact and intensive working among the Muslims is urgently required. The Muslim aristocracy, in their own interest, should now step down from their high pedestal and discharge the moral obligations which they owe to their brethren, the Muslim masses. Without the Muslim masses they would be nowhere. If they continued to remain inert, as they have been so far, at the most one more generation of theirs, would be able to keep their position intact. By helping the movement, they would, in fact, safeguard their own interests and will not be doing any special favour to the Muslim masses.

We must also change our political tactics and

methods. After the Mutiny of 1857, the policy we adopted, was of catering to the wishes of those whose wishes count. New times require a bolder policy. Our policy should be cooperation on terms of equality with reciprocal promises of support. We should no longer beg favours and concessions. We should demand our rights. In order to promote his own interests the big partner is bound to help us in the achievement of our objectives. The rôle of an agent in politics does more harm than good. So far we have been sowing in scratches made with our finger nails. Now we must sow deep. And also we must not think that the other parties are fools and cannot see through the game. Often those who start with regarding others as fools, ultimately find that they themselves have been the fools. We must discover men with honesty of purpose and sincerity of heart, who could strike boldy. Honesty, sense of justice, boldness, foresight, sagacity, sacrifice, patience, perseverance and fortitude are the essentials, for making a project, a success. We must remember that we have to build a nation. We have to raise it out of the ashes of its past. Our every failure must teach us a lesson and we must proceed in its light. Our defeats should intensify our desire for victory.

It is the duty of those who happen to be at the helm of affairs to read the signs of the times, rise to the occasion, and no longer be content with remaining figureheads. If they will not rise to the occasion, they can continue to be somebodies for

some time without achieving any substantial results. Ultimately they will be thrown out as worthless stuff, unworthy of the nation's trusts, wasters of the national time. Their inertness will lead to their own destruction while to the nation it will cause loss of some valuable time, for which they will be held responsible by the coming generations.

Often the dispirited amongst us allege that separation will offend this party or that party. Are we to be afraid of opposition? We should demand separation as our right and not as a favour that may depend upon the good wishes of anybody. We should be determined to fight for separation and not to beg for it as a special concession.

As the position of the Muslims is strong both in the North-West and in Bengal, the questions of their separation from Hindu India should be taken up simultaneously. In case Hindu India disagrees with the confederacy proposal, we should be prepared to separate our regions, without any link between them and Hindu India. Separation alone can save us and we should be prepared to get it at any cost. No doubt our struggle is difficult but our success is sure.

CHAPTER I

HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS

LOCAL CONGRESS IN THE NORTH-WESTERN MUSLIM BLOCK

THE Local Congress in the North-Western Muslim Block of India is mostly constituted by the Hindus who are nationalist by professions and communalist by practice. To all intents and purposes, to them nationalism denotes the revival of Hindu culture, Hindu supremacy in India and the replacement of the white bureaucracy by their own brown one. To them, in theory, the membership of the nation includes all communities but in practice only the Hindu community. They are unwilling to give up the undue advantage which they, and those whom they represent, possess over the poor Muslim masses. Although they do very much desire that the Muslims should accept their leadership and lend them their unstinted support, yet they do not wish that such items of any nation-building programme as may be expected to help their sister community should be carried out in practice. Unlike the Hindu Mahasabha they do not profess in so many words the complete reservatíon of India for the Hindus alone, but they do all that is likely to help the cause of Hindu religious and economic nationalism at the cost of the Muslims.

In the Punjab, the local Congress has always showed a special solicitude and partiality towards the communal Hindus. Their duplicity in this behalf has clearly been proved by their conduct in the local legislatures. In the local legislature of the Punjab there never has been a measure of any economic significance to the Muslim agricultural masses which was supported by its Congress members. Only recently when some agrarian enactments were under the consideration of the Punjab Legislative Assembly did many local Congressmen appear in their true colours. On these bills the Congress opposition were divided amongst themselves. Some voted for, and others, mostly non-agriculturists, against those measures. During the lifetime of the previous Punjab Legislative Council, on all legislative measures relating to rural indebtedness and protection of agricultural interests, they have been adopting an attitude of neutrality, on the plea that it was against their policy to take part in matters likely to raise communal issues. Since the introduction of 1919 Reforms, on account of their conduct they have laid themselves open to suspicion in the eyes of the local Muslims in general.

If we look at the history of the Congress for the last fifty-five years of its existence, we find that the local Congress leaders in the Muslim provinces have been mostly Hindus and that they have never made any serious attempt to convert the Muslims to the Congress ranks. Even at present, their main

activities are directed towards the conversion of the Ambala Division Hindus, Urban Hindus and the Sikhs of the Central Punjab to the ranks of the Congress. This can be attributed either to lack of confidence in their own resourcefulness in promoting the creed of the Congress among the Muslims or to dishonest motives in keeping them out of the Congress so as to permanently get the local Congress leadership into their own hands: for they know that if the Muslim masses joined the Congress the Hindu leadership of the local Congress would be replaced by the local Muslim Congress leadership—a thing for which they are not prepared. If their not working among the Muslim masses is due to lack of confidence in their own resourcefulness then this lack of confidence in its turn is due to the absence of any mutual understanding and affinity with the Muslims —a factor which is always prominent by its absence between two alien people. And if their avoiding the necessity of converting the Muslim masses to the Congress ranks, is due to the desire of securing the leadership of the local Congress in their own hands, then it is the indication of the existence of some ulterior motives. What could be those ulterior motives? What other than the monopolization of the local Congress to exclude the possibilities of its monopolization by the Muslims, in order that the Hindu communal interests could be protected in case there should arise a need to negative, through sheer force of numbers, any proposals likely to touch them

adversely. Under the circumstances the Muslims cannot be expected to have any confidence in them and are justified in regarding them as friends of the moneylenders, the communalists and the holders of undue advantage over them in the garb of nationalists and advocates of Hindu-Muslim unity.

In the Hindu provinces both the "have-nots" and "haves" are Hindus and the advantages which the "haves" possess in excess of their due share will pass into the hands of the Hindu "have-nots" after the Congress or any other national programme similar to it has been implemented. While in the Muslim provinces the implementing of any such programme would mean dispossession of the Hindus of an advantageous position to the benefit of the Muslims. In the Hindu provinces the Hindu "haves" have at least cultural affinity and natural sympathy with the Hindu "have-nots" and the pinch of delivery of goods to their rightful owners is not as painful as it is in such Muslim provinces where the local Hindus hold Muslim goods in their hands. Hence it can be inferred that the local Congress has ulterior motives in Muslim provinces. What the local Congressmen want in Muslim provinces is to divide the Muslim majorities and to secure for themselves the position of a deciding factor, in order to keep the Muslim parties forming the cabinets always under their influence by making their stability depend upon their support. Their policy is to support the Muslim parties in power in matters

which are likely to strengthen the Congress against the Britisher and to threaten to withdraw their support from them in all issues which are likely to help the Muslim cultural or economic interests.

If communalism is the lack of mutual sympathy between two people who have no cultural and religious affinity with each other, then the local Congress in the North-Western Muslim Block abundantly shows the lack of such a sympathy, more especially when a demand is made by the Muslims for the readjustment of rights between them and the Hindus in general.

THE ALL-INDIA NATIONAL CONGRESS

MUSLIMS co-operated with the Hindus wholeheartedly when the All-India National Congress came into existence in 1885. They took part in its discussions on the occasions of its annual sessions and helped as much as they could to promote it and to co-operate with it. But by the advent of the 20th century the feeling grew among them that their interests were not properly represented by the Congress. And the reasons for the shortcomings which the Congress showed in this respect were quite obvious. "Separation" which is the reality underlying all Hindu-Muslim relations was ignored by the politicians who formed the Congress and who invited the two communities to enter it leaving behind their religions—a physical impossibility for them both, for when a man calls himself a Muslim or a Hindu

he means to say that he is to a greater or lesser degree his religion incarnated. Consequently, soon after the formation of the Congress it was felt that the religions and religious and cultural prejudices of the communities had also entered it along with them. In other words it became clear that the principle of "Separation" which was working all along underneath the Hindu-Muslim relationship could not be conquered. How could the communities which had remained segregated from each other in the social field for centuries, mix and cooperate in the political field? Their respective religions and cultures which were refused admittance in the Congress in theory, could not be kept out in actual practice. The result was that the separatist tendencies which had remained dormant in the first few years after the formation of the Congress, showed themselves and proved that the very presumption on which that body was based was wrong.

HOW THE MUSLIM LEAGUE CAME INTO EXISTENCE

THE result was that men like Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk and others felt the need of creating an independent Muslim organization to represent the Muslims in the political life of the country. Consequently, in 1906, the All-India Muslim League was formed.

SEPARATE REPRESENTATION

IN 1908 Nawab Moshin-ul-Mulk thought of sending a deputation to the then Governor-General of India,

to press upon him the grave necessity of separate representation for the Muslims in the various Government departments and local bodies. The Congress also approved of his resolve and endorsed the point of view of the Muslim League in demanding separate representation for the Muslims. Consequently a deputation led by H. H. The Agha Khan waited upon the Governor-General. The demand they made in respect of separate representation also met his approval. In 1909 the Congress, which only a year back had approved of the idea of separate representation for the Muslims, recoiled and condemned the demand of the League as anti-national. Notwithstanding their condemnation the principle of separate representation was accepted and incorporated in the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909.

The Congress and the League continued to function as separate bodies up to the year 1916 when they compromised on the terms stipulated in the Lucknow or the League-Congress Pact. In this pact the principle of separate representation for the Muslims was recognized as a suitable device for securing inter-communal harmony and the joint progress of Hindus and Muslims. The terms of this pact were embodied in the 1919 Reforms. After these reforms were introduced and steps were taken to implement the terms of the pact, a Hindu communal group, namely, the Hindu Mahasabha condemned the principle of separate representation and the pact that

was based on it. This was the beginning of communalism in an intensive form. Riots, Shudhi and Tabligh movements were its natural off-spring. The mutual distrust which had remained suppressed up till now on account of there being a common enemy, British Imperialism, and which was also removed to some extent by the non-cooperation movement of 1919, was reborn amongst the communities. The Congress which was a party to the Lucknow Pact was let down and for the time being the Hindu Mahasabha dominated everywhere in the country. The Congress did not take, rather it was incapable of taking, any practical steps to condemn the attitude of the communal-minded Mahasabhaites. The Muslims were left in the lurch and they had to fight the aggressive Mahasabha without any practical support from the Congress. The Congress can at the most claim that Mr. Gandhi and some other Congress leaders gave a verdict first at Lahore and later at Simla in favour of the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain, who at the time was trying to implement the terms of the Lucknow Pact in the Punjab, and that this amounted to a virtual condemnation of the Mahasabha. Muslims did not expect a verbal verdict only in favour of the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain's policy as based on the Lucknow Pact, or a verbal denunciation of the Mahasabha's attitude. Since the Congress was a party to the pact, they expected it to observe its sanctity by supporting the cause of the Muslims who had become victims of the

malicious propaganda of the Mahabasha. They attributed this attitude of the Congress to its weakness or connivance, for the the Congress, being mostly a Hindu body, was suspected of being partial towards the communal Hindus.

Sometimes, to establish the impartiality of the Congress, the Congressites urge that the communal leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malavia, were turned out from it notwithstanding the fact that they had rendered valuable services in promoting its cause. But the Muslims' opinion about this affair, to which they refer is, that it had become necessary to take action against the rank communalists. They were turned out not because the heart of the Congress had burnt at the injustices which were done to the Muslims by the communal-minded Hindu Congressites but, because in view of its creed and also to keep up appearances in respect of its impartiality (at least before men such as the late Maulana Mohammad Ali, who had proved themselves as valuable assets to it and had begun to doubt the *bona-fides* of the Hindu Congressites who formed its main bulk), it had become incumbent upon the Congress to remove the notoriously communal element from its ranks. The explusion of the rank communalists was not on account of the Congress but inspite of the Congress. Even if we concede that expulsion of the openly comunalists from the Congress was effected as a penal action against them, how can they explain the fact that a mere formality like this

was expected to restore the shaken confidence of the Muslims in the Congress when it had not raised even its little finger in support of the Muslims against the communal Hindus in the twenties of the present century, when they were tearing the Lucknow Pact to pieces? The Muslims considered that it was the bounden duty of the Congress to stand by them and give them practical help in the predicament in which they were placed in those years of communal outbreaks. As a party to the Lucknow Pact, it ought to have helped the Muslims against the communal Hindus but it did not. As already mentioned, the Muslims argue that if it was on account of its weakness against the communal Hindus, it is no use to have any pact or alliance with such a body. And if it was on account of its cultural affinity with the communal Hindus then it stands condemned by its own action and it is dangerous to repeat the experiment of a pact with such a body.

That is how the Muslims' acute distrust of the Congress was born and they began to regard it as not even truly representative of all classes of Hindus, for otherwise it should have been able to enforce that pact upon them all uniformly. Such was the sad but natural end of the only national pact which India could produce.

THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCES

AGAIN during the three Round Table Conferences attempts were made to reconcile the communities,

but they came to nothing. Unity talks like the one between Mr. Jinnah and Baboo Rajindra Prasad have been so frequent that it has shaken the faith of the people in them and they have begun to regard their failure as certain.

The Congress in its session of 1936 invited Muslims to join it unconditionally through the mouth of its President Pt. Jawahar Lal. Muslims looked upon that invitation with suspicion. They thought that the Congress was afraid of the overwhelmingly communal element in its ranks and did not want that there should again be a split among the Hindus over a new pact, which would naturally be based on the principle of separate representation or the settlement of the rights of the communities in a united India. It does seem probable that the invitation of the Congress to the Muslims to join it unconditionlly was due mainly to such fears and also to its inherent diffidence in its ability to enforce any such pact uniformly on all Hindus. Now, can it be said that the League is not the sole representative of the Muslims or the Congress is the sole representative of Hindus? No Muslim group ever condemned the League-Congress Pact of 1916 as unauthorised. While an overwhelming majority of the Hindus did not only condemn it as unauthorised but also nullified it as shown above.

During the recent unity talks Mr. Jinnah was very harshly rebuked by the Hindu press for insist-

ing that any pact arrived at between the Congress and the League should not only bear the signatures of the Congress leaders but also those of Mahasabha leaders such as Pandit Madan Mohan Malavia and Dr. Monje. The reasons for making this demand are not far to seek. The sad end of the Lucknow Pact would lead any sensible man to see that any new pact made with the Muslims, should be really made on behalf of the Hindus, bearing the signatures of Hindu leaders of all shades of opinion. His insistence on having the pact signed by both the Congress leaders as well as the Mahasabha leaders was, therefore, quite justified. The Lucknow Pact was almost nullified by the Mahasabha by starting an agitation against it and contending the authority of the Congress to enter into that pact on behalf of all Hindus. What guarantee is there that in case a second pact is concluded with the Congress under the impression that it is the sole representative of the Hindus, it would not be nullified by the communal Hindus as they nullified the first one? The possible reply of the Congress to it, that the Congress of to-day is quite different from the Congress of bygone days, that now it is far stronger than before and that there is no longer any fear of the Mahasabha or any other communal body nullifying any new pact arrived at between them and the Muslims, is fallacious. Against the communal Hindus the Congress is as weak as it was in the twenties of the present century. The Hindu supporters of the

Congress make it strong in order that it may snatch more and more concessions for themselves from the English and not snatch concessions from their own hands for a rival community, wrongly called a sister community.

Whenever there is a question of giving any concessions to the Muslim minority, which is culturally and religiously different from the Hindus, they do not hesitate to withdraw all their support from the Congress. On such occasions the Congress is miserably let down. There is much wisdom in Mr. Jinnah's seemingly fantastic demand that the pact whether on the lines of the previous Lucknow Pact or not should also bear the signatures of the Hindu communal leaders, for it is they who can make or mar a pact as has already been amply demonstrated by them in the case of the League-Congress Pact of 1916. The Congress is not and would not be in a position to comply with such a demand. How can it get the signatures of the leaders of an organization which is quite separate from and independent of it? But the Muslims in making any such demand will always be justified, for any pact between the League and the Congress, and not amongst the League, the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha, cannot have any binding force and will always tend to divide the house of the Congress against itself on account of the presence of a large communal element in its ranks. The following passage from a resolution passed by the Hindu Mahasabha at Nasik on May

30, 1938, is a clear index to the attitude which that body will adopt towards any pact between the Congress and the League :—

" The Working Committee reiterates as emphatically as possible its protest against any attempt on the part of the Congress to enter into any agreement, whatsoever, with Muslims, in the name of Hindustan as a whole. It will be a sheer misrepresentation to call it a Hindu-Muslim agreement and cannot be binding on Hinduism as a whole unless and until Hindu Mahasabha which alone represents the Hindu community is consulted and sanctions such issues as are raised in such an agreement under their own hands and seals . . . . Finally the Hindu Mahasabha warns the Government that for these reasons, it should not recognize any Congress-League agreement as a Hindu-Muslim settlement or procceed to frame consitutional changes on that basis."

The Hindu Mahasabha is right in all that it has urged in the above resolution and we endorse it word by word. The Congress does not represent all the Hindus on communal questions, though it does represent a vast majority of them against the British Imperialism. The sad end of the League-Congress Pact of 1916 is before us and it amply proves the contention of the Mahasabha. It also shows that the threat and warning contained in the above passage from a resolution of the Mahasabha should not be

treated lightly. The Mahasabha is right because it represents the true feelings of the Hindus towards Muslims and as such is in a position to do or undo the attempts of the Congress at unity. The inner feelings of a large number of Congressmen also go with the Hindu Mahasabha.

CONGRESS POLICY

MOREOVER, the attitude of the Congress towards the Muslims in various provinces is not uniform. Its behaviour towards the Muslims of provinces of the Punjab, Sind and Bengal should form the basis for judging its intentions towards them in general and not its conduct towards them in the N.W.F.P. Certainly its conduct towards the Muslims of the Punjab, Sind and Bengal is different from what it is towards the Muslims of the N.W.F.P., or the rest of India. In the N.W.F.P. it flatters the local Muslims, in the rest of India it ignores them and in the Punjab, Sind and Bengal, by its connivance it encourages the local communal-minded Hindus always to stand up in arms against the Muslim majorities. In the N.W.F.P. it flatters the local Muslims because the Hindus have little stake there and the English a great interest on account of its being a border province. In Hindu provinces it ignores them because there it is confident of its strength *vis-a-vis* the Muslims. In the Punjab, Sind and Bengal it connives at the communal activities of the Hindus because the Hindu community have a sufficient

stake in these provinces. As already mentioned, under the excuse of not taking part in matters likely to raise communal issues, the adoption of an attitude of neutrality during the last 18 years by the Congress members of the Punjab Legislative Council, towards all measures aiming at the relief of the agriculturists, who are mostly Muslims, is a clear indication of its connivance at the antagonism of the communal Hindu opposition towards measures which had numerous precedents behind them and were in force in Hindu provinces. The disparity in the Congress attitude towards the Muslims of various parts of the country is another reason for their suspecting its *bona fides*.

MR. GANDHI

THEN the conduct of Mr. Gandhi in retiring from the Congress to carry on his Harijan work and at the same time remaining supreme authority in that organization is not without significance. What is the reason for playing this double role? He retired from the Congress to consolidate the position of the Hindu community internally by permanently bridging over the soical gulf between the 16 crore high castes and 8 crore low castes and to remove all chances of the latter's leaving the Hindu fold by the removal of the social disabilities from which they are suffering at present on account of the pernicious caste system. In other words he retired from active politics to ensure the solid ¾ Hindu majority against ¼ Muslim minority instead of the

present $\frac{1}{2}$ secure and $\frac{1}{4}$ insecure Hindu majority against the same $\frac{1}{4}$ Muslim minority. Had he taken this step without first nominally retiring from the Congress he, and on account of him the whole Congress, would have unreservedly made themselves open to the criticism that they are communal. So it was necessary for him, in view of its creed to nominally withdraw himself from the Congress without actually dissociating from it. Would not such a conduct make any community, which is in the position of the Muslims, suspicious of the *bona fides* of the Congress? A point worth noting in this connection is that Mahatma Gandhi, who was little perturbed at the time when the Lucknow Pact was being torn to pieces by the communal Hindus, became very much upset over a question likely to cause a split between the high castes and low castes, who together constitute $\frac{3}{4}$ Hindu majority against the Muslim minority and could even threaten to starve himself to death, and in fact actually did starve for weeks together until a decision was reached according to his wishes. No inspired fast of Mr. Gandhi came to the rescue of the League-Congress pact. We do not grudge his concern for the Harijans or his attempts to raise up a down-trodden section of his community. We rather very much appreciate it. We make mention of it simply in order to point out the disparity between his conduct on two various occasions, one relating to an actual split

between the Hindus and Muslims (who according to him constitute the Indian nation) after their differences had been settled by a pact, and the other to a likely split in the Hindu fold. Could the absence of feeling in one case and its abundant presence in the other be ascribed to nationalism ?

It appears that when the parties to an issue are Hindus, he unhesitatingly declares a hunger-strike in order to coerce the one who happens to be the aggressor into submitting to his wishes and decision. But when it is a matter between the Hindus and the Muslims and the former happen to be the aggressors, he never resorts to a threat of fasting to death. This is because either he knows that such a threat can achieve desirable results only in the former case and not in the latter case, or because he intentionally abstains from getting justice done to the Muslims when they happen to be the aggrieved party, by one of his inspired fasts. In other words his conception of "justice" is relative to the Hindu society and he does not believe in moral justice, the very basis of ethics.

UNITY TALKS

THE very fact that the Congress has so many times made attempts to effect a compromise with the Muslims, shows the inconsistency of its claim that it represents both the Hindus and Muslims equally. If it had really been the true representative of the Muslims as it is of the Hindus, the League could never have

come into existence. If "the All-India National Congress" had been the name of the union of the Mahasabha and the League, the case would have been quite different and one could have understood that the unity talks that occasionally take place between the leaders of the League and the Congress are talks between two groups within the same organization for the readjustment of their respective rights and privileges. But the position of the Congress becomes untenable, when on the one hand it claims to be representative of the Muslims and on the other readily engages itself in unity talks with another political organization with rival claims to the representation of the Muslims. If the Congress really believes that it is representative of the Muslims then why does it feel the necessity for effecting a compromise with the League? The reply of the Congress to this criticism can only be that since the League exists and has also some following, there are chances of its being used by the foreigner as a tool to exploit the situation against national interests. To reduce such chances it wants to rope in the League by effecting a compromise with it. But the question is, will it make the position of the Congress any better, when according to it a large number of the Muslims are not with the League and are also not with it, as is borne out by facts? Yes, so far as appearances could be deceptive. But will it also prove the *bona fides* of the Congress? No.

HINDU MAHASABHA

ANOTHER interesting point in the politics of the Congress is that whereas it has so many times attempted to effect a compromise with the Muslims, it has never seriously tried to convert the Hindu Mahasabha to its ranks. Is it because the Hindu Mahasabha wants to remain out of it or is it because the Congress purposely intends to keep that body independent of itself so that it may have a free hand in consolidating the Hindu community as a separate entity? It raises doubts as to the sincerity of the Congress. Muslims think that either the Congress is afraid of the Mahasabha (and in its heart of hearts admits that that body enjoys the confidence of the Hindus more than it does and so abstains from touching it), or that it intentionally wants that there should be a communal organization independent of it, to devote attention to the development of those aspects of the life of the Hindus which it is not open to it to touch. The curious fact that the Congress has never earnestly made an attempt to abolish or at least to effect a compromise with the Mahasabaha does constrain one to think that the Hindu community as a whole does not want to have all its eggs in the same basket.

However sincerely the Congress may try the impossibility of including the Muslims and Hindus in the same Indian nation, its efforts in this direction cannot succeed. Nowhere in India is the unity

of culture, language, traditions, martial ideals and the community of economic interests present between the Hindus and Muslims. There is not the slightest excuse for calling them a homogeneous people. The Mahasabha is right in maintaining that the Muslims cannot be members of the Hindu nation, although on account of the special circumstances which prevail in India, they can be admitted to the membership of the Indian Hindu State. No doubt Hindus and Muslims can be the members of the same state. But even such a political association would not be advisable in view of the cultural, religious and traditional differences which have divided them for centuries. Can they forget their past rivalries? In a common state the communal differences may be suppressed in the beginning by a conscious effort but this will continually add to the state of tension on both sides. No effort on their part will be able to obliterate traditional influences, which will admit pressure to a certain extent and then will produce a violent reaction leading to a civil war. The Congress must not look to the immediate future alone but should also have an eye on the remote future, the foundations of which have already been laid. The natural inclinations and tendencies of the communities must not be ignored. The dictates of communalism must be respected and carried out if possible in a pleasant way. Let the communities separate with a kiss instead of a kick.

RIVALRY

THE major communities are rivals for political power and the rivalry between them is bound to continue so long as one is not completely absorbed by the other. No power in the world can establish friendly relations between them at the same time keeping them as Hindus and Muslims. Their traditions have been built at each others' cost. The defeat of the one has been the victory of the other and their past, at least for the last one thousand years, is dotted with incidents which do not signify the same thing to them both. What one has recorded as its brilliant success, the other has registered as a wrong perpetrated against it.

COMPROMISE NOT POSSIBLE

THE Muslims must understand once for all that there cannot be any lasting pact between them and the Hindus. A pact with the Congress alone would be meaningless, while a pact with the Mahasabha is quite unthinkable, for its ideal prevents it from concluding a pact with a people who stand for another culture quite opposed to its own. Here we may also warn the Muslims against the futility of arriving at any pact with the Congress. All the success of this organization, at least, during the last 23 years, has been mostly due to the personality of Mr. Gandhi. After him (we wish him a long life) most of the members of the Congress High Command

will tactlessly appear in their true colours as rank communalists, while the few others who are sincere and honest among them will not show the same knack in handling the political situations as Mr. Gandhi has been showing, and on account of their lack of political sagacity will ruin their cause. What could be the use of a pact which ultimately could have no value? To the Hindus, Hindu-Muslim unity denotes a temporary phase of their political struggle for freedom—a diplomacy to avoid conflict with two rivals at the same time. To them Congress consitutes one front to fight against the English and the Mahasabha another to consolidate their internal position against the Muslims. This means tolerating the Muslims until the time for showing them their place is ripe. The much propagandized claim of the Congress that it represents and treats the Muslims and the Hindus equally, as we have shown, is in reality a platitude to put the Muslims off their guard and to strengthen the position of the Hindus against the English. The answer to the question whether in the event of a communal riot the Congressites—Muslims or Hindus—feel more for their respective communities or for them both equally, if honestly given, would form the crucial test as to whether they are communalists or nationalists. This would also be the criteria for judging whether the Hindus and Muslims form a single nation or are two nations.

We know that during the last few centuries the

Muslims have been on the horns of a dilemma and in recent times more so: To achieve independence, if they side with the Congress which they believe is no better than the Hindu Mahasabha, their economic as well as cultural interests become endangered, on the other hand if they stand out of it in order to keep their integrity intact, they sacrifice their political ideal of independence and agree to perpetual slavery. These two interests can be reconciled by a compromise with the Hindus. But the difficulty in the way of effecting a compromise with the Hindus, as already pointed out, is that they are not a united people. If a pact is concluded with the Congress the Hindu Mahasabha would denounce it as unauthorized. And if the Mahasabha is approached with this purpose the terms on which it would agree to effect a compromise with the Muslims would be such that they would prefer to commit suicide rather than to accept them. Thus so far as the prospects of a pact with the Hindus are concerned the position remains practically unchanged. The failure of Hindu-Muslim political relations as shown, point to the only conclusion that the Muslims will either have to be content with their present state of affairs or will have to discover some new political ideal wherein all clash between their various loyalties may cease. Such an ideal could only be the one in which the territorial loyalties of the Muslims and their allegiance to their faith could find

a happy compromise and which could also ensure to them their economic and cultural interests backed by an unimpaired political power. Discovery of such an ideal would remove the division among their ranks and also the chaos in which their politics have been during the last 300 years. This ideal can be none else than that which separation of the Muslim North-West and Muslim Bengal from the rest of India promises to them.

THE PART WHICH EACH COMMUNITY PLAYED IN EARNING THE REFORMS

IN some quarters the idea prevails that the reforms, the benefits from which the Muslims enjoy equally with the Hindus, were due to the selfless efforts of the Congress (Hindu Congress) alone and that the Muslims had no share in the earning of them. This idea has no historical basis. Rather the historical background of the reforms shows that the reality is quite opposed to it. If we were to refer to the conditions which obtained in India during the years these reforms were earned in order to know how they were earned and who had the greater share in earning them, we should find that the truth about them is not what is alleged by the supporters of the present Congress to impress people with the achievements of this organization. While asserting that the Congress earned the reforms they confuse the Congress of to-day with the Congress of the League-Congress Pact, which lasted from the years 1916 to 1923. All the successes of

the Congress of these years were due to the accident of the said pact which may never repeat itself. It was, therefore, not the present Congress, for whom they canvass, who earned the reforms. It was the Congress of the Muslims and Hindus which earned the reforms and which by chance had the solid foundations of the Lucknow Pact under it.

Now let us try to find out what share each community had and what part it played in earning the reforms during the years 1916-19. The Great War, which broke out in 1914, necessitated the whole-hearted cöoperation of the Indians with the English in order to fight it. Consequently in order to win the cöoperation of India in fighting the war the English had to hold out promises of rewards for sacrifices made and services rendered during the war. The Congress agreed to cöoperate with the English and to support them against the enemy countries. Indians enlisted in the army, mostly from the Muslim North-West and more particularly from the Punjab. The number of the Muslims in the Indian Army, which fought on various fronts in the Great War, far exceeded the number of the Hindus. The part which the Hindus played during this war bears no comparison with the meritorious services which the Muslims rendered. The reforms of 1919 were the reward which the English had promised for the war services of India as a whole, although it was mainly earned by the Muslims. Hence it should be said that it is the Hindus who enjoy the benefit of

the reforms equally with the Muslims (although they did little to earn them) instead of saying that the Muslims enjoy the reforms equally with the Hindus without having earned them. The giving of the credit of earning the reforms to the Congress, meaning thereby the Hindu Congress of to-day, is due the Hindu press propaganda. Well, we do not grudge it. But when looked at from the practical side of the question, it will be seen that the reality is what we have stated.

Now let us look at the same question from the point of view of the agitation which the communities made, when after the war the English showed signs of going back upon their promises *re* reforms. When the war was over and the Allies returned victorious from the battlefield the English regained their sense of security and showed unwillingness to carry out the promises which they had made during the war to the Indians. The Congress which after the Lucknow Pact of 1916 was constituted of both the Hindus and Muslims started on agitation against the English. The Muslims had a double cause of grievance against the English, firstly because they had shown by their conduct—Rowlatt Act—that they wanted to go back upon their promise *re* reforms and secondly because, notwithstanding their (Indian Muslims') appeals with regard to the defeated Turkey, they intended to partition it among the victorious Allies and later when Mustafa Kamal succeeded in establishing a government at Angora, they

instigated Greece in invading it. On account of this they showed more vehemence in carrying out the non-cöoperation movement than their Hindu allies. The whole Muslim North-West was ablaze with anger against the English. They took the most prominent part in the said movement and the Hijrat movement particularly, which was undertaken by them, proved most effective in wrenching reforms from the hands of the English. We need not dwell upon the subject any further. This is the important part of the whole affair, the rest is a matter of detail.

To summarize, in winning the promises for reforms, the Muslims had the greatest share, because the main practical cöoperation which the Hindu-Muslim Congress had promised to the English in fighting in the Great War, had come from them. Then in agitating for the promised reforms, they had an equal, if not bigger, share with the Hindus in courting imprisonment and sustaining loss of life and property—the Hijrat movement destroyed and disrupted many a Muslim family.

Now let us direct attention to the part which the Hindus as a community played in the Great War of 1914. In brief, compared to the Muslims they sent far less numbers to the front, advanced more war loans and got good returns on them. They also earned war profits and many a Hindu of small means became master of estates after the War. In other words in the Great War the Muslims bled and the Hindus traded.

In view of what we have said above it will be clear that the reforms were earned by the Hindu-Muslim Congress of 1916 as based on the League-Congress Pact of that year and not by the present Hindu Congress, which lacks that basis. At the time when the League-Congress Pact was made, the Muslims ought to have insisted on changing the name of the Congress from "The All-India National Congress" to something like "The All-India Hindu-Muslim Congress". If they had done it successfully it would not have been possible to-day for the present Hindu Congress to take undue credit for winning the reforms. The impression that the Congress won the reforms is due to the fact that no change was effected in its name either at the time of the Lucknow Pact when the Muslims joined it or after 1923-24, when the Muslims left it. Those Muslims who confuse the present Congress with the Congress of the Pact and wrongly give credit to the former for what was due to the latter should revise their opinions in the light of the facts mentioned above.

Now let us try to understand the difference between the Hindu Congress of to-day and the Hindu-Muslim Congress which was due to the accident of the Lucknow Pact of 1916. The Hindu-Muslim Congress of the Pact achieved the reforms of 1919 and along with them a promise for a further instalment of reforms after a ten years' working of the first. This means that the reforms of 1935 were

also due to the Hindu-Muslim Congress as above described. If both these instalments of reforms were due to the said Hindu-Muslim Congress then one may legitimately ask what is due to the present Congress or the Congress without the Muslims? To its credit one may put the contents of the Government of India Act of 1935—a constitution which looks more like "the reconquest of India" than a set of reforms in the direction of self-government! All sections of opinion are agreed that the constitution as drafted in the Act of 1935 is most unsatisfactory. No doubt the Congress of to-day as monopolized by the Hindus is much stronger so far as internal discipline and organization are concerned. But this is due to a very natural fact. After the elimination from it of the Muslim element which was responsible for the division among the Hindus, and against whom the communal element, whether within or out of it, was so very much prejudiced, it became solely a Hindu organization and as such inspired them all with confidence. By the undivided support of the Hindus, whom it represents alone at present, and also on account of the removal of the chances of internal dissension among the Hindus as was the case previously (due to the presence of a foreign body like the Muslims in their midst) the Congress of to-day has become more disciplined and organized than before.

COMMUNALISM

THE mutual relations of the Hindu and Muslim masses have always been hostile. The cordial relations subsisting between certain classes among them, so often pointed out by the nationalists as a basis for optimism regarding the future, have in the past as also in the present been alliances of exceptional character, mostly of vested interests. Both the communities are essentially communal-minded and it is natural for them to be so. Two rival cultures existing side by side in the same country must give rise to such antagonistic sentiments as are shown by the Hindus and Muslims towards each other.

COMMUNAL RELATIONS IN THE PAST

IF one were to refer to the pages of past history one would come across innumerable passages like the following :

"They would enter mosques, worship idols there and chant hymns to the accompaniment of musical instruments. The heart of His Most Just Majesty was filled with sorrow when news about this reached him. But since he had no power to stop it, he would act as if such news had never reached his royal ears . . . . . When Ali Adil Shah did not find his forces equal to those of Nizam Shah on the battle-field, he had to seek help from Ram Raja on the condition that the Hindus of Bijapur should not be allowed to feed their fanatical grudge on the Muslims and should not be permitted to

pollute mosques. But things took quite a different turn. The Hindus stopped at nothing in order to harm and humiliate the Muslims and to bring about their utter ruination."

The above passage refers to the Hindu followers of Ram Raja whom Ali Adil Shah had invited to come to his aid against Husain Nizam Shah. It was settled with Ram Raja beforehand that his followers, when in Ali Adil Shah's territory, should not interfere with the life and property of the Muslims. But the Hindus who came to Ahmadnagar indulged in the acts protested against in the above passage by Farishta, a well-known historian of the times.

"When the Imperial standards reached the Gujrat suburbs in the Panjab, some Syeds and holy men of that town made a complaint that some Hindus had free Muslim women in their possession and that some of them had by force converted mosques into their residential houses. On this Sheikh Muhammad of Gujrat, who was a man of rare intellect, was deputed to make inquiries, and in case of the allegations being true, to release the mosques and Muslim women from the possession of the Hindus. He accordingly got back as many as seventy Muslim women from their possession. Wherever a mosque was found in the possession of the Hindus, it was taken back after due inquiries and a sum was realized from them by way of fine and the buildings were restored to their original state. When this was reported to His Majesty Shah Jahan, he was pleased

to ordain that wherever events like those above related might have taken place, action might be taken accordingly. The result was that many Muslim women were released from the possession of the Hindus and were given in marriage to Muslims."

The above passage is from *Shahjahan Nama* written by Abdul Hamid Lahori.

" Hindu governors, collectors, bailiffs and accountants should be discharged and the collection of the government revenues be entrusted to the Muslims. After that it was ordered that among the officials in the Revenue and Treasury Departments the proportion of one Muslim and one Hindu should be maintained."

The above passage is from the history written by Khafi Khan. It shows that monopolization of government offices on the part of our sister community is an old game and even in those times the question of communal representation in services (it may have been only for the benefit of the government) caused a good deal of inconvenience to the rulers.

Such things as referred to in the above passages occurred notwithstanding the fact that the Moghuls did their best to cement relations between the communities and weld them into a single nation. Akbar the Great went so far as to recommend and set examples of inter-communal marriages and to introduce a new faith, Din-i-Ilahi. consisting of all the good principles drawn from almost all religions.

The Moghuls not only allowed Urdu—a compromise between the foreign Persian and the native Prakrits—to develop but also extended their patronage to it by adopting it as their own language although if they had so desired they could have easily imposed Persian on the Indians.

COMMUNALISM—A HERITAGE OF THE PAST

THUS we see communalism is the natural heritage of the past and is not a new phase of our political life. When the advocates of Hindu-Muslim unity say that the English are responsible for bringing into existense communalism, they only indulge in self-deception in order to retain their optimism about an impossible ideal like the one of harmoniously fitting the communities in a single nation. Communalism as shown above existed long before the English came to India. Blaming the English for inventing communalism as an instrument of division is denying the facts of history. The natural relationship between the Hindus and Muslims is communal and not national. Communalism is in their blood. Their common past, so far as communalism is concerned is dark and no whitewashing on the part of the sincere nationalists can falsify history.

THE ARYA SAMAJ

NOW let us turn to the study of the communal problem in more recent times. It is a matter of

common knowledge that after 1875 the Arya Samaj started a campaign of invective against Islam and the Muslims. Heated debates on religious matters took place everywhere in the country between the Arya Samaj preachers and Maulvies and often resulted in a good deal of heart-burning and ill-will among the communities. We also know that the Congress was started as a non-communal body, but within a few years after its coming into existence it became the sole monoply of the communal-minded Hindus and the Muslims had to form the All-India Muslim League to promote their interests.

Next we come to post-war times, when the Hindus and Muslims had a common grievance against their rulers. In those times they united but their union lasted only for a few years. When their demands had been satisfied by the rulers to a certain extent and the question of dividing the loaves and fishes of offices and services among themselves arose, they parted company and started quarrelling among themselves. Riots took place all over India a few years after the reforms of 1919 had been introduced. The period fixed for these reforms drew near to expiry and from 1928 onwards we witness the formation and failure of various committees to evolve common formulæ, the holding of three round-table conferences one after the other and the failure of Hindus and Muslims to come to a settlement.

Eclectically-minded people like Akbar the Great

and Raja Ram Mohan Roy failed to bring the communities together. Philanthropists like Guru Nank and Kabir could not make them religiously tolerant of each other. The noble attempts of such leaders of thought instead of relieving the situation complicated it all the more, for their followers formed themselves into separate groups, with their own particular prejudices. An organization like the Congress, with such vast resources at its disposal, instead of removing the virus of communalism from amongst the Hindu and Muslim masses has itself developed strong communal tendencies.

Attempts to effect a compromise between the two communities have always failed and to repeat them over and over again would be a mistake.

THE MYTH OF A SINGLE NATION

THE basic principle of attempts at building a national India rests on a wrong assumption, namely, that India constitutes one country and Indians form a single nation. All the confusion and chaos which is witnessed all around in the ranks of various political groups especially Muslim, is due to this wrong notion about India and its people. The very presence of communalism in all our ranks shows that Hindus and Muslims are not one nation, but two nations. And since all past and present attempts to suppress communalism have miserably failed we cannot expect that some future day shall see the

communities united into a single nation. Communalism is the violent expression of the general will of the two communities that they are two different entities and that they must separate. Communalism as a form of public opinion should be respected rather than flouted.

It is wrong to conceive Hindus and Muslims as members of the same nation merely on account of the accident of conquest of India by the British. Subjugation of two or more nations to another nation can never make them a single nation howsoever the conquering nation for its own convenience may describe them as one people. The case of the Little Entente—Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania is an illustration on this point. Austria and Hungary had remained united under the House of Hapsburg since 1526 until the year 1918, when they were broken up into independent states in order to assign separate homes to the various races inhabiting them. The European statesmen who were responsible for breaking up the political union known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire knew very well that the various races which inhabited it had lived together for centuries as one people and were also uniform in respect of the system of law which governed them and the culture and religion which they followed. The different races, for example the Czechs, the Magyars, the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Croats, etc., had in fact more in common with one another than the Muslims and Hindus have in India.

Notwithstanding the social intercourse which obtained among them and the religious and cultural oneness of the said races, Austria-Hungary was dismembered in order that each one of them might have a separate home and right of self-determination. Similar is the case of the Baltic Bloc. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania became independent national states after the Great War although prior to it they were treated only as minorities.

It is not our business to attribute ulterior motives, but what we fail to understand is why the precedent of the above-mentioned states was not followed in the case of the Muslim North-West and Muslim Bengal at the time of deciding their destiny and linking them with Hindu India in an All-India Federation. Why were the democratic principles, like right of self-determination, etc., which are so very much applauded in Europe, not adhered to in the East, in the case of the said Muslim regions when it is a broad day-light fact that in both of them the Muslims, who are absolutely different from the Hindus, form overwhelming majorities? Why have they been included in a single nation scheme of provincial autonomy, with an all powerful federal Hindu centre, and denied the right of self-determination? If the federal scheme had been limited only to the Hindus and Muslims of parts of India other than the said Muslim tracts, then it could have been easy for us to understand why the fiction of a Hindu-Muslim nation was necessary, like so many

other legal fictions. In view of the fact that the Muslim minority was scattered thinly all over the said Hindu parts and was not thickly concentrated on any particular tract there, the creation of such a fiction could have been explained as unavoidable and consequently tolerated. But the extension of the federal scheme to the definitely Muslim regions which do not present any difficulty, even in respect of their geographical situation and separation from India proper, is a matter which passes comprehension. Why were the Muslims of the North-West and Bengal pushed into the inferior position of minorities to a Hindu majority in an all-India Federation when it was quite easy to constitute their regions into separate states. Eyes were completely closed to the fact that in each of these regions the Muslims formed separate nations and in respect of areas and population they stood comparison with some of the biggest states in Europe and Asia. There is no precedent, in the modern world, of a nation that has been converted into a minority community by its inclusion in another nation numerically stronger than it. But this has been done in the case of the Muslim North-West and Muslim Bengal. They are nations by themselves but they have been denied the right of self-determination by their inclusion in the Hindu nation. In the past Hindus and Muslims lived together in India in the same way as the Englishmen are living with them to-day. Does the Englishmens'

living together with the Hindus and Muslims in India make them nationally one with the latter two communities or will it make them all three a single nation, if India happens to be conquered by another nation, say Japanese or Germans? If in this sense the English in India can be classed as one nation with the Hindus and Muslims then the latter two communities do constitute a single nation, otherwise not. Similarly if the English were to annex Afghanistan, it would not make the people of that country a single nation with the Hindus of India proper, the Muslims of the Sind Regions or the Muslims of Bengal. The modern history of the world abounds in examples wherein even smaller minorities than the Muslims of the said regions have been provided with homelands and granted complete right of self-determination. The myth of a single Hindu-Muslim nation in the Indian sub-continent is unprecedented in the modern history of the world. It is high time that this myth should be exploded in the interests of a happier and contented India.

THE HINDU MAHASABHA, THE REAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HINDUS

THE real representative of the Hindus so far as their relations with the Muslims are concerned, is the Hindu Mahasabha which came into existence in 1918 as a purely reformative body. Within such a short time as four years after its coming into existence, it

also assumed a political role and transcended the All-India National Congress in point of popularity among the Hindu masses, although the latter had existed and worked among them for 34 years before the inception of the former. This easy access of the Hindu Mahasabha to the hearts of the Hindu masses and its success with them was due to the very natural fact that it undertook to reflect and represent directly their real feelings and opinions. It is a historic fact that the Mahasabha undid the pact which the Congress had concluded with the Muslims in 1916.

THE HINDU MASSES

COMPARED with the Muslim masses, the Hindu masses are politically, socially, educationally and economically more advanced. They have developed that mutual understanding and sympathy which is so essential for the formation of a nation. They are a well-knit and compact body with an ability to form independent opinions. It is they who really lead their political organizations. If they find that the views of the Mahasabha on a particular issue, in most cases communal, are the same as their own, they follow it unreservedly. If they find that the views of the Congress reflect their own wishes, they lend it their full support. As we have already seen, when an attempt was made to implement the League-Congress Pact of 1916, the whole Hindu India was up in arms against it. The Hindu

masses went over to the Mahasabha leaving the Congress, which had been a party to that pact, as if it had never enjoyed their confidence. At present we find that the Federation is not to their taste and though the Mahasabha may cry itself hoarse in its favour, yet they will never listen to it. Let Dr. Moonje and other Mahasabha leaders shout to them from house-tops to accept the Federation, they will never listen to them. They will stand with the Congress and abide by its decision in the matter. No pact arrived at between the Muslim and the Hindu leaders, whether Mahasabhaites or Congressites, can have any sanctity unless it has the approval of the Hindu masses, whose attitude towards the Muslims has always been communal. For them the Congress is a wing to fight British Imperialism and to snatch power from the hands of the British for their benefit, and the Mahasabha another wing to safeguard their economic interests as also to promote their religious and cultural ideals. In other words the Congress and the Mahasabha are two fronts, one to fight the Britisher and to drive him out of the country and the other to fight the Muslims and to push them into the background. After the Hindus have secured themselves against British Imperialism, it is quite possible that they may begin to regard the Congress as unnecessary and think of abolishing it in order that the Mahasabha may not be hampered in its work of consolidating the Hindus against the Muslims.

NATIONALISM

THE factors in the uniform presence of which the sentiment of nationalism develops in a country are, generally speaking, common race, country, language, civilization and culture, religion, traditions and heroes and economic interests. Sometimes the subjection of a heterogeneous population living in the same country, to a foreign aggressor, also helps to establish the sentiment of nationalism among them. This happens only when the differences between the people of that country happen to be very minor. It may also be noted that the general principle as laid down above admits of exceptions in certain cases, for there are nations in the world amongst whom some of these factors do not exist but still they are cohesive and compact. If we study the conditions that obtain in India from the point of view of nationalism, we find that every element that goes to the formation of a nation is missing here except a common country and the yoke of foreign rule.

RACIAL DIFFERENCES

THE racial differences in India are so glaring that a Punjabi, a forntier man, a Bengali and a Marwari cannot be put together as belonging to the same type. Ethnologically the Indian population is so diverse that the general claim of the Indians that they are pure Aryans cannot be admitted. Mongolian,

Dravidian, Iranian and Semitic types inhabit different parts of the country. Racially India is anything but one.

CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE

AT present in India three civilizations prevail: Hindu, Islamic and Western. They are all hostile to one another. Although some educated classes of both Hindus and Muslims have adopted Western methods yet this influence of the West is only skin deep. They are already feeling the inconvenience caused by the adoption of western methods in a country least suited for them.

The Hindu culture is based on the Hindu Social System, the most important feature of which is the institution of caste. It does not admit of equality between man and man. In the Hindu Social System importance is attached to the group and not to the individual. As opposed to it the underlying principle of Islamic and Western civilization is democracy and both of them are based on "equality, fraternity and liberty." According to Islam no human being has preference over another and it is the individual who forms the unit of society and not a group of individuals. The same is true of Western civilization. In the Hindu society the liberty granted to a Brahmin far exceeds that granted to a low caste man. The acts of omission and commission open to a high caste are forbidden to

the lower castes. A member of a low caste must not touch a high caste man ; he must not use a public well ; he must disappear on the arrival of a Brahmin lest his shadow fall on him and pollute him ; and he must not interdine and intermarry with a high caste.

In the daily round of labour and care, in the supreme and testing moments of life, every Muslim equally enjoys with other Muslims the right to seek inspiration as well as consolation and to get faith which can move mountains and the hope which endures, from the pages of the Holy Quran. But in Brahmanism, a Shudra is denied the right to acquire the knowledge and wisdom of the Vedas. Common possession of the Holy Quran with a unitary system of worship has increasingly been the symbol and safeguard of Islamic unity ; while the Hindu scriptures, on account of diversity of systems of worship, combined with the tyranny of Manu's caste system have always been the cause of disintegration and disruption of the Hindu society. The Hindu social order in its formation is hymenopterous while the social relationship in Islam is based on the broad principles of humanity.

Western civilization no doubt is very near to Islamic civilization but it has become too materialistic. The communities cannot hope to acquire any uniformity by adopting it.

LANGUAGE PROBLEM

THE linguistic position in India forms another

problem for the advocates of nationalism. So far as language is concerned almost each province differs from the other. There are some 400 languages spoken in India.

The following chart will give an idea of the diversity that prevails in India as regards languages :—

Bengal—90 per cent. speak Bengali.

Assam—50 per cent. speak Bengali and Assami, 30 per cent. other languages numbering about a 100.

Bihar and Orissa—60 per cent. Hindi and Pahari, 20 per cent. Oriya, the remaining use Marathi and Santhali.

Bombay—About 45 per cent. Marathi, 32 per cent. Gujrati and the remaining population use other languages like English, Urdu and Parsi.

C. P. and Bihar—55 per cent. Hindi and Prakrit, 13 per cent. Marathi, the remaining population use other languages.

Punjab and U. P.—45 per cent. Western Hindi (Punjabee), 32 per cent. Eastern Hindi (Hindi and Urdu), 20 per cent. Bihari, and 3 per cent. Central Pahari.

The above statement will show that the question of language not only presents difficulties so far as the Hindus and Muslims are concerned but also constitutes a grave problem *inter se* the Hindus of different provinces. The Bengalees can never accept Hindi as their state language. In Madras, "the Madras Anti-Hindi League" has already been formed. This League is responsible for a strong Anti-Hindi

agitation in connection with which many arrests have been made. The diversity of opinion regarding the question of a *lingua franca* for India is causing a disturbance even among Hindus who are socially and religiously one. The linguistic problem cannot have any solution so far as the Muslims and Hindus, who are culturally and religiously different from each other, are concerned.

The cultural differences between the communities express themselves very eloquently whenever the question of deciding upon a *lingua franca* for India is raised. Although the Hindi-Urdu question is not that of diction but of script yet the Hindus demand that Hindi or Nagri script should be adopted and the Muslims stress that the Persian script should be adhered to. The reasons for the adherence of the Hindus to the Nagri script and the Muslims to the Persian script are not far to seek. Hindi literature, which is the expression of Hindu culture, is published in the Nagri script with which the Hindus have cultural associations. Urdu literature, which is expressive of Islamic culture, is obtainable in books published in Persian script. The adoption of one script against the other as the script of the State language will help the cause of the culture it represents, while the discarding of it would have dire consequences to the culture it stands for. As such the national antagonism between the two communities comes to the forefront whenever this question is taken up. The decision of the Congress to recognise both the

scripts amounts to an admission that the two communities are in reality two different nations and their cultural differences cannot be obliterated.

RELIGION

THE basic principles of Islam and Hinduism are so different from each other that it can be said that one is the negation of the other. Religiously, the Hindus are very liberal and they readily take to all sorts of religious belief. This is not due to any broadmindedness on their part but to their superstitious nature. In some localities *Azan* may be believed in as an effective incantation against plague, during the spread of the epidemic, but later on it may become a sacrilege and give provocation. The breath of a Muslim may be curative for a Hindu child held up by a Hindu mother at the door of a mosque. Whereas Hinduism is flexible, conciliatory and vague, Islam is rigid, uncompromising and clear-cut. There cannot be any approach between the two. On account of its flexibility Hinduism has the capacity for absorbing any other religion of Indian origin whose followers happen to be culturally similar to the Hindus. But it cannot accommodate any religion of foreign origin like Islam or Christianity. Moreover, the numerical strength of the devotees of each of these two religions is so large that it is impossible for one of them to oust the other by effecting a wholesale conversion of its followers.

Some people are of the opinion that by the spread of education Hindu-Muslim relations will

improve. They hold this opinion either because they think that education will remove their ignorance and with it the chances of their being exploited by the interested persons with the object of straining their relations or because they take education to mean complete westernization, by the help of which the communities can be expected to sink their differences and become uniform in every respect after the removal of all those factors which create discord between them, namely, their respective religions and cultures. No doubt, if adherence to religion and culture amounts to ignorance, education in the sense of making them non-religious and weaning them away from their particular cultures, would improve their relations. As regards the complete westernization of the Hindus and Muslims which "education" also means, it is something physically impossible and no hopes of improvement in their relations can be bound up with it. The spread of Western education among the Hindus may completely westernize them in thought and dress but all the same they will continue to remain Hindus. It cannot make them non-Hindus. We may draw attention to the fact that the present tendencies among the Hindus show that they want to adopt only the political ideas and creeds of the West and nothing else. No influence of the West can make them anything other than Hindus. Even if we imagine that the Hindus will some day achieve the ideal of becoming English in every respect

but colour, we cannot persuade ourselves to think that they by such a complete westernization can overcome the dynastic influences which have kept them Hindus as a class with a particular type of character from time immemorial notwithstanding the various cultures, creeds and religions that have swept over India in the past. They will always remain Hindus. In the extreme case of their becoming completely westernized, the definition of the word "Hindu" according to them, will become something like this. One born of Hindu parents in the male line during, after or before the period of complete westernization and not professing Islam or any other alien creed as his religion."

As regards the Muslims further spread of Western education, will in the beginning, create in them a repulsion against Islam, which will in reality be against the Islam of the Mullas for in the real Islam, Islam of the Holy Quran, there is nothing which could be said to be against the ideal human nature or nature in general. Soon after this repulsion against the Islam of the Mullas, mistaken for the Islam of the Holy Quran, a time will come when after an intelligent understanding of Islam, they will revert to it. This will happen because their national genius is Islamic and they cannot escape it. Their wandering away from Islam would in reality be their discarding Islam as presented by the Mullas in a distorted and ugly form. By the help of education they will be able

to broaden their outlook and to understand the Islam of the Holy Quran more intelligently. The more they understand it the more they will try to keep away from the Hindus. The same will not be the case with the Hindus for their national genius is not religious, on account of there being no definite Hindu religion. If once they discard Hinduism they would never come back to it, although they may continue to maintain their identity as a particular class. The binding force of the Hindus is their social system, which even after being modified and amended, will continue to keep them as one community. Hence the hopes that the spread of education will bring the communities intimately closer, are quite baseless. By education they will come nearer in order to fly away from each other with greater force.

ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF NATIONALITY (MILLAT)

THE Islamic conception of nationality is quite different from that current in the West. It rests on certain definite beliefs about the ultimate end of life and the nature of the universe, participation in the same historical traditions, and sentiments of fraternity based on the idea that all Muslims, wherever they happen to be are members of the society founded by the Holy Prophet of Islam, in relation to one another equals as brothers and in relation to their God, His servants. This conception of nationality in no way derives its life-force from the character or

genius of a particular race and is also not territorial in its origin. In its essence, therefore, it is non-racial and non-spacial. The bond of Islamic nationality is further strengthened by Islamic civilization, which is a product of cross-fertilization of the Semetic and Aryan ideas and represents the characteristics of both the parents. It has the refinement of its Aryan mother as well as the sterling character of its Semetic father. Islamic civilization as based on the Islamic conception of life, helps to create a particular type of individual, with a particular character, who can only live in an Islamic society. This stamp of Islam on their character is uniformly borne by all Muslims and distinguishes them from the non-Muslims. The Muslims all over the world are, therefore, a single nation (*Millat*) just as the Jews are a single nationality whether they be German, English or Russian. As Islamic nationalism is non-spacial and non-racial, Muslims living in different parts of the world and belonging to different races, are above territorial and racial patriotisms. Their separate states only denote administrative units. A common nation with the Hindus or any other non-Muslim people, more specially those who are not even Ahl-i-Kitab, is, therefore, quite alien to the Muslim mind. But it does not mean that their mental attitude is unsympathetic or aggressive towards the non-Muslims. Their religion is universal and cosmopolitan in its nature and keeps them from forming any such attitude towards those who are

not its followers.

Due to foreign interventions especially those of European powers, at present the hold of the said bond of fraternity, no doubt has slackened over the Ummat. But previously it was so strong that a Muslim, travelling from Java to Morocco, in no Islamic country through which he passed, did feel that he was on a foreign soil or among an alien people. The new dawn that has appeared on our national horizon, shows that this bond is once again going to be strengthened. The anti-climax which is facing the Western civilization seems to be a happy augury for our rise.

TRADITIONS AND HEROES

BOTH the communities have participated in making the history of India for the last one thousand years. The defeats of one have been the victories of the other. What one has registered as a wrong against the other, the other has recorded as its brilliant success. The antagonism between the two communities is so strong that the friendly relations that existed between them at any time have been completely forgotten, while the hostilities mutually exchanged are remembered. Sivaji and Aurangzeb always remain in their minds, while Akbar and Todar Mal are personages that only exist in the pages of history. The fact that the memory of two rivals who took up the cause of their respective

religions against each other is retained, while the memory of the two friends who tried to bring the communities together is effaced, is an index to the ineffaceable antagonism between the two communities.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

SO far as the North-West Muslim Block is concerned, the Hindus are the capitalists and the Muslims are the wage-earners. The interests of the Muslims are mostly agricultural and the interests of the Hindus are industrial and commercial. The Muslims are the debtors and the Hindus are the creditors. The Muslims are included amongst the consumers of foreign as well as Indian manufactures. The Hindus are either the middlemen who sell foreign goods or the millowners who market their finished products in the North-West Muslim Block. Foreign imports as well as the export trade are mostly in their hands. A protectionist tariff may be ruinous for the Muslims of the North-West and very helpful for the industrialists of the Southern and South-Eastern Hindu provinces. Hence, their economic interests are not common and they will always tend to separate them.

There is a class of people who believe in the unification of India on an economic basis and regard the present strained Hindu-Muslim relations as due to particular class interests in the communities, who

set them against each other to safeguard themselves. It may be true in particular cases but so far as the general position of the communities with regard to each other is concerned, it is not true. Supposing class interests are eliminated and economically India becomes united, what would be the economic position of the communities with regard to each other? Will they be on the same footing? If so, how will the Muslims achieve this economic parity with the Hindus in face of so many handicaps and disabilities from which they are suffering at present because of the Hindus? We cannot expect the Hindus to show so much generosity to them as to allow them to come up to their standard. Will it then be effected by socialism? If so, then we are moving in a vicious circle—a choice between Islam and some other creed whether Hinduism or socialism. Keeping intact our integrity as well as seeking economic equality with the Hindus as members of the same nation, are two contradictions which no logic can reconcile. If we were to become economically one nation with the Hindus without sacrificing our integrity, would it not mean consenting to be relegated to the position of pariahs as compared with the Hindus, to whom it would be immaterial whether we said our prayer once or five times a day, so long as it did not interfere with their own rituals, in case they maintained them, or their phsysical comfort? Moreover, even if we concede that ultimately the communities will become economically one nation and will sink all their

differences, we cannot be sure how long it will take before they will be so. In the process of the economic levelling up or down (as the case may be) of the communities, at least a stage will intervene when one community will be " the master " and the other " the subordinate " and no one can say how long this stage may last before socialism interferes to level them up by evolutionary and constitutional methods. Will all the generations of Muslims who will be born during this stage, rot under the Hindus, waiting and hoping that some future generations of theirs will some day enjoy economic equality with their Hindu masters? If it had been so easy to level down the owning classes and level up the working classes in a short period, socialism would not have admitted such modifications as it has at present in order to accommodate religion.

Then there are some Muslims whom we should better describe as culturally Muslims without being religiously so, who regard Islam as too rigid and unable to readjust itself to the changing needs of humanity. Consequently, they propose that it should be discarded in favour of an economic nationalism with the Hindus. In the first place, we do not agree with their point of view and secondly even if we concede that Islam is so, then we cannot imagine how an economic nationalism is practicable with a community like the Hindus, who, although they profess economic nationalism with the Muslims are, in actual practice as we have shown elsewhere,

not ready to treat them on an equal footing with themselves, both economically and socially. In the economic as well as in the social sphere they want to assign to the Muslims a position lower than themselves. According to the said opinion Islam is rigid and stands in the way of progress of Muslims. According to the facts of the Muslims' position in India they cannot progress because of the handicaps under which they live on account of the rivalry of the Hindus, who are economically far superior to them. Consequently if the Indian Muslims were to seek progress by discarding Islam the Hindus would stand in their way—in case of their (Muslims') socially remaining cut off from them, by communalism and in case of their entering the fold of Hinduism, by assigning to them (Muslims) a lower position in the nation than themselves. Consequently, even from the point of view of those who propose to discard Islam in favour of economic nationalism with the Hindus, the Indian Muslims cannot hope to progress and there is no other alternative but to separate from the Hindus in all those zones which belong to them and to seek their salvation in some other way than by uniting with the Hindus.

COMMON MOTHERLAND

THE only thing which is common to the two communities is India, which by mistake is supposed

to be one country and not a sub-continent containing many countries. On account of the fact that it is so vast and extensive, the mutual understanding that could develop among a people inhabiting a smaller country cannot develop here. The very fact that the country is so big stands in the way of the development of the sentiment of nationalism and presents difficulties in the way of its organization on national lines. Had the country been of smaller proportions and geographically less diversified the tremendous work which the Congress claims to have done during the last fifty years in uniting all the communities into a single nation, would certainly have borne fruit. Notwithstanding the efforts of sincere congressmen and many a reformer, the Hindu-Muslim differences continue to be as strong as they were a few centuries back.

COMMON CAUSE OF GAINING FREEDOM FROM A FOREIGN AGGRESSOR

THE major communities have at least a common cause in gaining freedom from foreign domination. Often they have attempted to form a united front in order to achieve independence. No doubt they do feel the necessity of sinking their differences in order to enable themselves to fight with advantage the battle of freedom and it has also bred in them an affinity, but unfortunately this one uniting factor

has not the force to counteract the influence of disintegrating tendencies caused by the other disrupting elements that exist in the country. Their common grievance against their rulers has failed to bring them together. Their mutual distrust has made it easy for the interested party to play them against each other.

Past history tells us that in all countries which had the misfortune of being under foreign rule, the people always joined on the issue of gaining freedom from foreign domination. But this generalization does not apply in the case of India. How is it that the Indian people neither in the past nor in the present have been able to make a common cause against the foreigner? Under the Muslim rule the Hindus never jointly exerted themselves to gain freedom. There were Hindu princes who always sided with the Afghans or the Mughals to suppress Hindu rebellions. For example, Aurangzeb had the support of Hindu Rajas against the Marhatta chief, Sivaji. In the case of Hindus one of the strong reasons for their not joining hands against the foreigners, seems to be that the Hindus of one part of the country had no sympathy with the Hindu aspirations of another part. In other words the various Hindu regions considered themselves as constituting separate countries and not parts of the same country, and as a consequence showed mutual lack of sympathy. This constrains us to think that the conception of India as one country is a mere fiction for

otherwise it would have been quite easy for all the Hindus of the Mughal or Afghan period to imagine themselves as people of the same country without making any allowances for the distances which intervened between one Hindu area and another. The reality about India is, therefore, that it is not a single country but a sub-continent, comprising many countries. And since it is not a single country, it does not allow the establishment of that closer contact among its people which is possible in other countries of the world. Lack of closer contact has resulted in the conspicuous lack of mutual understanding and sympathy among the inhabitants of various parts of India. The disunion for which the Hindus of the past are notorious, was also due to some extent to the same reasons. Modern means of communication and consequent increased intercourse among the various provinces have helped the Hindus and Muslims to unite separately as two different nations instead of reducing the aversion which they feel toward each other. Western influence has also helped the communities to unite against each other.

The next aspect of the question relates to the disagreement of the Hindus and Muslims regarding their making a common cause against the British. To find out the causes of lack of co-operation among them on this issue, we can only refer the reader to the fact that they are two different nations who have been mutually giving causes of complaint to

each other in the past. When the English conquered India, Hindus, of regions under the Muslims, were happy to get rid of the Muslims, against whom they had failed to avenge themselves. Similarly the Muslims of those parts where the Hindus had become supreme were jubilant for they thought that the English had saved them from the humiliation of being subjected to a people whom they had conquered and ruled for 700 years. For example, the Muslims of Southern and Central India were happy to get rid of the Marathas and the Muslims of the North-West were happy to get rid of the Sikhs, and the Hindus of the Eastern provinces were happy in being rid of the Muslims. After the disruption of the Mughal Empire, on account of the jealousies and the fears which they entertained against each other, both hailed the foreigner, the Hindus thinking that he was their saviour and the Muslims believing that he was their rescuer. Time has failed to obliterate the memories of wrongs which they registered against each other in the past. The differences which separated them in the past continue to separate them in the present. Had there been more occasions like the Jallianwala Bagh, where they were made to suffer jointly, perhaps their union against the English might have been possible. But as the English seldom give a common cause of complaint against themselves to both communities at the same time, it is not possible that the common cause of gaining freedom would ever eraze from

their memory the fears which they entertain toward each other on account of their past animosities. Then the hold of their respective communal interests is so strong over them that the memory of the few occasions when they have suffered jointly at the hands of the English, cannot shake it off.

Many communal Muslims of the present times wonder why some congressite Muslims of the generation which preceded them, knowing the inconsistencies in the Congress behaviour towards the Muslims in general and also knowing the intentions of a large number of communal-minded Hindus in the Congress ranks towards their own community, obstinately stick to that body. The reason is very simple. They were impelled to join the Congress by the indiscriminate repression of Hindus and Muslims as was undertaken by the English Bureaucracy at the time when the Ilbert Bill was moved or when the notorious Rowlatt Bill was brought in the Assembly. The memories of the atrocities committed in the Jallianwala Bagh in 1919 or the intolerance shown by the Anglo-Indians and Europeans towards the natives during the last quarter of the 19th century and the first two decades of the persent century, are still fresh in their brains and they attach more importance to the grudge they formed against the aggressors commonly with the Hindus in these times than to the dangers to the Muslim interests at the hands of the Hindus. The Muslím generations which came after them and who had not personally

witnessed the massacre of the Jallianwala Bagh and the persecution of the Indians at the time of the Rowlatt Bill, or suffered humiliation on account of the intolerance showed by the white man, cannot imagine how the Muslim congressites who saw that atrocity and witnessed that persecution or suffered humiliation at the hands of the foreign rulers, feel towards them. The same is also true in respect of the Hindu communalists who fail to understand the behaviour of the true Hindu congressites. Had this sort of repression been continuous, it would have joined the communities in a common cause against the foreigner and they would have at least for some time forgotten their respective communal interests to fight for freedom. In the case of India the animus which is created against the oppressors through any overt act of indiscriminate repression undertaken by them, of contemporary generations of Hindus and Muslims, dies by the time their next generations grow up. This whittles down the chances of their permanently uniting against the foreigner. The foreign rulers of every community-ridden country, are always shrewed enough to select at a time only one community for slapping. While slapping one community, they pat the other on the shoulder.

Under the circumstances the two alternative methods by which they can hope to achieve independence are either that they should forget the sufferings which they caused to each other in the past and remember only the ills done to them

both by the foreigner, or to separate. The first is impossible because it requires long spans of time of inter-communal harmony without any intervals of communal outbreaks so that they may only keep in view their common object of gaining freedom from foreign rule. As we have shown in the preceding pages, inter-communal harmony is not possible on account of the communal interests of the Hindus and Muslims, and making a common cause against the foreigner is also not possible because the indiscriminate repression which is so necessary for it, is not continuous. Hence in the case of India it is not possible that the people can gain freedom by making a common cause against the foreign aggressor. The other method of achieving the same end is of separation. Let the two communities separate in different regions assigned to them so that they may mutually feel secure against each other. Separation will also help them to forget their past rivalries, and hostility for the absence of the one, as a rival, in the zone of the other would automatically remove the chances of communal outbreaks which are reminders to them of their past strained relations and the pains which they caused to each other. In case it is not done, the Hindus and Muslims will either have to submit to perpetual enthraldom to a foreign power or in the case of their acquiring freedom, to remain under the strain of an unpleasant, everlasting condition of communalism, marked by intrigues and counter-intrigues against each other and a

consequent state of fear of once again passing under foreign rule.

HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY OF 1919—22

SOME nationalists try to make out a case for a single Hindu-Muslim nation by referring to the cordial relations which subsisted between the communities during the period 1919—22. No doubt during this period the communities were almost in each other's embrace. But unfortunately this happy conjugation was not due to any natural affinity between them. This short-lived union of the communities was due to their respective grievances against the rulers. Public demonstrations of inter-dining on the part of Hindu and Muslim leaders, at the time, was believed to be the end of the untouchability which had been practised on the Muslims by the Hindus from time immemorial. An orthodox Hindu like Swami Shardhanand might have entered a mosque and drunk water from the hands of a Muslim, but could timely suppression of aversion between the communities be taken as a permanent basis for inter-communal harmony? Only a few years after this self-deception of the communities as regards tolerance of and respect for each other's beliefs, the communal aversion reasserted itself in an uglier form and those very leaders who had been demonstratively inter-dining and preaching union, bitterly attacked each

other's religion. Swami Shardhanand made an attack on the personality of the Holy Prophet and a Muslim fanatic stabbed him. The Hindus acclaimed Shardhanand as their hero and the Muslims declared their fanatic Maulvi a martyr in the cause of Islam.

What were the reasons for that short-lived Hindu-Muslim unity? The Rowlatt Act, the policy of general repression initiated after the Great War to curb the Indian political aspirations, and a series of provocations given to Muslims in India as well as in other Muslim countries formed the foundations on which the Hindu-Muslim unity of those years rested. Desecration of a mosque at Cawnpore and a massacre of the Muslims in the streets of that city; the repression of the Indian Muslim Press during the Balkan War; the treachery of the Sharif of Mecca against the Calif at the instance of Britain; the attempt to apportion Turkey among the Allies after the Great War; the Greek attack upon Asia Minor at the instigation of the English; and the British missionary propaganda to take possession of Constantinople and to turn the historic Mosque of Saint Sophia into a church; and the attempt to suppress the Egyptian national movement formed a series of complaints which the Muslims had registered against the English and it was on account of these that the unsophisticated Indian Muslims had joined hands with the Hindus in 1919. The unhappy events which followed later from 1923 onwards are

sufficient to show the sandy foundations of this much-talked of Hindu-Muslim unity.

MUSLIMS SUFFERED THROUGH NON-CO-OPERATION

WE may mention here that a peculiar feature of the Hindu-Muslim unity of those times was that, although apparently the communal Hindus had joined issues with the Muslims and had accepted the lead of the Congress, they never allowed the Congress to step inside their houses while the Muslims threw open their doors to it. Muslim educational institutions like the Aligrah were closed down but the Benares University was kept intact: in fact Pandit Malavya never allowed the Mahatma even access to it. Whereas the Muslims had completely merged themselves into the Congress; the Hindu communalists had joined it without losing their individuality in it.

The losses which the Muslims had to sustain on account of their follies of those times are very many and they have not been able to recover their position up to this time. It was chiefly they who had to bear the brunt of the Non-co-operation Movement. The claims of the Indians to political concessions which were promised by the English during the Great War and were almost denied by them after the War, were earned mostly by the Muslims who had fought and bled on many a battlefield in Europe and Asia. The Hindus had earned

war profits while the Muslims had sustained loss of life. When the Hindus pressed forward the claims of political concessions as based on the participations of India in the Great War, it was necessary for them to strengthen their position by the support of the community who was mostly responsible for earning those claims.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

MUCH stress is laid by the nationalists when preaching Hindu-Muslim unity on the necessity of separating religion from politics. Hindus may be able to accept this advice, for already their religious belief is isolated from their social system. The Muslims cannot divorce their religion from their politics. In Islam, religious and political beliefs are not separated from each other. It speaks of this world as well as of the world to come. Religion and politics are inseparably associated in the minds and thoughts of all Muslims. They cannot be first Indians and then Muslims or *vice versa*. Their religion includes their politics and their politics are a part of their religion. The mosque not only constitutes the place of worship but also the Assembly hall. It is open to the Muslims to offer their daily prayers individually but it is preferable if they offer them in congregation. In addition to their daily prayers they are also enjoined to say the weekly Juma prayers and the Id prayers in the mosques in the company of fellow Muslims.

The mosque forms the centre of all aspects of their public life, religious, social, economic and political. Consequently they are not in a position to separate religion from politics, or to prefer one to the other. They are born into a system. The system is not thrust upon them. Religion and politics are the same to them. Hence, Hindu-Muslim unity or nationalism, signifying homogeneity between them in all non-religious matters is unimaginable. The Islamic polity in which religion and politics are inseparably united, requires perfect isolation for its development. The idea of a common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam, and can never be fruitful. Those Muslims who, finding no prospect of Hindu-Muslim unity based on the acceptance of the Muslims' terms, believe in the maintenance of the *status quo*, *i.e.*, the present Communal Award as the final political state for the Muslims, show lack of political aspiration and also err in the direction of the right spirit of their religion. The present Communal Award cannot be the final goal of the political aspirations of the rising Muslim generations. If the Communal Award were to be accepted as the final solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem it would bar the political and economic progress of the whole of India. In its effects it would be the reconquest of India by the Britishers. The communities cannot accept it as the permanent basis of settlement between them simply because in a federated India their separate

entities cannot be secured otherwise. In such an India they will naturally hang round each other's necks like mill-stones. Unity between them would be impossible because one of the parties to it cannot separate religion from politics and the other is very strict with regard to matters which relate to its social system. Hence, in their own interests, they will have to separate.

DOMINATING THE ALL-INDIA NATIONAL CONGRESS

No security even after joining the Congress

NOTWITHSTANDING the weighty considerations to which we have already alluded some diehard Muslim advocates of a single Hindu-Muslim nation might still contend, that the Muslims can secure their cultural and religious interests by entering the central organization of the All-India National Congress in large numbers, and exerting internally a strong influence on it in their own favour. This argument at first sight seems quite flawless. But if the Mahasabha-minded Hindus also entered the Congress in numbers larger than theirs to counteract any influence which the Muslims might hope to obtain over it, what would come of this move? Can we assure ourselves that the Mahasabha will continue to sit still and regard our joining the Congress without any concern? It is certain that

in this matter the Muslims, if they are not already forestalled, will be forestalled by the Mahasabha. If both the Muslims and the communal Hindus decide upon entering the Congress with the object of capturing it, being numerically and economically stronger than the Muslims, the communal Hindus are sure to dominate that body. In that case the Congress will consist of four groups, *viz.* (1) the Muslims trying to safeguard their integrity as a separate community, (2) the Mahasabha exerting itself to revive Hindu culture and to dominate India, (3) the Socialists dreaming of and waiting for the socialistic revolution to follow the national democratic and industrial revolutions, and (4) the purely national group, the real congressites, infirmly trying to keep intact the integrity of their national ideal and at the same time fighting against the onslaughts of the British Imperialists and the disintegrating opposing creeds within its own body-politic. As the numerical strength of the Mahasabha in the Congress would preponderate, the poor Muslims will find that their idea of capturing the Congress was just a wild dream. Inside as well as out of the Congress, the old game of communalism, will continue to be played and the Muslims will again be disappointed at the prospects of arriving at a respectable settlement with the Hindus. The purely national group will be so small in numbers that it will have no voice or influence in the Congress. And it is also possible that this group may

absolutely lose its identity due to everyone, whether a Mahasabhaite, or a socialist, posing as congressite, *i.e.*, nationalist. Morever, as this small group will mostly consist of Hindus, it will always stand out as compared to the Muslims, so much so that their alliance with them will look unnatural on the face of it. The purely nationalistic will, as a consequence, behave exactly like the congressites of to-day, paying lip service to the Muslims profusely, while doing nothing to save them from the aggressive communal Hindus. They will simply keep up appearances like the present-day congressites by adopting an attitude of neutrality on all communal issues, even going to the extent of confusing purely economic interests with communal interests. The Muslims will thus gain nothing by an alliance with them, for any such alliance will not be backed by the Hindu nationalists with any practical support for them against the Mahasabhaite impostors in the Congress.

Lastly we come to the socialist group in the Congress, as constituted by all Hindus and all Muslims. It suffices to say that so far as socialism as a creed and a culture is concerned, so long as the number of its adherents won from both the religions will not swell to an extent as may give to the socialists an overwhelming majority in the country, both against the Hindus and the Muslims, it would not become a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem. But the question is how long it will take socialism to win so

many adherents as to be in this dominating position and whether the Muslims should wait for that day and continue to rot during the transitional period which may extend to many a decade? Then we have also to see whether the Muslims will be willing to discard Islam in favour of socialism merely for the sake of their material well-being? If so, then what is the necessity of continuing the struggle for maintaining our separate existence as a community or cultural and religious integrity? If in the last resort we have to seek shelter in socialism, then why not from now try to adopt measures which may help to bring us nearer to the socialistic goal? Would it not be better to educate Muslim masses right from now to forget all what we call Islamic faith, Islamic culture and Islamic traditions, etc., and egg them on to take to socialism as the sole panacea of all their ills? But the question is, are the Muslims prepared for it? Their present attitude does not show that they will be prepared to accept socialism in this sense at any time and let go all what they consider, have been their distinguishing feature, for the last 1400 years.

Now supposing the communities retain their respective religions and cultures and also evolve a compromise between socialism and religion, say some sort of religio-economic socialism, then can we imagine that it would solve the Hindu-Muslim problem? No. This would mean that each community will accommodate the economic

aspect of socialism within the fold of its religion and there would be Muslim socialists and Hindu socialists allied together on economic issues and opposed to each other on cultural and religious questions. In other words the communal labels which the communities have borne for ages past, will continue to mark their separate entities and the cultural struggle between them will not cease. This sort of religio-economic socialism, therefore, will not solve the communal question and the political situation would remain as complicated as it is to-day.

A common Hindu-Muslim India and a free India in which each community may be guaranteed its separate entity are two incompatible things. A common Hindu-Muslim India free of foreign domination can be secured only if either of the two communities apostatizes and enters the cult of the other, or if both of them discard their respective faiths and embrace a new one. If they are not prepared for this, then they should either give up the idea of a common India, free of foreign domination or separate from each other into their respective cultural regions. Separation will bring them nearer to their respective cultural as well as political ideals. At least they will not stand in each other's way so far as independence is concerned.

If at all the Muslims must seek alliance with the non-Muslims on some common socialistic programme it should be only with the non-Muslim

minority communities, inhabiting their own regions. In no case it should be on an all-India basis.

We may invite the sincere socialists, belonging to non-Muslim communities and the socialistically-inclined Muslims who have lost their religious sentiments, to look at the proposition from the point of view presented below.

In face of the deplorable conditions obtaining in India—combination of communal, capitalist and Imperialist evils,

(1) whether socialism or Islam promises earlier relief for the Muslim masses;

(2) whether a compromise between socialism and religion—religio-socialism—will help to reduce the communal question; and

(3) whether it would not be better to reach the socialistic millennium through the semi-socialistic economic system of Islam?

Now let us consider the above questions one by one. On account of the religious sentiment of millions of Muslims, in favour of the Islamic economic system, the opposition to it coming from the Muslims, will not be as strong as it can be against socialism, revolutionary or evolutionary. This means that Islamic economic system can be enforced among the Muslims more easily than a socialistic economic order and consequently the former promises earlier relief for the Muslim masses than the latter.

Religio-economic socialism—compromise between

religion and socialism—will have to combat many factors within the communities separately before making their alliance possible. It would also mean Muslim socialists, Hindu socialists, Sikh socialists and Christian socialists as distinct from one another as they are to-day religiously. On account of the continuance of communalism side by side with socialism, socialistic alliance on an all-India basis would, therefore, be liable to break down under the least strain of communal tension the chances of which would continue to remain as numerous as they are at present.

Islamic economic institutions will lead to the same results as are expected to be achieved by socialism. No usury would mean no banking capital. Muslim law of inheritance would mean fragmentation of an individual's property within a few generations succeeding him. State oragnized Zakat would mean passing of an individual's surplus to the state within a few decades. Moreover in an Islamic state, such of the socialistic institutions as are not strictly against Islam can also be established.

Soon after the establishment of the Islamic economic system, a stage will be reached when it will refuse to work in a capitalistic world. At that time Muslims will have to decide whether to revert to the original capitalistic system which had been discarded in favour of the Islamic economic order or to go ahead to complete socialization. It is also possible that when such a stage has been reached, the Muslims like the socialists may desire,

a world revolution on Islamic lines. In any case the chances are that they would go forward whether to complete socialization or world revolution on Islamic lines. By that time the world would also have moved more towards socialism and this factor will help them in going forward instead of retrogressing. The big condition to all this is that, under no circumstances, any particular class among the Muslims, should be permitted to usurp power to distort Islam into a weapon of maintaining their supremacy. Healthy neologism to read the real spirit of Islam, is also a condition precedent to it.

There is another possibility and it is that the world, after it has advanced a certain stage towards socialism, may come face to face with some such difficulties which it may not be possible to foresee at present. At such a stage it may deem wise to call a halt to socialism and to try to find out a compromise between socialism and capitalism. If such a thing happened Islamic socialists would already be in that position and will be saved from the dangers of traversing into undiscovered regions from which the world would be anxious to beat a retreat.

In other words they will gain by the experience of others, well advanced in socialism. If the world found it safer, they can follow. If the world found it inconvenient and tried to effect a retreat to some safe compromise, they would already be strongly entrenched in a position which would be a

compromise between socialism and capitalism. It is very possible that experience may show that a world revolution on Islamic lines, rather than socialistic world revolution, is the real remedy of the difficulties of distribution—a problem which has not yet been solved.

INDEPENDENCE

INDEPENDENCE does not signify the same thing to the Congress as it does to the Muslims. To the Congress "independence" constitutes a national necessity and they want it for the restoration of national self-respect and all the other national, social, and economic benefits which accrue from it. To Muslims independence is a religious necessity, for the achievement of the spiritual and worldly benefits which Islam promises. Muslims want independence for the sake of their religious and cultural ideals, for they cannot flourish under a foreign rule. Under an alien state or even in a state formed in alliance with a non-Muslim community the individual's Islamic personality, upon which depends the attainment of heaven, cannot develop because of lack of the chances of self-expression. Only that state in which the Muslims are given an opportunity of self-expression can suit their religious requirements, which include both the secular and spiritual sides of their lives. Only an Islamic state can be such. In States which are not Islamic they can at the most get

opportunities for entitling themselves for purgatory.

CLASH OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS

BY joining the Congress the Muslims can only hope to dominate it in their provinces and it will be with a tremendous effort on their part that they will succeed in safeguarding their local economic interests,—adequate representation in services and share in the local trade and industry. In All-India affairs or foreign affairs they will have no voice as they will have no hand in the formation of the policies of the Central Government. Even their local economic interests may also depend upon the central governing body, the federal assembly. Would it not be a temptation to the capitalists and industrialists of Hindu provinces, to reserve the raw material produced in the Muslim Block in the North-West of India for themselves and also to secure markets here for their finished goods ? What guarantee is there that they would abstain from exerting their influence with the central assembly to adopt a protectionist policy and to raise high tariff walls against foreign goods, so that in the absence of foreign competition they may flourish better? If they succeeded in doing so, would it not mean dependence of the present agricultural provinces on the industrial provinces for the sale of their raw material and purchase of manufactures? Would it not mean decrease in

the price of raw material and increase in the price of manufactures on account of lack of competition amongst the industrialists?

AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION OF INDIA

IN order to avoid a misunderstanding it is necessary to make it clear that we do not suggest that the agricultural interests of the Muslim North-West should stand in the way of the industrialization of India. What we mean is that they should be given a fair treatment and that as in actual practice industrialization of India means industrialization of the Hindu provinces (Hindus being capitalists), it is very doubtful whether the North-West, which is not only economically but also religiously and culturally different from the former, will receive fair treatment at their hands. The so-called agricultural North-West has also to industrialize. If it remained within the Indian Federation, dominated by the Hindu industrialists, the chances of its industrialization would be few and far between. The foreign commercial and industrial interests have been standing in the way of the industrialization of both Hindu India as well as the Muslim North-West. In the Indian Federation, as contemplated at present, Hindu India will be relieved of foreign competition while the position of the Muslim North-West will become all the more worse in this respect. In their case Hindu

competition will take the place of foreign competition and it will be more acute and disastrous in effect than the latter has ever been. We will refer to these dangers again in some other portion of the book. Here it suffices to say that separation is also necessary in order to leave to the Muslim North-West chances of industrialization which would be denied to it in a common federation, dominated by the Hindus.

MR. CALVERT'S WARNING

IN his book *The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab*, Mr. Calvert has alluded to the dangers that will confront the agricultual North-Western Muslim Block in the event of their participation in the Indian Federation. He has ably made out a case in favour of his contention. His argument proceeds on the following lines:—

"The simplest way of stating the facts of international trade is to say that goods, services and loans from one country equal goods, services and loans into that country, or that if any country is exporting goods, services or loans it can only take payment in goods, services or loans in return, there being no other method beyond a supply of gold so small as to be a mere fraction of the world's volume of trade. India is not in a position to lend money to any other country. Further she lacks the capacity and resources to render to any other country services of great value, therefore, she

must pay in goods exported for whatever goods, services or loans she needs." We find that already there is a great demand for assistance in the form of a protective tariff for Indian industries. The more India becomes self-governed, the bigger will be the demand for raising high tariff walls against foreign imports. Restriction on imports will automatically reflect on exports. India can make payment for goods, services and loans received in the form of goods alone, *i.e.*, raw material. The raw material which is exported to other countries is mostly agricultural produce, a large portion of which is supplied by the agricultural Muslim units in the North-West of India. Protection will mean discouragement of imports and consequently diminishing of the exports which would be detrimental to the agricultural interests of the North-West Muslim Block. An illustration of this is afforded by the case of Japan. Mr. Calvert in the same book quotes the case of that country in these words: "A striking example of the last was the placing of a duty on the Japanese cloth so heavy that it drove the Japanese from the market for India's raw cotton and diminished the price obtainable by the cultivator for his product."

By a protectionist policy industrial India, which would naturally be Hindu India—Hindus being capitalists—would benefit to the detriment of agricultural India, mostly the North-Western Muslim India. The agricultural produce of these parts would remain

in the country, and the producers would not be able to get the same price for it as they might in the open market, which would be closed on them on account of the high protection tariff in India against the manufacturing countries. The surplus agricultural produce, finding no outside market, would have to be sold to the Indian industrialists who, in the absence of any competition for its purchase would pay as little for it as they liked. And since there would also be no competition as regards their manufactures on account of the diminishing of the import trade, they would charge for them as high prices as possible. This would be very detrimental for the agriculturists for they would receive very little for their raw material while paying far more for the manufactured goods. In such an eventuality either they will have to stop producing surplus or forego even a little return on the cost of its production.

In another part of the same book the learned author refers to the case of some other countries where similar circumstances appeared. He takes, for example, the United States of America where similar differences arose between the Industrial North and the Agricultural West and South and which ultimately led to the Civil War of 1861-64, resulting in a victory for the industrialists of the North. The agricultural South and the West had to submit to the will of the industrial North.

To illustrate the point, how in a clash between the agricultural and industrial interests, the latter

always suffer, he has, in the same book, drawn an analogy from the case of Australia. He says that "in 1901 the various states were federated into the Commonwealth of Australia and to the Central Government, was allotted, as means of raising revenue, the power to impose tariffs. In the following year the tendency of the Federal Government went more and more towards the protection of industries at the expense of agriculture and the fact that such industries as there were, were concentrated in one small portion only of the vast continent, did not convey to the protectionists any idea of the incongruity of their policy. The farmers found themselves facing costs of production largely increased by the heavy tariffs, while they had to sell their produce in the competitive markets of the world. For while the manufacturers trusted chiefly to the protected home market for the sale of their goods, the farmers produced more wheat and wool than was required at home and had to find markets abroad, where their produce was not protected. The result deserves to be widely understood, especially in the provinces which have as yet no great industries protected. Western Australia finds that she has to pay for protection of Eastern industries without deriving any advantage from them, while she receives no federal help in the marketing of her surplus wheat and wool. The parallel with India goes a little further. In Australia the import of sugar is prohibited in order to secure a market for the product

of a factory in the extreme east; all Australia has to pay much more for its sugar, just as all India has to pay more for its iron and steel in order to benefit a single factory in Bihar, or more for its cloth just to benefit shareholders in factories in a few towns, mostly in one province. In the United States, similar attempts are being made by the agricultural states to secede from the federation. In Australia, the huge province of Western Australia has petitioned His Majesty the King for permission to secede from the federation. Her agriculture is being ruined by industrial protection and her only salvation, in the opinion of her leaders, lies in secession."

"In British India, since the Central Government abandoned its policy of encouraging commerce by freeing it from every hindrance and began the reverse process of imposing obstacles itself, one State, Burma, has been able to prove that she has been the victim of a policy which may help others but which only penalises her. Burma has protested again and again at being compelled to pay more for steel and cloth just to please a few shareholders in another province and her late Governor, while expressing his view that federation was good for India, was at pains to explain that it would be bad for Burma. As a result Burma is to secure what the Southern States of America failed to win by war, and what Western Australia seems fated to lose by peaceful means. In the foreshadowed federation

of Indian provinces and States, the future secession of Burma is to be forestalled by its immediate exclusion, and she will escape the ruinous consequences of the protection policy of Indian leaders. There can be little doubt that if the facts were only better known, all the agricultural provinces of India like the Punjab would likewise claim exclusion from an urban dominated federation."

"In Australia, the concentration of the population in a small industrial area in the south-east gives control in the federal parliament to the representatives of one corner of the continent and these are deaf to the arguments that the rural people bear all the burdens of protection without reaping any of its advantages. It is to be feared that in India the caste fellows of the small industrial population will blindly vote for protection despite the clearest proofs that the provinces they represent have no industries to protect or at any rate no industries benefiting from protection and, therefore, like Western Austalia, are paying for others while gaining nothing in exchange."

Mr. Calvert very feelingly proceeds to say, "The great activities of distribution will remain in other hands; the railways, the post and telegraphs, communications, overseas and port facilities and costs will all remain outside provincial autonomy. The great essential factors of finding purchasers and stimulating demand are likely to be left to those who are not Punjabees. Prices will continue to be

largely determined by extraneous influences, including of course the effects of the policies of the Central Government in regard to import and export duties, currency and exchange........How dependent is the Punjab for its canal water upon the continued, careful conservancy of the forests in the catchment areas of its rivers beyond its boundaries!........The peculiar geographical position of the Punjab deprives it of control over its own trade; its magnificent manhood will be helpless in the future........Its greatest danger lies in the stronghold which Bombay interests have secured over its trade by 'inducing' the Central Government to adopt a policy of protection. People so far removed from sea and seaports, as those of the Punjab, find difficulty in understanding problems of import duties, just as the peoples of Bombay and Madras find it difficult to understand the problems of a land frontier. The term "protection" means little to the Punjabee who carries on trade free of all duties on all his frontiers. It is difficult for him to understand that everywhere throughout the wide world protection almost of necessity involves political dishonesty and corruption, either as direct payment to legislators as in some countries, or as a contribution to party funds in others. It may be necessary, indeed perhaps it will be necessary, for the Punjab to take part in this game and to organise funds for the bribery of support in its own protection. For the facts seem to be quite simple; the province will now enter the

Federation as a minority and if it is to save anything of its old prosperity it must organise a majority and this majority must, if appearances be trustful, be the combination of agricultural interests against the protectionist, and as the whole world is a witness to the essential corruption that supports protection, the Punjab will either have to gain its majority by fair means or foul, or sink back into a mere hewer of wood and drawer of water for the protectionist interests of Bombay." It may be noted that these remarks of Mr. Calvert about the future of the Punjab are also applicable to the case of all the Muslim provinces in the North-West of India.

Almost all the North-West is agricultural and as such a protectionist policy of the Central Government will affect all its parts equally. Moreover the Muslim population of this area is notoriously poor and is not in a position to organize funds for bribing the legislators. The Hindu industrialists being economically superior will beat them in any such competition for the corruption of the legislature, with the result that their financial position will become worse than it is at present.

LOSS TO THE RURAL POPULATION

IN another portion of the same book Mr. Calvert has stated: "Apart from some metals and ores and paraffin the export trade is almost entirely of

agricultural origin, and even if such commodities as leather, wool and manufactured goods are omitted, there remains over 76 per cent. which is made up of field produce; therefore, any loss of overseas trade resulting from heavy duties imposed to satisfy industrialists must fall upon the export of agricultural produce and so must diminish the trade in such produce........The first to suffer will be those tracts which produce in excess of their local consumption and which have a considerable surplus for export, such as the Punjab Canal Colonies........One effect of this urban-inspired policy will be to keep prices of agricultural produce at a low level; this is the aim of industrialists and town labour in most countries, for, the manufacturer naturally enough wants cheap raw material, cotton, oil-seeds and wool, etc............But in India there are aspects of this policy which are apt to be overlooked but which touch the agriculturists very closely. The great Railway system has cost nearly 900 crores of rupees, most of which had been borrowed from England and on which interest has to be paid whether the lines return a profit or not. The system was designed originally when India was a free-trade country and it expanded on the assumption that a large overseas trade would continue; it is doubtful in the extreme if the system will ever pay if the overseas trade continues to decline owing to heavy duties........Unfortunately for the agricultural classes much of the loss will be passed on to

them by heavier freight charges on their produce (thus still further reducing the price gained for it) and by heavier taxation designed to make up the loss.........But there is yet another great undertaking involving heavy expenditure from loans and that is the irrigation systems; as has already been stated, these great works like the railways were undertaken to relieve the cultivator from the ever-present threat of famine........but they too were designed when India was a free-trade country and they were financed when there was no suggestion of the heavy restrictions on trade which are now becoming a normal feature. With prices of agricultural produce at a fair figure the cultivator finds little difficulty in paying the water-rates and indeed is prepared to pay much more; but with prices of produce forced down to a low level it is becoming increasingly difficult for him to meet these charges and if the low level is artificially maintained by high tariffs there is every danger that the great irrigation system of which the Punjab is so justly proud will become a serious liability on provincial finances...........It has been shown that under a federal system there is an overpowering tendency to rely upon higher and ever higher custom duties to meet federal expenses until either rebellion or ruin or secession comes to the relief of the agricultural member."

SIR ABDULLAH HAROON'S STATEMENT

THE serious danger to the agricultural provinces at

the hands of the Indian mill-owners as alluded to in the above copious quotation from Mr. Calvert has already begun to be felt. The following statement which was issued to the Press by Sir Abdulla Haroon on May 25, 1938, from Simla, forms a note of warning to the agricultural provinces. It is in connection with the Lancashire Delegation which came to India recently.

"While giving this statement, I greatly regret that I am leaving for Karachi without having achieved any terms for the cotton growers of Sind and other parts of India, whose interests I was called upon to watch and protect. I feel called upon to give a plain and truthful statement which, I know, will not be approved by interested persons; but truth is seldom sweet.

LANCASHIRE'S CONDITIONS

ACCORDING to statistics, supplied to me, it is clear that in spite of the reductions in the tariff duty of preferences, imports from Lancashire have been reduced by 45 to 50 per cent. within the last five years. It is, therefore, natural that the Lancashire delegation was anxious to obtain from India not that standard of imports commanded by her ten or fifteen years ago, namely, 1,200,000,000 yards per year, but a little above the 400,000,000 yards which is the average of her last three years' imports in this country. As a *quid pro quo* Lancashire was willing to buy Indian cotton on an increasing scale

as she had done within the last three years. *But on account of the selfish attitude of the representatives of the Indian textile industry no settlement could be reached because these representatives were not prepared to give enough preference, by means of which Lancashire could have secured a reasonable access to the Indian market for her goods.*

COTTON-GROWERS

I AM, however, glad to say that the representatives of the cotton-growers were able to embody their demands in a unanimous memorandum and handed it to the chairman of non-official advisers, to be forwarded to the Lancashire Delegation. I do not know whether this memorandum has yet been forwarded to the quarter for which it was meant.

I may state that we, the representatives of the cotton-growers, were inclined to meet the Lancashire Delegation and discuss with them our point of view, but we were advised by our chairman not to do so as it would be of no avail. We were, therefore, not able to find out the views of the Lancashire Delegation as regards the future of Indian cotton in the United Kingdom. I, however, was able to learn that the Lancashire Delegation was prepared to give a reasonable assurance as regards the purchases of our cotton, if they were permitted to export to India per year a quantity of cloth which should be an average of their past five years' exports. The

Delegation, I was also told, was prepared to assure India that Lancashire would increase the consumption of Indian cotton up to one million bales per year.

In my opinion, the Government of India has not been fair to the Indian cotton-growers. For, lately, among the newly-appointed advisers to the non-official advisers there were five representatives of the Indian textile industry against three of the cotton-growers. When the non-official advisers and their advisers were added together, the representatives of the cotton-growers were in a hopeless minority.

EMPHATIC PROTEST

UNDER these circumstances, I shall be forced to place all the facts before the provincial Government of Sind and also before the Indian Merchants' Association and ask them to record their emphatic protest to the Central Government before the Indo-British trade agreement is signed, and *urge upon the Central Government the great necessity of protecting the interests of the cotton-growers and growers of other raw materials.*

I also consider it my duty, as a humble servant of India, to warn the cotton-growing provinces of Bombay, the Punjab, the Central provinces; the jute-exporting province of Bengal; the tea-exporting province of Assam and the U. P. which exports linseed and other oils and the ground-nut exporting province of Madras, to take keener interest in the

Indo-British trade agreement than they have done so far.

I also want to make an appeal to the Indian National Congress and the leaders of Kisan Sabhas to save the interests of the agriculturists of our country from the ever-growing hunger of the textile magnates and millowners; otherwise, their schemes for the betterment of the peasants and agriculturists and producers of raw materials will never materialise.

At present our attention is wholly centred on the industrialization of India regardless of the vital interests of the agriculturists, who number 300,000,000.

I am not saying all this because of any personal prejudices. On the contrary several of the non-official advisers, representing the textile industry, have been my personal friends for many years and I hold them in great respect. I must, however, lay aside my personal feelings when the future and prosperity of my country is at stake."

The above statement of Sir Abdulla Haroon conclusively shows that the fears which Mr. Calvert has so lucidly expressed are not baseless and that disruptive forces are already at work in undermining the present artificial political unity of India. The Kisan Sabhas which have within a very short time spread all over India under the leadership of the Left Wing of the Congress also are an indication of the future split between the agricultural and industrial

interests of the country. But as North-Western India is religiously, culturally and linguistically different from the Hindu agricultural provinces it is very likely that it may show tendencies to unite and organize separately from them to fight the industrialists. It would be introducing unnecessary complications in their politics if on the one hand the North-Western Muslim units were to make a common cause with the Hindu agricultural provinces of the rest of India to fight the Hindu industrialists and on the other to organize themselves against all Hindu India indiscriminately whether agricultural or industrial, in order to safeguard their cultural interests. It would be to their interest to leave the Hindu agriculturists and the Hindu industrialists to decide the matter among themselves. By remaining part and parcel of India they will have to fight continuously against the dangers of Hindu communalism and capitalism at the same time.

It may be argued that in case Industrial India exhibits any such tendencies, it will be always open to the North-Western Agricultural interests to launch a policy of acquiring industrial self-sufficiency. No doubt to escape the serious consequences of a protectionist policy of the Central Government the Agricultural North-West will have to resort to such a scheme. But the question is, will it be in a position to do so? The Sind regions have open frontiers between them and Industrial India and also lack the

resources to acquire economic self-sufficiency. The capital is in the hands of the Hindus who are mostly industrialists and are controlling the money-market in India. In all probability they will successfully forestall the Muslims by investing their ready capital in industries in the North-West Muslim Block. Such an investment of their capital in the North-Western India would, in the first instance, save them the expenditure of conveying raw materials from these parts to their own provinces and then bringing them back in the form of finished goods. Moreover, it would give them an easily accessible market, where they, being on the spot, would be in a better position to crush by competition any local attempt at acquiring economic self-sufficiency. Even if we suppose, that the Muslims will successfully launch a policy of acquiring economic self-sufficiency, it will take a long time to drive the Hindu industrialists out of the home market.

It may be suggested by some that, in a common federation, if the dangers alluded to by Mr. Calvert appeared, the Muslims of the Sind regions could strike a bargain with the foreign manufacturers. The local governments of these regions can levy heavy octroi duties and terminal taxes, etc., which are provincial subjets, on the manufactures, of Ahmadabad, Bombay and other industrial towns of Hindu India to facilitate the marketing of foreign manufactures in their territories. The foreign manufacturers, in order to earn this discrimination, can

offer to purchase raw materials from these agricultural provinces. Apparently this suggestion sounds well; but the question is, will not the burden of high tariffs, levied by the central government, ultimately fall on the consumers of these Muslim tracts? Will not the foreign manufacturers sell here their goods at prices which will include the cost price, the customs duties and the profits? For these reasons this suggestion is not sound. In no way will the Sind regions be able to escape the dire consequences of joining the All-India Federation. Then Section 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935 also provides against any such discrimination. Moreover, it is no use trying bitter experience first and then seeking remedy against it.

CHAPTER II

RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE MUSLIMS

IN the preceding pages we have shown —

(1) that the relations of the Hindus and Muslims in the past have been anything but happy and that past experience does not point to their ever becoming cordial in the future;

(2) that communalism is a natural relationship between them; and

(3) that the data from which a single nation of Hindus and Muslims could be inferred is notoriously absent in their case.

Now let us proceed to see what other considerations are there to make separation a necessity. These considerations relate to the integrity of Islamic faith, preservation of Islamic culture and security of the economic interests of the Muslims. Let us consider them one by one.

(1)

MUSLIM RELIGIOUS INTERESTS

SO far as the religious interests of the Muslims

are concerned, we need not enter upon any lengthy discussion involving a survey of their religious condition during their political supremacy in India and after their downfall. It would suffice to say that under the British they have been enjoying religious freedom so far as religious customs, usages and beliefs are concerned. Although apparently they have been allowed complete religious freedom yet by subtle methods and deep tactics the religious freedom granted to them has been curtailed and they have not been allowed to develop those tendencies which ought to have taken birth in them if they had been allowed to practise Islam in its right spirit and which would have continuously made them the rivals of the ruling nation. Their contentment in this respect is due to their comparatively fresh memories of times when they were not allowed to enjoy even such a curtailed religious freedom as at present, for example, under the Sikh rule in the North-Western India, especially towards its close. The right spirit of Islam, the characteristic features of which are an immense love of liberty and profound respect for the enjoinings of the Quranic Law—things which made Islam a great force in the past—could not develop in the degenerate Muslim generations of the periods which immediately followed their downfall in India. This decadence was due to the debasing influences to which they became exposed on account of the passing away of their temporal power, the very presence of which was so helpful in maintaining the

supremacy of the Muslims and their culture over other communities and cultures, respectively.

The intentions of the Hindus towards the Muslims and their faith are clear from the virulence with which various attempts (Arya Samaj's unreasoned onslaught on Islam is a typical example), were made during the last quarter of the 19th century and the first quarter of the present century, to extirpate them from India. Although they could not do any harm to the cause of Islam and Islamic culture in India, yet they prove the *mala fides* of the Hindus towards the Muslims.

The religious tolerance which the non-Muslims outwardly show towards Muslims is not due to their being really tolerant of other religions but to the fact that a third power is there to keep the scales even between them both. Their subdued passions against Islam often find expression in the shape of music before mosques and obstruction to Muharram processions, etc.

The integrity of Islam and the social and economic position of the Muslims in India cannot remain safe so long as they do not wield unimpaired political power in those parts of India which are theirs by numbers.

(2)

MUSLIM CULTURAL INTERESTS

THE cultural interests of the Muslims are in danger on account of the fact that the Muslims

happen to be very tolerant of other religions, cultures and creeds, while the Hindus are not. The more the Hindus gain power the more they will become intolerant of all that is necessary to maintain the integrity of the Muslims as a separate and independent community. A community which could for centuries enforce untouchability on the Muslims with their implicit consent even in their palmy days, cannot be expected to respect the integrity of the Muslim faith after coming into power. Even to-day we find that the Hindus are adversely affecting the Islamic culture on account of the advantage they enjoy over Muslims by virtue of their strong economic position. Through cinematographic films whose dialogues run in the most florid Hindi and whose plots expressly aim at bringing out the finer traits of Hindu culture in order to establish its superiority over other cultures, the Muslims are imbibing influences which are fraught with dangerous consequences to Islam, Islamic culture and Islamic languages. The attempts of the Hindus at the revival of their culture with the object of establishing its superiority over other cultures, have succeeded so far that the Muslims have already begun to feel ashamed of cartain aspects of their own culture, a fact which amounts to an admission on their part that their culture is defective and inferior to that of the Hindus.

The Hindus themselves are a very adaptable people. There being no hard and fast rules of religion to guide them in their daily life, as is the case with

the Muslims, they readily accept all outward appurtenances of other civilizations without experiencing any inward change. Their outward appearance may change, as it has been changing through the centuries by their coming into contact with every new race that happened to conquer India, but the stamp of Hindu culture on their inner selves will always remain intact. They have preserved their racial character, mentality and outlook on life exactly as it was centuries before the advent of Islam in India. On the other hand the Muslims have lost that inner imprint which Islam had made on their minds. Islam no longer claims the same allegiance from them that it did a few centuries ago. Sub-consciously they have discarded Islam while consciously they are sticking to it. Their faith in Islam has degraded itself into the fear of the sanctions behind it. Their practice of Islam has become divorced from their professions about it. The divergence between their practice of and professions re Islam is responsible for their degeneration. Direct and glaring aggressions against Islam rouse their sentiments but subtle and invisible influences operating against it, even if they cut at its very root, go unchallenged. Both Islamic culture and the Muslims have fallen under Hindu influences. The causes of this deterioration are, (1) close contact of the Muslim civilization with the Hindu civilization, (2) the natural affinity which developed between them as a result of this contact, and (3) the fact that Islam won a large number of its followers from Hindu-

ism, who brought with them certain elements of Hindu civilization and who were permitted to keep fresh their associations with their old faith and culture by maintaining some of the Hindu usages. If it was necessary to have the Muslim population mixed up with the Hindu population everywhere in the country, to help the expansion of Islam, it was also necessary to set up a Muslim base at some safe situation and to isolate it socially and politically from the rest of the country, in order to keep it immune from the debasing influences of alien cultures and creeds. Such a base could have been of service for feeding Islamic tendencies in all parts of India. From such a base disintegration appearing within a Muslim community in Hindu surroundings, its dissociation from Islam, could have also been combated. The need of establishing such a base as a defensive measure still continues.

LANGUAGE

OF all the factors which distinguish Islamic culture from other cultures in India, only the newborn language of the Muslims, Urdu, has somehow or other escaped the all-embracing influence of the Hindu culture. But now that the Hindus have obtaind political power, it is no longer possible for Urdu to continue to hold its own against Hindi. The Hindus have already started an intensive propaganda for popularizing Hindi all over India. Large number of publications in Hindi have begun to appear.

They first prepared the ground for it by handling the political situation in India in a very scientific manner. To begin with they organized themselves and then gained political power. Now they are using that power as a means for the revival of Hindu culture and the achievement of the Hindu social ideals, which also include a vigorous propaganda to make Hindi the *lingua franca* of India. The cultural rivalries between the Muslims and Hindus, which are bound to become more acute with the passing of more political power into their hands, have already made a start in the battle which is raging between the advocates of Urdu and Hindi. Urdu has a clear advantage over Hindi on account of the existence of a good deal of literature published in the Persian script and, therefore, it can for the present defy the attempts of the Hindus to abolish it as a living language. Another advantage which Urdu enjoys over Hindi is that all the Muslims unanimously claim it to be their common language while the Hindus do not claim Hindi as the language of all the Hindu areas. But with the development of Hindi and the production of more literature in it, it will become increasingly difficult for Urdu to resist the attempts at its abolition. Although the Muslims have begun to produce literature in Urdu at an accelerated pace, cinematography which is absolutely in the hands of the Hindus, is seriously affecting its growth. Cinematography as a means of popularizing Hindi and Hindu culture has a great

advantage over the published Urdu literature. The Urdu publications reach only a few who are literates in Urdu while thousands of people who daily throng cinema halls to see Hindi films, portraying Hindu life, replace their Urdu vocabulary with Hindi words. The fact that Hindi vocabulary can easily be acquired through the agency of films while Urdu vocabulary can only be acquired by oral instruction or reading, may some day drive Urdu out of the field. A film-goer throws his heart open to the effect of the stories and is powerfully impressed by the salient qualities of the culture they depict. He cannot afford to be critical while seeing a picture. Criticism of the story while seeing it means losing its pleasure. Hence he cannot be expected to be on the guard against imbibing Hindu cultural influences while seeing a film. Moreover, the very cheapness of this form of recreation attracts people and once attracted, Hindu practices and Hindi words and phrases catch their fancy to the disadvantage of Islamic usages and Urdu words. Compared to the Muslims, the Hindu masses are so biased against all that is Islamic that even in a recreative thing like the Cinema, they want that the whole atmosphere of the film should be Hindu. In order to cater to their taste the film producers often introduce Muslim actors and actresses under Hindu names and return stories written by Muslim authors in Urdu with a polite request that wherever possible Urdu words may be replaced by Hindi words. The dislike

for every thing that is Islamic cannot go further. It will not be necessary for the Hindus to inflict a violent death on Islamic culture and languages. These will simply wither away without the Muslims even feeling it—an euthanasia.

MUSLIMS' SEPARATE ENTITY

ALL the constituents which make the Muslims a separate entity in India have lost their true quality. It is feared that the more Hindu culture is revived, the more Muslim culture will become modified and merged into Hinduism. The first to revert to the fold of Hinduism would be the Hindu converts to Islam who embraced it centuries ago but did not discard some of the Hindu customs which they brought with them. The fact that already in some parts of the country the Muslims are governed by the Hindu Law of inheritance and customary law and also observe caste system almost as strictly as the Hindus do, will encourage the tendencies in them to adopt Hindu civilization. The more the Hindus become politically powerful, the more will Hindu culture come to the forefront and Islamic culture recede into the background. In a federated India, on account of their superior strength in the central assembly and economic position, the Hindus will be able to damage Muslim culture even more seriously than they have done hitherto. The culture of a politically superior nation often dominates

other cultures. The masses unconsciously copy the customs and habits of the dominant community. The Muslim masses, it is feared, will not form an exception to this rule. Even if they continued to call themselves Muslims, they would not be the model Muslims which Islam expects them to be. They would be something like the Muslim Gujar community of the Kangra district who are nominally Muslim but in actual practice much nearer to Hinduism than Islam. This small community worship idols of Hazrat Ali and the Holy Prophet. This is due to their Hindu surroundings.

(3)

MUSLIM ECONOMIC INTERESTS

MUSLIM LABOUR

THE Muslim labouring classes in urban areas are generally backward, uneducated and disorganized. Compared to their brethren of the countryside they are a bit better, a little more advanced and alive to the political needs of their community. Their comparatively better condition is the result of the general enlightened atmosphere that prevails in the cities and towns and is not due to any concerted effort on their own part. Although they are conscious of their ills, they are not in a position to remedy them.

TRADE

THE non-Muslim trade and industrial concerns

are so well organized and run on communal lines that Muslims cannot stand competition against them even if they try to start any trade or industry. All the trading and industrial concerns are owned by the non-Muslims, generally Hindus, who prefer to borrow capital for industrial and trade purposes from Hindu insurance companies and banks, which means that there is no chance, for the Muslim insurance companies and banks to flourish, even if they are started under the control and management of very efficient persons. On the other hand in the field of trade and industry where capital has often to be borrowed, the Muslims have little chance, the money-market being entirely in the hands of the Hindus, who will not advance loans to them for any of these purposes. The Muslims have no organized capital but still if any Muslim concern were to overcome the difficulty of acquiring capital the problem that would face it, would be that of marketing. All markets being in the hands of the non-Muslims, the goods of such a Muslim manufacturing company would either not be purchased at all or if they are purchased will not sell on account of the keen competition from the Hindus. Hence the non-Muslims are in a position to defeat all the attempts of the Muslims at industrial or trade enterprize.

Many times the Muslims have started *Bazars* in order to boycott the Hindus and cease buying from and selling to them but they have always failed miserably to attain any of these objectives. Even

the village grain markets which ought to have been controlled by the Muslims, owing to the agricultural industry being in their hands, are controlled by the Hindus. Concerns like banks, insurance or trading companies, foreign agencies and corporations of public services like electric supply companies and communications are held and run by the non-Muslims. Their method of successfully starting such concerns is to include one or two very influential Muslim shareholders in the board of directors and allot them the work of popularizing them with their co-religionists through their influence and stopping any opposition proceeding from them. After a concern becomes well established the Muslim directors are either purchased or demoralized by the advance of heavy loans to them and if possible even made to resign by having things made hot for them on the board of directors. The Hindu business concerns and corporations have at present a free hand in the North-Western Muslim area. In other words the non-Muslim capitalists are controlling the Muslim masses. The non-Muslims enter the services and control the departments. They wholly usurp the state aid, if any, to industry.

By securing control over the Government they secure control over the trade and industry of the country. Let us illustrate this point by a reference to the Hydro-Electric Schemes which were put forward before the Punjab Government for consideration in the early twenties of the present century. The first proposal was about the present Uhl River Hydro-

Electric Scheme. Some Hindu capitalists brought forward a rival scheme, namely the Madhopur Hydro-Electric Scheme. The important feature of this scheme was that it was to be a private and not a state concern. The motive behind the intention to run it as a private concern had more to do with the desire to secure profits for the rich Hindu shareholders than with any solicitude for efficiency and economy in the matter of construction and working expenses. If this proposal had been accepted, its shares would have been sold and, the Hindus being the capitalists, most of them would have been purchased by them. The scheme was intended to supply electric current to all the urban areas for the purposes of lighting as well as motive power for electrically worked machines of presses and factories and to rural areas for agricultural purposes, for example the working of tube-wells and fodder-cutting machines, etc. What would have been the results if the Madhopur Hydro-Electric Scheme proposal had been accepted? It being a private concern, the Hydro-Electric staff at Madhopur would have been non-Muslim, the staffs at the main and sub-stations would have been non-Muslim, the staffs of the consuming centres in electrified towns, etc., would have been non-Muslim ; the non-Muslim factory owners would have got current easily and obstacles would have been placed in the way of giving current to the Muslim manufacturers, to save the former from the competition of the latter ; the non-Muslim rural areas would have got current in preference to the Muslim

rural areas. Then again suppose that the rural areas had got current from the said private Hydro-Electric concern and the Government had also by state aid to industry helped the rural population which is mostly Muslim. Now imagine whether under such circumstances it could have been possible for the Government to enact all the agrarian legislation and other legislation to control the malpractices and nocent activities of the money-lenders? In the first instance the Government would not have dared to move all this legislation and in case it had moved and enacted it, the capitalist Hindus would not only have passed resolutions not to give credit to the rural people but also would have resolved to stop current to the rural areas and it would have brought many a machine employed in cottage industry, and electrically worked tube-wells and fodder-cutters to a stand still. And this would have meant not only waste of some working days but also of the money spent on all those machines, etc. These were the dangers to which the Muslim rural population would have been continuously open if the said Hydro-Electric Scheme had materialized as a private concern.

Now let us try to see what happened after the Uhl River Hydro-Electric Scheme got through the House and became an accopmplished fact. A Hindu Minister was put in charge of the Department. He exercised his patronage regarding services mostly in favour of the non-Muslims. Also during the period of its construction as well as after its completion,

in many towns of the province contracts were given to non-Muslim electric supply companies, with the result that so long as the periods for which these contracts have been given do not expire, the Muslims will have no representation on the staffs of the said electrict supply companies and the non-Muslims will continue to get employmet, as well as profits. The Government invested money in the scheme by borrowing and has to pay a large amount of interest on it every year. In the interest of the province the ealier the borrowed capital is paid up the better. If there had been no contracts of electric supply given to various private companies in the various towns, these towns would have been electrified from the Government's Uhl River Hydro-Electrict Scheme and all the profits would have come to the public exchequer and the payment of at least a part of the borrowed capital invested in the scheme could have been made a good deal earlier. It would have meant the saving of a large amount of money which is now going into the pockets of private persons. All the profits which these Hindu private concerns earn are in reality a burden on the Muslims, who are the consumers. They are being burdened with the amount of profits which the non-Muslim shareholders of the electric supply companies divide among themselves without even the advantage of getting employment on the staffs employed by them. As a particular instance we have the Lahore Electric Supply

Company. The share-holders are non-Muslims and earn all its profits. All its staff is recruited from the non-Muslims. The consumers are mostly Muslims and they have not even the consolation of getting employment in the said company. They only get bills for the current consumed by them. And when the period of this company's contract expired some years back and the proposal was made that the Government should take it over, the Hindu opposition urged that if at all the Government decide to take it over, it should take it as it is with all the Hindu staff in it. And the Hindu Minister very patriotically said that he did not want to break so beautifully run an Indian company. Although every one saw the immoral motive which this beautiful phrase covered none could do anything. The result was that its lease was extended for another long period. And when this period draws to a close the company will agree to get the bulk supply of electric current from the Government's Hydro-Electric Department and will pay for it and continue as a Hindu concern dividing the profits among its Hindu shareholders. Similarly in the case of other Hindu Electric Supply Companies working in other towns of the province the period of their contracts will be extended for similar reasons. Some Hindu Minister will come to their aid and will extend their lease with a compliment. The Muslim majority of the province will continue to pay the staff of the Hydro-Electic Department and also the heavy amount of interest

on the capital invested on the Scheme year by year and no one will be able to raise his little finger in their support. Pitiable is the plight of orphans. And notwithstanding all this Hindus taunt the Muslims with seeking protection from the foreigner. If the English could protect us, we would be thankful but the tragedy is that even they can no longer do it. It appears that even their protection can no longer be of any avail against Hindu aggression. They tried to protect us with the Land Alienation Act; but it hit them as well as us on the head. Some good people thought that by dropping the Madhopur Hydro-Electric Scheme they were protecting us but the results show that their efforts have failed. Verily the conditions portend evil. They may lead to a revolution. It would be in the interests of all concerned if a peaceful solution of the whole problem is sought.

To sum up it can safely be said that the Muslims have little share in the trade and industry of their country. To-day when their weak economic condition compels them to have recourse to economic activities, the Hindu monpolizers make their efforts in this direction unavailing.

CAUSES OF HINDU MONOPOLIZATION OF TRADE AND INDUSTY AND MUSLIMS' LACK OF TRADE ENTERPRIZE

IT is often alleged that Hindu monopolization of

trade and industry in the Muslim areas of North-West India is due to the Muslims' own fault, for they do not organize their capital, are wasteful and lack business enterprize. This is a wrong assertion. When once a community secures a position of economic vantage over another it becomes highly difficult to drive it out of it. Had it been so easy the Germans would not have resorted to the drastic step of expelling the Jews from their country to escape from the economic stranglehold which they had secured over them. Under the present circumstances it is impossible for the Muslims to surmount the difficulties that lie in the way of their securing a proper share in the trade and industry of their country. The apathy which they show towards these occupations is the result of discouragement and is not due to any lack of initiative on their part. It was by sheer chance that the Hindus forestalled them in these fields. All through the Muslim domination in India, the trade remained in the hands of the Hindus: Rather they were encouraged to adopt this occupation. The Muslims never felt the need of resorting to it. Civil and Military departments were sufficient to absorb them. Moreover the trade in those times was not so important and paying as it is to-day. Another factor which helped the Hindus to monopolise trade and industry was that when the trade relations between India and Europe were established the European firms set up their trading Kothies

first in presidecies like Bombay and Madras, where Hindus predominated. It was but natural for them to enter into business relations first with the Hindus on account of their excessive availability and also because the internal trade of the country was already in their hands. With the advent of machinery the European firms flooded the Indian markets with their manufactures. This had an adverse effect on the indigenous crafts which were mostly in the hands of the Muslims. As the landbound North-West Muslim Block was far away from the ports which are situated in the predominantly Hindu country it doubly missed the chance of getting the middleman's occupations, foreign agencies, etc., which all went to the Hindus. It was also the last to pass under British rule. Consequently it was but natural that the Hindus should get the chance of becoming agents of foreign manufacturers both for the sale of their finished goods and supply of raw material to them. Later on the Indian market was expanded to the North-West Muslim Block through the Hindu agents who approached the local Hindus first with whom they had a natural affinity, with the result that even in these Muslim areas the Hindus became the agents of the foreign firms. For the last three centuries at least, the Hindus have been getting the middleman's profit, and accumulating it. And as there was no other avenue to invest all these profits which they were earning except moneylending, they started

lending and charging high rates of interest with a vengeance. On account of this advantage which fell to them at the very start of the European trade with India and the extensive usury to which they had recourse, the Hindus have got an immense advantage over the Muslims in every field of life. Their success in business, industry and politics has been due to this. The Muslims, as already said, in the beginning of trade relations with the West, never cared to devote any attention to trade. Moreover, as the English had won their Empire from the Muslims, they trusted the Hindus in preference to them. The Muslims also, as they had a grievance against the English, stood aloof from them. Perhaps the English intentionally let the Hindus have the middleman's profit in preference to the Muslims, whom they regarded as a vanquished enemy and consequently rivals for political power.

It appears that in India Islam got most of its following from the agricultural classes and the lower castes, the former as is usual everywhere in the world being also the martial classes. The economic reason for it is quite clear. The agricultural and fighting classes, by embracing Islam wanted to secure the patronage of the Muslim state. The lower castes adopted Islam because they wanted to escape the tyranny of the higher castes. So long as the Muslim rule lasted these classes and castes continued to enjoy the advantages which

they had secured by embracing Islam. All through the period of Muslim rule in India, it appears, the trading classes avoided Islam. And the apparent reason for it is that Islam preaches against usury, a lucrative profession among the Hindus, and also because its spirit runs counter to unjustly earned profits. Only a few members of the Hindu trading classes embraced Islam, and continued their profession even after their conversion. The Khojas are the only people whose occupation is trade. The trade, therefore, all through the period of Muslim rule in India remained in the hands of the Hindu trading classes but at that time it was not as profitable a profession as it became after the industrial revolution in Europe. As explained elsewhere large profits, combined with high rates of interest, middleman's profits, etc., helped the Hindu trading classes to become rich and to reduce the Muslims as well as the non-trading Hindu castes of India to a position of economic slavery.

MUSLIM REPRESENTATION IN SERVICES

ONLY a few years back, Muslims' representation in the various services of their country was notoriously inadequate. For the last forty years they have been trying continuously to get their due share in the services, yet their efforts in this direction have been of no avail. Almost all the Government Departments, even in the Muslim provinces,

are the monopoly of the non-Muslims. The technique of the method employed by the non-Muslim ministers, appointing authorities and officers to wrongfully help their communities, at the cost of the Muslims, in the matters of appointments, promotions, fixation, revision and enhancement of grades of pay, grants of honorariums, preparation of seniority lists of the subordinates and enteries in their character rolls, should form a separate subject of study. We hope to bring out, at our earliest opportunity, a pamphlet dealing with the subject.

AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS

THE LAND ALIENATION ACT

AS regards the Muslim agricultural population and their agricultural interests, it is a fact as broad as day-light that the Hindu money-lenders have been their ruin.

The Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1901 was passed to protect the Punjab agriculturists, mostly Muslims, from being expropriated by the Hindu money-lenders and we know how, during these last 38 years, the non-agriculturist money-lenders have nullified its effects. The purpose of that Act was to provide for the economic safety of the agriculturists; but the Hindu non-agriculturists who were denied the right to purchase agricultural land undid its purpose by multifarious methods of depriving the agriculturists of the income from land. They bled the agricul-

turists white by excessive rates of interest within a short time of the passage of that Act. They were denied possession of land but they got the real thing, the income from land. They also monopolized the grain markets and looted the unsophisticated agriculturists by unfair cesses and practices. We know that even the Government had to admit the failure of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act to protect the agriculturists and had to pass supplementary legislation for the purpose. The rural population is so very much under the thumb of the Hindu money-lenders that no legislation can be expected to rescue them unless they are given full political power to manage their own affairs in their parts of the country.

SEPARATION, THE ONLY CONCLUSION

AT present the trade and industrial interests of the Muslims are but nominal. Necessity compels them to demand their full share in the trade and industry of their country. In a federated India dominated by the Hindu capitalists and industrialists, it is not possible for them to have their proper share in these interests. Their representation in services is inadequate. Their agricultural interests are in danger. In short no economic or cultural interest of the Muslims is safe. All their interests can be safeguarded only by separation of their regions from Hindu India.

CHAPTER III

SEPARATION OF THE NORTH-WEST MUSLIM BLOCK FROM INDIA

ITS IMPORTANCE

IN our previous discussions we have seen that the Muslims are very much handicapped economically and cannot hope to ameliorate their material condition by the methods they have been employing so far, for that purpose. We have also observed that on account of their weak economic position and close contact with Hinduism even their cultural interests are not secure. The attempts to secure their economic and cultural interests by arriving at an understanding with the non-Muslims have come to grief. We have also noted how communalism is the abiding feature of Hindu-Muslim relations and how development of the sentiment of nationalism between the two communities is impossible on account of the glaring absence of all those factors which go to form a nation. We also know that all along Muslim politics have been in a tangle. In fact during the last few centuries Muslims have been on the horns of a dilemma and recently even

more so. If to achieve independence they side with the Congress, which they believe is no better than the Hindu Mahasabha, their economic as well as cultural interests become endangered; on the other hand if they stand out of it in order to preserve their integrity, they sacrifice their political ideal of independence and agree to perpetual slavery. They tried to reconcile these two interests by effecting a compromise with the Hindus. The terms of the pact they concluded with the Hindus could not be implemented because the Hindus are not a united people who could, one and all, respect any pact. If the Muslims were to conclude another pact with the Congress, it is sure that the Mahasabha will again denounce it as unauthorized and will leave no stone unturned to make it a dead letter. If on the other hand they were to approach the Hindu Mahasabha with a similar purpose, the terms which that body would offer to them, would be such that it would be better for them to commit suicide than to accept them. And even supposing that a pact is successfully concluded with the Hindus, its terms are implemented, the rights and privileges of the communities are readjusted, India achieves independence, and the economic position of both the communities becomes ideal. Will it solve the Hindu-Muslim problem? No, because this problem is not only limited to its economic aspect but has also religious and cultural aspects. After a certain stage of economic felicity,

each of them will be prompted by the genius particular to it, to realize its social, cultural and economic ideals. This will again lead to religious intolerance, communal tension and a clash which would be ruinous for them both.

UNIFORMITY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE

IT may be argued that if the communities continued to receive the inspiration and impetus they have been receiving during the last three centuries from the West to progress on Western lines a time will soon be reached when they will become uniform in every respect. This is preposterous. We see in the life of our urban population a dual system at work. In public they show that they have adopted Western civilization and one may sometimes even fail to know a Hindu from a Muslim. But inside their homes a Muslim is a Muslim and a Hindu a Hindu and we miss the uniformity which Western civilization has given them in their public life. In reality each community wants to copy the methods of the West to improve its economic condition and not to adopt Western culture. As in actual practice it is denied them to adopt Western methods to improve their economic well-being, they unconsciously practise self-deception by taking up and copying the distinguishing features of the Western people, for example, their dress, manners and habits, which are easy

to adopt. We already see Indianization in dress is one of the results of the political reforms. The same is the case of Japan. Japan has adopted Western civilization to the extent to which it is necessary for improving her economic position. The Japanese culture continues to dominate the domestic life of the people of Japan. A people who have their own particular civilization and culture never adopt an alien civilization. They only adopt it to the extent to which it is expected to serve some useful end. In the case of the Hindus and the Muslims also it is true that they have not adopted Western civilization for its own sake but just because under the present circumstances the acquisition of some economic benefits depends upon it. In an Independent India they may adopt the Western methods of acquiring economic and political ends but they will never replace their own cultures by Western culture. The Hindu culture and the Islamic culture will continue to hold sway in Hindu and Muslim homes, respectively, even if after achieving independence they adopt Western methods of organization both in commercial as well as political fields. The communities will never discard their particular cultures in favour of some alien culture. The expectations that by the adoption of an alien culture the Hindus and Muslims will become uniform and a single nation, cannot materialize and as such the communal question cannot die.

THE URGENT NEED OF MUSLIMS

THE failure of Hindu-Muslim relations, as shown in Chapter I, point to the one conclusion that the Muslims will either have to remain content with the present state of affairs or discover some new political ideal wherein all clash between their various loyalties could cease. This ideal should be such that in it their territorial loyalties and their allegiance to their faith should find a happy compromise and it should also ensure to them their economic and cultural interests backed by an absolute political power. Such an ideal will also remove the division which we witness among their ranks to-day and also the chaos in which their politics have been during the last 300 years. This ideal could be none else than the one, the prospects of which are held out to the Muslims by separation of their regions from Hindu India. This ideal is sound and practicable and upon it depends their existence as a separate, self-respecting and honoured community. It is their legitimate heritage to enjoy full state power in all those parts of India where they are in an overwhelming majority. The revival of Islamic culture and orthodox Islam, the betterment of the Muslim masses, the securing of trade and industrial interests and the restoration of self-respect to them, depend upon their having separate states of their own whether within or without the Commonwealth of Nations.

If the warning given by Mr. Calvert carries any weight, it must make the Muslims consider their position seriously and realize the grave dangers that await them in the near future. They must try to find out ways and means of escaping the evil consequences of their inclusion in the Indian Federation. They must realize that the integrity of their faith, culture and language depends upon their economic well-being. The coming federation will considerably hamper their economic, political and social progress.

Muslims and Hindus are a heterogeneous population. Two different species can be tied together but cannot be put together as belonging to one type. To bind fast the Muslims with the Hindus in a federation dominated by the latter, would be denying to the North-West Muslim Block and Bengal the right to realize, develop and fulfil themselves.

CAUSES OF MUSLIM FAILURES

IF the demoralization of the Muslims is due to their failures, the failures in their turn are due to their loss of power. Had they been a people with any prestige, many of the side issues, which we need not enumerate here, would not have arisen and even if they had arisen, they would not have been decided against them. The one great need of the moment is to focus all attention on the real problem, which is the recapture of political power,

at least in their own homes, the Indusstan and Bengal, in order to reduce the stubborn opposition of their opponents, to regain their lost prestige, and to safeguard their economic and cultural interests against the dangers to which they will be exposed in the Indian Federation. Had they successfully isolated their homes, the North-West Muslim Block and Bengal, from alien interference after their downfall in India, they would not have been a disorganized and an undisciplined people. There would have been no clash between their religious and political ideals. The loyalty of the Muslims to their country, which was common to them with the Hindus, clashed against their allegiance to their religion and culture because it required tampering with the latter. Rightly considered this clash had resulted from a wrong conception of the country, which ought to have signified to them only those portions of India on which their population was thickest even if they happened to be contiguous with some other parts of the vast Hindu sub-continent. Their extension of the conception of motherland even to Hindu parts of India, simply because a small population of their co-religionists happened to live there, has been responsible in a large measure for the confusion and complications in their politics. If they had considered only the far eastern province of Bengal and some portions of Assam and the North-Western tracts of India as their motherland and had successfully reserved these parts for them-

selves, their position would not have been what it is to-day, and the clash of ideals and loyalties, which dissipated their energy and contributed towards their failures, would not have appeared and they would not have been in a cleft stick as they are to-day. Various problems arising from the demands of patriotism on the one hand and fidelity to religion on the other would have been reconciled if leaving aside the other Muslim tracts in India they had reserved only these two Muslim zones exclusively for themselves. They would never have wavered between their religion and country since such a complex arises only in those lands which harbour two or more communities, one of which has some tie binding it to a foreign country.

HINDUS AND MUSLIMS, DIFFERENT ENTITIES

FROM our previous discussions we find that the Hindus and Muslims are two absolutely different entities. Their civilizations are pronouncedly individualistic and although they may have influenced each other yet they cannot suffer absorption into each other. Their habits and customs, social systems, moral codes, religious, political and cultural ideals, traditions, languages, literature, architecture, art and outlook on life are absolutely different from, nay, hostile to one another. These heterogeneous essentials of their respective lives are not the elements which go to the formation of a single nation. They always create mutual distrust

and misuuderstanding. The basic differences between the communities, the memories of their past and present rivalries and the wrongs they registered against each other during the last one thousand years form an unbridgeable gulf between them. As we have already observed the only thing common between them for the last few centuries has been the common yoke to a foreign rule. As soon as the cord which binds them in a common allegiance to a foreign state snaps they will disintegrate and their mutual differences, which are not felt at present as acutely as they should, will show themselves more glaringly. These factors, as well as the experience gained from the failure of unity talks and attempts at concluding pacts whether after or before the three Round Table Conferences point to the serious necessity of separation.

A CALL TO THE CONGRESS

IT is high time that the Congress showed enough moral courage to admit its failure in uniting the communities into a single nation. It has attempted for over half a century to bring them together. It has not succeeded in persuading the communities to sink their religious and cultural differences and in giving them a single view-point regarding the political situation obtainable in India. The Congress should not waste any more time on this experiment and should at once proceed to revise its

opinions, as also the data on which they are based. It should view the situation from a correct angle and should not close its eyes to the reality in order to run blindly after the fiction of a single nation. It, once for all, must understand that the country is too large and diversified geographically, socially economically, religiously, linguistically and politically and that its organization on national lines is not possible on account of the fact that its various parts are far flung, and prohibitive distances intervene between them, making co-ordination and co-operation impracticable. It is an established fact that the various cultural zones of India refuse to co-operate and a movement which starts in the far eastern province of Bengal dies by the time it reaches the far North-Western Frontier Province. The Congress must realize its limitations and should cease attempting the organization of the whole of the Indian sub-continent as a single country, inhabited by a single nation. The only solution under the circumstances is to allow the unwilling partners to separate. Their separation would never mean the disintegration of India. It would result in a better co-ordination, for the solution of India's problems is not a federation of different units but a confederation of various states.

DISRUPTIVE TENDENCIES

OUR past history has a lesson to teach. Under the

Muslims, so long as the central government remained strong the centrifugal tendencies which were natural remained curbed; but as soon as the hold of the central government relaxed, they appeared and the different parts of the Empire disintegrated. The rise of the Marhattas in the South and the supremacy of the Sikhs in the North-West were not only political revolts but were also Hindu cultural revolts against Islamic culture. When the Marhattas became supreme in India, the Muslims started intriguing against them and invited Ahmad Shah to their aid. Ahmad Shah invaded India and broke the Marhatta power. The same thing happend after Maharaja Ranjit Singh's death. The Sikhs showed religious intolerance towards the Muslims and the Muslims, who had no hope of getting aid from Afghanistan, hopefully looked forward to the occupation of the Punjab by the English. Even before Maharaja Ranjit Singh the Muslims had been intriguing with Zaman Shah of Afghanistan against the non-Muslim domination of India. Supposing India gets independence and there is no third party to keep the communal tendencies in check. In such a single independent India the communal rivalries of the communities will set them against each other. The Muslims will hatch intrigues against the Hindu predominance at the centre, the Hindus of the Muslim provinces will show discontent against the local governments and, by and by, the whole past history of India will repeat itself item by item.

CONFEDERATION OF INDIA

CULTURALLY separated India under two or more central governments united in a confederation will be strong, while politically united India under one central government will be weak. India partitioned between the Muslims and Hindus will also be different from the disunited India of the pre-Muslim period or the period which preceded its occupation by the English.

The experiment of tying together the unwilling communities in a single federation, as already resolved upon, cannot succeed in the interests of the Indians. It may prove itself to be a great success for the rulers. The All-India Federation will be a failure because it is based on the wrong assumption that Hindus and Muslims are one nation. A federated India can never be the solution of the internal problems of India. The Hindus of North-Western India will not give up their aggressive and "have-all" tendencies so long as they know that in the rest of India their community dominate and they can have their support. To secure weightage for the Muslim minorities in the Hindu provinces, the Muslims of the North-Western India will have to submit to coercion and aggression practised by the local Hindus without in any way materially helping their co-religionists of those provinces. The minorities, whether Hindu or Muslim, in their respective provinces, will always expect weightage and cause

trouble to secure it. It would be much better to deny any such expectations of the minorities once for all. Otherwise it will continuously mar the prospects of India's becoming completely independent or even her becoming an equal partner in the Commonwealth of Nations. Would it not be better to allow the incoherent parts to disintegrate and consolidate separately? Let India be partitioned between the Hindus and Muslims. It would be to the advantage of both of them. To agree to be linked with the Hindus in a common federation dominated by the latter for the sake of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces, will ruin the cause of Islam and Islamic culture even in the Muslim parts. It will not guarantee safety to the Muslim minorities and Islamic culture in the Hindu provinces. A common federation of the Hindus and Muslims may even adversely affect the programme of the Hindus, in reviving Hindu culture even in the definitely Hindu provinces, for their every attempt in this direction will be strongly protested against by the Muslims of all parts of India. It is very possible that in such a federation both the communities may rot and remain backward, fighting against each other with intrigues and counter-intrigues, thus impeding one another in the materialization of their respective programmes regarding cultural revival, etc.

The duty of the Muslims of Indusstan and Bengal lies first to themselves. Let them first set their own house in order and then think of helping their

brethren elsewhere. They must once for all understand that their benefit lies in separation and in concentrating all their energies on the formation of the Federations of the Sind Regions and Bengal separately.

Mr. Calvert, after pointing out all the dangers to which North-Western India will be exposed in the foreshadowed federation, arrives at the unavoidable conclusion that these parts should be federated separately. To quote his exact words: "It has been shown that under a federal system there is an overpowering tendency to rely upon higher and ever higher customs duties to meet federal expenses until either rebellion or ruin or secession comes to the relief of the agricultural members; Burma has already won her escape from the threatened future and the suggestion arises whether it would not be wiser at the outset to forestall the almost inevitable ruin of agriculture and the agriculturists by allowing the provinces dependent upon this source of livelihood to form a federation separate from that of the industrially-minded. The Punjab, Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind and the Indian States served by the North-Western Railway with the free port of Karachi, if permitted to federate separately from the rest of India might escape the evil consequences of a central government relying under the corrupt influence of the protectionists, on the stifling of the international trade for its resources. The rural people cannot,

for ever, remain ignorant of the heavy burdens imposed upon them or of the causes of the continued low prices of their produce and the removal of markets from their reach and when realization comes, it will be difficult to see how India will be able to escape from demands for secession."

THE CONSTITUTION AS DRAFTED IN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935

THE way in which the Indian Muslims have been behaving during the last 150 years is quite in accord with their circumstances. Any nation placed in the same predicament would have behaved exactly in the same manner. Bewildered by the break-up of their power and their backwardness in a world that had suddenly advanced with long strides, surrounded by political rivals on all sides, placed in circumstances that were quite new to them, it was not surprising if the Muslims for a long time failed to discover the right ideal to which they could offer their loyalties. They formed various ideals at various times and tried them all one after the other. They tried to recapture their lost political power by revolt. But they failed. They tried to rehabilitate their economic position by adapting themselves to the needs of the new times. But their attempts in this direction also failed. They tried to unite themselves with the Hindus, first in 1885 and then in 1916. But they found that it was not practicable. The effect of the experiment of union with the Hindus is, that a majority of them has

become convinced of its impossibility. A section of them who happen to be unimaginative think that failing Hindu-Muslim unity, the *status quo* as based on the Communal Award is the last word in the politics of India. But those who can see through the mists of the present perturbed times are convinced that the Muslims are sooner or later going to be dissatisfied with the 1935 constitution. The reasons advanced in support of their contention are that the more the Hindu community tastes political power the more aggressive it will become. Against the aggression effected by the Hindus, the Communal Award will not provide any security to the Muslims, whether in their own provinces or in Hindu provinces. The Punjab Muslims are convinced that soon they will lose even that rag of prestige which they had gained under the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain. The opinion which prevails among the Punjab Muslims is, that with the establishment of Federation they will be beaten in all fields, whether cultural or economic. Notwithstanding the so-called majority rule in the Punjab the Muslims are always conscious of this danger. And we can ill afford to ignore the sense of the Punjab, for the conditions are such here that it is this province which feels first the tremors of all earthquakes that have to shake later the other Muslim areas in India. Every communal evil makes its appearance first in the Punjab and then from here spreads to other Muslim areas, whether in the North-West or rest of India. A few years' working of the 1935 reforms will create

in them a disgust against the present constitution. The Punjab will soon be disappointed with it and so will be the other Muslim units in India. The more the political power passes into the hands of the Congress, the keener the Hindu industrialists, upon whose financial support it depends, will become on the industrialization of India. And as we have shown elsewhere, industrialization of India means to them only an extensive field for the investment of their capital, which in fact constitutes a denial of all prospects of industrialization to the Muslim North-West and also a danger to its agricultural interests. Similarly the communal Hindus will become inebriated with their new-found power and will lay mines for the destroying of Islam and Islamic culture in India. The acute dangers to these Muslim interests will be felt first in the Punjab and later on in other Muslim units also. But the economic exploitation of the Muslim North-West at the hands of the Hindus, will be felt everywhere at the same time and will make it sore against the Southern and South-Eastern Hindu India. So far as Muslim interests are concerned the present constitution is not innoxious.

SECTIONS 102 AND 107 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1935 AND THE FEDERAL AND CONCURRENT LEGISLATIVE LISTS

SECTION 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, makes provincial autonomy a misnomer. This

section provides that if a provincial law is repugnant to any provision of a Federal Law which the Federal Legislature is competent to enact or to any provision of an existing Indian Law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List then, subject to its provisions, the Federal Law whether passed before or after the provincial law, or as the case may be, the existing Indian Law, shall prevail and the provincial law shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. The Concurrent Legislative List extends to too many subjects and will afford easy excuses to the predominantly Hindu Federal Legislature to make many provincial laws repugnant to laws passed by it on the same subjects. Thus it will be open to the Federal Legislature to interfere in most of the provincial matters to frustrate the purposes of provincial autonomy. Similarly Section 102 of the said Act will be invoked to mar provincial autonomy. In addition to this, the Federal Legislative List also covers many matters and gives to the centre greater power than is desirable from the point of view of the security of the Muslim interests. The combined effect of all these factors will force the Muslims to seek some new harbour for their safety. And since by the time these imports of the present constitution precipitate in the form of actual dangers, all other methods of seeking security having been tried and exhausted, the only one left will be that of separating from Hindu India. To begin

with the Muslim North-West will feel the necessity of seceding, and after some time, Muslim Bengal will follow suit.

MUSLIM REPRESENTATION IN THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY AND COUNCIL OF STATE

ANOTHER important point which we want to bring to the notice of the Muslims is in respect of their position in the Federal Assembly and the Council of State. They are given 33 per cent. representation among the British Indian representatives, *i.e.* 82 seats out of 250 British India seats in the Federal Assembly. The maximum of seats assigned for the Indian States in the Federal Assembly is 125. The number of Hindu States far exceeds the number of Muslim States and it is sure that out of 125 seats assigned for the states, no less than 100 will be filled by the representatives of Hindu States. The representatives nominated by the Hindu states will be mostly Hindus and even if some Muslims happen to be nominated, they will have to abide by the instructions issued by the nominating Hindu authorities. All this means that in a House of 375 members, the Muslims will have only 107 seats, *i.e.* 28 per cent. Had it been a question of only safeguarding Muslim economic interests, mainly agricultural, we could have imagined that even with 28 per cent. representation, it would be possible for them to hold their own against the Hindu

capitalist and industrialist interests by entering into alliances with Hindu agricultural interests of British India and States India. But the weightage which the Muslims have been demanding all through has not been to secure their economic interests alone but also to secure their cultural and religious interests. Weightage is necessary to safeguard their cultural heritage rather than their economic interests, for they are already more or less safe on account of the existence of similar non-Muslim interests, which will always stand by them. Hence weightage is required more in the interests of Islam and Islamic culture. And so far as the safety of these interests is concerned even 33 per cent. representation in the Federal Assembly is not sufficient, while the representation which the Muslims will actually get in that House of 375 is only 107 seats, *i.e.*, 28 per cent. Culturally Hindu India, whether state units or provincial units, will be one against the Muslims and there will be no third group of any importance with whom their alliance will be possible to protect their cultural and religious interests—interests which, as we have explained previously, cannot be protected even by legislation. And in the case of India as elsewhere such a favourable legislation as is required in the interests of culture, etc., ultimately depends upon a majority of votes or alliances to secure them. As is obvious the Muslims have no prospect of securing a majority of votes in the Federal Assembly of India to safeguard their interests from an econo-

mically as well as numerically superior community like the Hindus, who have the cause of their own culture and religion to advocate. Their cultural interests rather require that Islam and Islamic culture should be ousted even from their present position in India so that they may have a chance to flourish better in the absence of such strong rivals.

The position of the Muslims in the Council of State will be exactly the same as in the Federal Assembly.

1935 CONSTITUTION BASED ON THE PREVALENT ERROR OF A SINGLE HINDU-MUSLIM NATION

HOMOGENEITY is an essential condition for the development of a parliamentary system of government. If we were to look to the opposing interests and uncompromising elements of which the proposed federal government shall be composed, we can anticipate its failure as certain. The Central Government as at present constituted has the despotic element in it, and on account of this it can, whenever it likes, put down its foot and command the submission of all concerned. The proposed federal government, if it is intended to be a government by the exclusive deliberation of the federal assembly, can never be a success on account of the lack of homogeneity among the various elements included in it and, therefore, if it functions at all, it will function as a government run by the community having more

votes and consequent influence. And in case the majority community is denied its rights of majority in this respect, the Governor-General will have to govern by the special powers vested in him under the Act of 1935, which would mean a despotic government. The Muslims are not a small minority. To save them from the majority the Governor-General will have to intervene at every step which would amount to denying self-government to the majority community. And if he abstained from using his special powers to let the Hindus have their way, it would mean no self-government for the Muslims who constitute a minority comprising 80,000,000 souls. Because of the lack of homogeneity as regards their interests, self-government would always remain a distant dream of both the communities—in the event of the Governor-General interfering too much to save minority interests, the majority will have no self-government and in case of his allowing the majority to have its way on all issues, the minority would be deprived of it. In a federal government embracing all India and all communities, it is physically impossible to achieve such a homogeneity as is required for governance by deliberation of the representatives of the people. Hence it will not be a democratic government but a despotic one always depending upon the powers of interference of the Governor-General to save the minorities from the majority. The same will be true of all the provincial governments, of provinces where

the communities are more or less equally balanced in respect of their numbers. These are the Muslim provinces. With the passage of more and more time Muslims will find that their autonomy has been frustrated. They will rely more on the mercy of the governors than on their own majority votes. Hence on account of the presence of a strong Muslim minority in the Federal Assembly and strong Hindu minorities in the local assemblies of Muslim provinces, self-government will remain a distant dream of the Hindus, so far as the former is concerned and provincial autonomy of the Muslims so far as the latter are concerned.

The constitution as drafted, in the Government of India Act, 1935, is based on the prevalent error of a single Hindu-Muslim nation. So long as this error is not corrected and a new constitution based on the real facts of the Indian sub-continent, namely, that it consists of many countries inhabited by various nations, whose interests are opposed to one another, India can never achieve self-government. Those parts which are inhabited by homogeneous people should be allowed to set up their own states. At present the Indus Regions, the Muslim Bengal and the Hindu India (which can be further divided as States' India and Hindu India) are separate blocks and they can be constituted into separate states which can be linked together in an All-India Confederation. All schemes, howsoever elaborately prepared to secure a composite Hindu-Muslim nation as well as lesser

control of the centre over the federal units to save the minority community from the aggression of the majority community, will ultimately prove failures and the communities will have to seek shelter against each other in separation. This is the only harbour which is open to the Muslims particularly. They should better try to enter it at once instead of wandering into it, after a criminal wastage of their national time and energy.

If the communities could not learn to live together in harmony in hundreds of years, there is little purpose in prolonging the experiment by constitutions like the one embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF SEPARATION

THE idea of separation has not been discovered in the heat of disappointment, rather it has regularly developed.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan read the political situation in India correctly and prescribed the right remedy by which the Muslims could hope to enable themselves to live as respectable citizens, economically well off, educationally advanced and politically well awakened and in every respect on a par with their sister community and the world at large. This remedy which he prescribed was adaptation to the needs of the new times which had come to exist in India with the advent of the Western civilization. The Muslims took to Western Education and soon

qualified men for various Government services became available among them too. But they found that the departments had become the monopoly of the Hindus and that there was no chance of their getting in. This led to a demand for separate representation for the Muslims in all Government Departments and local bodies, etc.

NAWAB MOHSIN-UL-MULK AND SIR FAZL-I-HUSAIN

IT was Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk who first gave utterance to the need of separate representation for the Muslims in services. The deputation which was led by H. H. The Agha Khan in 1908 to the then Governor-General of India, succeeded in getting the principle of separate representation recognized by the Government. The practical application of this principle made the communal problem which had already existed in the country all the more pronounced. The long strides with which the sister community had covered the preliminary stages of their political development did not allow the Muslims to come up abreast with them in such a short time as they had expected. The late Sir Fazl-i-Husain gave a further fillip to the principle of separation by once again convincing the Congress, who had been a renegade to it since 1908, of the necessity and importance of separate representation and basing the League-Congress Pact of 1916 on it. Sir Fazl-i-Husain aimed at

a union with the Hindus after bringing his own community on a level with them, educationally, economically and politically. Consequently his communalism as denoted by communal representation in services and separate electorates for elections to local bodies and legislatures, was in fact only a stage leading to the final act of union of the communities. He believed that the principle of separate representation was only necessary for a decade more when it would no longer be required and discarded in favour of every thing joint. But in actual practice, as it became clear even during his lifetime, separate representation instead of contributing to relaxation of communal tension, increased it tenfold. The ideal of seeking union with the Hindus is a physical impossibility, for the Hindus seek unity and not union with the Muslims. By unity they understand "complete oneness" that is complete absorption of the Muslims in Hinduism. Sir Fazl-i-Husain ignored the cultural differences between the communities and their past rivalries and looked at the situation only from the point of view of their common country which in reality is a vast subcontinent comprising many countries and a common subjection to a very strong foreign power. According to him, there were few instances of nations, who won freedom by themselves from a foreign rule although there were many instances of slave nations having been freed on account of the appearance of some internal trouble among their conquerors. Hence in

the case of India, he believed that, it had no chance of acquiring freedom by itself unless something staggering happened to the English at home. It was natural for him, therefore, to devote attention only to the readjustment of economic relations between the communities so that by it his community might have a chance of improving and ameliorating its position. To him as such readjustment of economic relations between the communities constituted an end in itself. He also hoped that such a readjustment will also remove communal tension. He was wrong in imagining that economic readjustment would remove communal friction and not attaching importance to the cultural and religious differences of the communities. Had the issue been between two communities with minor differences between them, for example the Sikhs and the Hindus, who are culturally the same and among whom inter-dining and inter-communal marriages are obtaining, principle of separate representation to help the one who, happened to be backward, could have worked satisfactorily and could have also led to their union as equals having no grievances against each other. But expecting that the application of the principle of separate representation would yield the same result in the case of the Muslims so far as their union with the Hindus was concerned, was a mistake. Application of the principle of separate representation as a means of putting the Hindus and Muslims economically on the same level in order to

secure inter-communal harmony was a wrong approach to the Hindu-Muslim question. Both Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Sir Fazl-i-Husain did not read correctly the trends of the principle of separate representation. The logical ending of this principle is complete separation of the communities and break up of their too close cultural contact. Separate representation is bound to work up to its natural terminus of complete segregation of the communities. Both the above-mentioned Muslim luminaries although they carried out the right policy yet they failed to envisage its ultimate end. If there had been minor differences between the Hindus and Muslims as there are between the Sikhs and the Hindus, this principle might have led to their union. But in view of the circumstances which obtain here in India, the two major communities cannot unite and the separate representation can never yield any other result but that of complete separation. As this principle has already worked up to an advanced stage towards separation the steps already taken by the communities in opposite directions cannot be retraced. It appears that the economic forces have been and are working to effect social separation of the communities and any attempt to oppose them would be an attempt against nature.

SIR MUHAMMAD IQBAL

THE credit of reading the Indian political situation in its true perspective, goes to the late Sir

Muhammad Iqbal. He alone looked at it from the right angle and studied it in view of all the basic differences which separate the two major communities. Unlike the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain he refused to look at it from the point of view of such factors alone which were uniform to both the communities for example a common sub-continent supposed to be their common motherland and the common yoke to a foreign power. He alone arrived at the right conclusion, namely, that their complete separation and not their union, was the proper remedy of the complicated political situation bewildering India at present. He suggested this remedy to the Muslims but they criticised him harshly and called the ideal of separation, as presented by him, fantastic and unsound. They little realized, at the time they were criticising him, that they were not finding fault with the ideal but only doubting their own ability to achieve it. This ideal is not a physical impossibility. It is neither abstract nor unsound. It is also not a logical incongruity. If to some Muslims it appears impracticable it is not because of any inherent defect in it but because of their own debility as a nation. This ideal has developed regularly through various stages and we find that all through the period of Indian political history of modern times, the Muslim thought has been subconsciously working up to it and evolving it. In itself it is perfect. What is required is, that an intellectual revolution must precede it among the Muslims.

CHAPTER IV

VARIOUS QUESTIONS RELATING TO SEPARATION

(1)
ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH TOWARDS SEPARATION

IT is difficult to say what is the real attitude of the British towards the separation of the Muslim Regions from India, and in the event of their being hostile, whether anything favourable is expected to turn up in the future, to make them in its favour. However, we suggest that the reader should think along the following lines in order that he may be assisted in understanding the position of the British with regard to the question of the separation of the Muslim Regions from India.

The moral plea of the British to remain in India is to maintain peace between the hostile communities and to save them from the aggression which they want to effect against each other. How will separation affect this plea? Will it strengthen it or weaken it?

The British have some commercial as well as Im-

perial interests bound up with India. Will Congress domination in India affect them adversely? If so, to what extent?

What are the instruments which might hamper the Congress progress? What was the policy adopted after the introduction of the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 or Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919? Did the Government succeed on both these occasions in finding opportunists in the ranks of the Congress to take the bait of offices, ranks or distinctions, to side with them and to bring the work of the Congress to a stand still? If so, what prospects have they got of finding opportunists in the ranks of the Congress of to-day, in order to hold back the little that has been conceded in the Act of 1935? Did the Congress after acceptance of office, take any new action which it did not take or had failed to take after the Reforms of 1909 or 1919? Why was the Congress High Command established after the Reforms of 1935 and has it succeeded in maintaining discipline in the Congress ranks and curbing opportunistic tendencies on the part of its prominent members? If it has, what effect could it have on the minds of the British bureaucracy? Have the British bureaucrats not already manœuvred to create any new division in the country and can this new division be pitching League Units and Congress Units against each other? What were the relations of the Punjab Muslim group with the League before the elections to the local

Assembly of the Punjab took place, especially between the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain, the Unionist leader and Mr. Jinnah, the League leader? Does the joining of a sycophant element with the League portend anything? Usually the invisible hand of the Government works behind the scenes even in small matters.

Now, is it possible that the British would use separation as a threat by always letting it hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of the Congress in order to restrain it from doing anything harmful to the Imperial interests in India and how far would the Congress mind that threat? How long can the British and Congress interests go together? Will the British in the last resort actually carry it out, partially as a measure to save their interests, at least in as much of the country as may be possible by this method, and partially as a further threat against the Congress in order to restrain it from breaking the British connection on account of the commotion which can be made of a Muslim state in the North-West of India and be satisfied with some semblance of dominion status? It is important for the Muslims to consider what would be the nature of separation if it occurred at the instance of the British to be used as a weapon of coercion against the Congress so as to keep India always within the British Empire? Will it be like the exclusion of Ulster from the Irish Free State and what would be the position of the Muslim Federations as compared

to Hindu India under the Congress? Will they have the same prospects with Hindu India of becoming free?

What should be the attitude of the Muslims if the British were to use separation as a handy tool to safeguard their own interests in India without allowing it to serve the purpose for which the Muslims want to secede? Had they better link their destinies with Hindu India and fight shy of such a separation, and agree to be absorbed by the Hindus gradually instead of remaining permanently under the British? Would it be better to let the British use them as an instrument and later when separation is actually effected try to achieve their ideal, whether of independence or dominion status *de facto*? Supposing the Muslims decide to link their destinies, in a common India with the Congress, as they did in 1916, in order to first drive the British out of India and then demand from the Congress separation of their regions from Hindu India. In this case they will have to see whether the Congress wants independence as soon as possible or after some time when it is able to take upon itself the duties of defence. If it wants independence after it is strong enough to assume the duties of defence will it not, at that time, treat with contempt any such demand of the Muslim Regions? Supposing India becomes free, the Muslims demand separation and the Congress says "No". Will it mean civil war then? If so, what chances

are there for the Muslims against the Congress and what chances will there be for any foreign power to occupy India ? Will it be possible for the Muslims to intrigue against Hindus with any foreign power to help it to reduce them in return for their own independence and will not that foreign power after first reducing Hindu India with their aid turn upon them and conquer them ?

Supposing Hindus and Muslims become united and acquire independence. Do the Muslims hope to be equally strong with the Hindus in an independent India, to command respect at their hands ? Supposing in a free India they are not as strong as the Hindus and the Hindu Congress starts persecuting them. Will it be possible for other Muslim States to come to their help ? Turkey is far off. So is Egypt. Persia can aid them through Afghanistan. But what chances will these countries have against Hindu India under such an organized body as the Congress with the resources of a vast sub-continent at its disposal ? Do the economic resources of these countries stand any comparison with the resources of the Indian sub-continent ? The next point which the Muslims should always bear in mind when tying their hopes to the neighbouring Muslim countries, is the difference which has come over Hindu India since the fall of the Moghul Empire on account of Western influences. The new India is not and will not be the India of the later Hindu period, divided against itself and torn by the internecine

dissensions, petty quarrels and jealousies of its chiefs and rajas. Now it will not be possible for any new Muslim invader to reconquer it by reducing one raja after the other. The whole of non-Muslim India which follows Hindu culture will stand against the Muslim aggressor as one solid block. The sentiment of nationalism which was notoriously missing among the Hindus of yore, has immensely developed among the Hindus of to-day. It has almost welded their higher castes into a single nation. Any ally of the Muslims of India will have to face the Hindu India of the Hindu masses and not the Hind of the Rajas.

The next point which we should like to press for their consideration is, will Afghanistan come to the aid of the Indian Muslims in order to put them on their feet, or will it come with a colonizing purpose? Will it not be to the interests of Afghanistan to have access to the sea through the port of Karachi by annexing the whole of Baluchistan and Sind to Afghanistan State? What is the verdict of history in this connection? Is it not a fact that Karachi did form a temptation both to the Afghan Government as well as Maharaja Ranjit Singh only a century back—a little time before Sind was annexed by the British?

If we think on the above lines, do we arrive at the conclusions that,

(1) a demand for separation should be launched at once;

(2) separation should take place while the British are in India ;

(3) we should avoid the risks of a civil war and of passing under some new expansionist power ;

(4) the British will lend their support to this idea with ulterior motives, for their interests demand that they should keep India under them whether as one country or two countries ; and

(5) we should not try to make an alliance with the Congress in order to achieve independence first and then demand separation of the Muslim Regions from Hindu India under the Congress, for it is possible that the Congress may never wish to sever the Imperial link or it may sever it when it has become strong enough to suppress our separatist tendencies by militarizing Hindu India and reducing the Muslims to the position of "drawers of water and hewers of wood" or a community completely absorbed by the Hindus ?

II

THE ALL-INDIA NATIONAL CONGRESS AND SEPARATION

THE All-India National Congress will oppose the idea of separation of the Sind Regions from India because it will sense danger in the creation of a separate state for a people who had for centuries a direct cultural, religious and political clash with the Hindu population and who may at any time think of absolutely severing their connection from the

Indian Confederation and creating a Muslim confederation consisting of their own regions and the other Muslim states in the North-West of India. Such fears will gain strength from the fact that right up from the banks of the river Sutlej to the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean there is a block of countries which are culturally and religiously the same as the Muslims of the Sind Regions and rest of India, and who, as in the past, will always extend their sympathies to the Muslims living in the Hindu areas under the Congress Government, even in the case of small provocations and complaints. The Congress will think, rather it does think, that after the separation of the North-West Muslim Block from India, it will no longer be in the interests of the Muslim Bengal and Hyderabad State to continue to be associated with Hindu India, wherein they will have no voice and recognition on account of being left in a negligible minority and that they will also seek to secede from it. Consequently it will not like to be sandwiched on all sides by Muslim states even if they happen to be member states of the Indian confederation. The Congress would rather prefer to have all the Muslim zones under its direct control and authority in order to reduce to a minimum the dangers to Hindu India. In other words it will try to seek strength in the weakness of the Muslims.

III

THE SIKH MINORITY IN THE PUNJAB

THE total Sikh population in the Punjab (British territory) is 3,064,144 and it is mostly concentrated in the central districts. The table on page 182 shows communitywise population of the Tahsil areas of such of the provincial districts in which the Muslims are in a minority as against the non-Muslims.

The same table also demonstrates:—

(*i*) that the Sikhs constitute the strongest single group only in the Ludhiana district, in tahsil Phillaur of district Jullundur, tahsil Moga of district Ferozepore, tahsil Tarantaran of district Amritsar and nowhere else;

(*ii*) that in tahsil Nawanshahr; district Jullundur; tahsil Mukatsar; district Ferozepore; tahsil Amritsar, district Amritsar and tahsil Gurdaspur, district Gurdaspur; the Muslims form the strongest single group; and

(*iii*) that only in tahsils Garhshankar and Una of district Hoshiarpur, are the Hindus the strongest single group.

But as we have suggested elsewhere if tahsils Una and Garhshankar of district Hoshiarpur were to be excluded from the Punjab in order that the Hindus of these tahsils may " not be subjected to the hardship of living with others of different religion and of different language " as Mr. Nanik Chand

Table showing areas in which the Muslims are in a minority

District	Tahsil	Area in Sq. miles	Hindus	Sikhs	Muslims	Total population
Hoshiarpur ...	Garh Shankar ...	511	92,724	60,224	59,956	212,904
	Una ...	690	169,940	22,633	33,163	225,736
	Total ...	1,201	262,664	82,857	93,119	438,640
Ludhiana ...	Ludhiana ...	686	44,752	147,252	122,696	314,700
	Jagraon ...	419	17,267	106,539	70,760	194,566
	Samrala ...	291	21,407	59,038	42,234	122,679
	Total ...	1,396	83,426	312,829	235,690	631,945
Jullundur ...	Nawan Shahr ...	299	41,166	62,592	63,318	167,076
	Phillaur ...	289	27,823	68,199	63,050	159,072
	Total ...	588	68,989	130,791	126,368	326,148
Ferozepore ...	Moga ...	625	19,124	144,606	52,930	216,660
	Muktsar ...	934	23,772	90,814	94,980	209,566
	Total ...	1,559	42,896	235,420	147,910	426,226
Amritsar ...	Amritsar ...	546	113,892	183,198	275,825	572,915
	Taran Tarn ...	597	17,677	161,173	130,682	309,532
	Total ...	1,143	13,1569	344,371	406,507	882,447
Gurdaspur ...	Gurdaspur ...	497	41,088	62,415	98,778	202,281
	Total ...	497	41,088	62,415	98,778	202,281
	GRAND TOTAL ...	6,384	630,632	1,168,683	1,108,372	2,907,687

Pandit put it during the Round Table Conferences held in England, it will be only in ten tahsils of the provincial districts that the Hindus and Sikhs combined will exceed in numbers the Muslims and even their excess over the latter will be very small. As regards the rest of the province the Muslims are far larger in number than the Sikhs and Hindus combined.

The geographical situation of the Sikh areas in the Punjab is such that they cannot be easily excluded from it as could have been possible if they had been all located to one side of Industan, like the Ambala Division or the Kangra district.

Moreover, their exclusion cannot be effected without sacrificing a large number of Muslims who are in majority in most of the areas of the provincial districts of the central Punjab even against the combined population strength of the Hindus and Sikhs. Then there are districts where the Sikhs, although small in number against the Muslims, compared to their own population in other districts, are sufficiently strong. For example Lahore, with 244,304 Sikh population as against 815,820 Muslims; Sheikhupura with 119,477 Sikhs as against 445,996 Muslims; Sialkot with 94,955 Sikh population and 609,633 Muslim population; and Lyallpur with 211,391 Sikhs and 720,996 Muslims. Exclusion of the definitely Sikh areas of the central Punjab will not serve any purpose because as shown above, the Sikh minority is dispersed all over the province. In

no case will the Sikhs agree to fragmentation of their community by the exclusion of the more definitely Sikh areas from the Punjab. They may agree to an exclusion of their tracts with exchange of population and on condition that they may be concentrated around Amritsar and that all the towns where there are prominent Sikh shrines may be declared as cosmopolitan areas. This they will do in the interests of having a strong minority in the new province to which their areas will be joined and securing their religious rights, etc.

But the Muslims can never agree to any proposal regarding the exclusion of the central districts from the Punjab, firstly because most of the Muslim intelligentsia is concentrated in them, secondly because the soil of these districts is the best in the whole of the Indus Regions and after their exclusion, a federation of the remaining Muslim tracts will be a federation of the sandy tracts of Bahawalpur, and Khairpur states, barren and rocky soil of the Rawalpindi Division, sandy stretches and colony areas of the Multan Division, which are already becoming water-logged and being deserted, bad soil of N.-W. F. P., and the sand dunes of Baluchistan and Sind.

And giving any other areas to the whole of the Sikh minority howsoever fertile will not be agreed to by them. All their holy shrines and temples are in the Punjab. They originated here and their religious and martial traditions were also built here.

All these factors bind them to the soil of the Punjab. They cannot go anywhere else. Consequently in their case exclusion is out of the question.

Formation of the Indus Regions' Federation, although it will greatly help the Muslims as against the Hindus so far as Hindu communalism and control of tariff policy, etc., are concerned, will not be of any aid to them in respect of the communal question between them and the Sikhs. But as compared to the Hindu-Muslim question the Sikh-Muslim question has some relieving aspects. By a careful handling of the situation and showing of complete religious tolerance towards them they can be expected to become very good citizens of the state. They are good agriculturists. Religiously they are closer to the Muslims than to the Hindus. Both the Sikhs and the Muslims believe in the unity of God. Sikhism and Islam are based on principles of democracy—equality, liberty and fraternity of mankind. Neither of the communities believe in the caste-system. Their economic interests are common. On all economic issues they generally vote together in the local legislature. Like the Muslims a major portion of the Sikh community lives in rural areas and depends upon agriculture for a livelihood. The dangers to their agricultural interests at the hands of the Hindu millowners of Bombay and Madras, etc., are commonly shared by them with the Muslims. Both the communities have suffered at the hands of the Hindu non-agriculturists

and want a remedy against them.

If the Eastern Hindu tracts of the Ambala Division, etc. are excluded from the Punjab as proposed in chapter VI, the percentage of Sikhs in the population of the province becomes about 15 instead of the present 12·9 and the Hindu percentage falls from the present 24 to 14. This means that in the province as constituted without the Eastern Hindu tracts, the Sikhs will become the most important community after the Muslims—a factor on account of which they cannot be the losers but may gain. At present in the Punjab Cabinet there are two Hindu ministers and one Sikh. If the eastern boundary of the Punjab is re-adjusted so as to exclude the Eastern Hindu tracts from the province, it is very possible that there may be two Sikh ministers and one Hindu minister in the said Cabinet instead of the present order. Similarly they can hope to get at least one minister in the Federal Government of Sindistan, while they can never dream of having a Sikh minister in the cabinet of the Federal Government of India.

Although the said increase in their percentage of population looks very small, it is not so considering the fact that the Sikhs are a very small minority. An increase of 13% by 2% is not small. If we keep in view the results which will be produced by this apparently small increase in the population percentage of the Sikhs, we cannot treat it as insignificant. It will enhance their importance

in the province, their representation both in the legislatures and cabinets of the Punjab and Sindistan federation.

In the past there have been very grave political differences between the Muslims and the Sikhs. They revolted against the Moghul Government and the hostilities exchanged in those times form the respective traditions of the Sikhs and the Muslims in the Punjab. Then again during the period of the Sikh rule in the North West, the Sikhs showed religious intolerance towards the Muslims, on account of which a distrust of the Sikhs was born among them. These sad past relations are responsible for the antagonism which they show againts each other at times. Opposition to Jhatka by the Muslims and cow-slaughter by the Sikhs are not enjoined upon them by their respective religions. Past political rivalries dominate their minds and they mutually seize upon the provocation caused by Jhatka and cow-slaughter, respectively, to give vent to them. But such occasions are very rare. No doubt stray cases of intolerance as regards Jhatka by the Muslims and cow-slaughter by the Sikhs do happen now and then in the villages but they never assume the magnitude of a Sikh-Muslim riot. On account of such cases fears may be entertained in some quarters that the Sikhs will become a menace for the Sindistan Government as they did for the Moghul Government in the past. These fears are not likely to materialize. Times have changed.

The Hindus who exploit the Muslims as well as the Sikhs may, in order to secure their own interests, try to excite the feelings of the Sikhs against the separation of the Sind regions. But it will not be in their interests, neither economic nor religious. They may be very close to the Hindus culturally but already among them an opinion has gained ground that Sikhism has contracted some unwholesome influences from Hinduism. For example the caste-system against which Sikhism preaches. Apparently there is no reason why they should not regard the policy of "lesser contact" with the Hindus as a remedy against their contracting such influences.

Even if we suppose that the Sikhs will adopt a hostile attitude towards separation, the question is should the interests and rights of 90% Muslims of the Sind regions be allowed to be trampled under foot in a federation which is bound to be dominated by the non-Muslims, merely because of a small minority's taking into their head to oppose it notwithstanding all the advantages which may accrue to them by it?

Now let us look at the same problem from the point of view of the exclusion of the prominent Sikh areas from the Punjab, along with the exclusion of the Eastern Hindu tracts of the Ambala Division, Kangra District, Una and Garhshankar Tahsils of Hosiarpur District and all the non-Muslim States, etc.

In the 12 tahsil areas shown in the foregoing

table, the Sikhs and Hindus combined are in excess of the Muslims. In order to let the Sikhs have Amritsar, their religious centre, as also some other prominent towns wherein are situated important Sikh shrines, and also in view of the concentrated Sikh population consideration, these tahsil areas will have to be excluded from the Punjab. These tahsil areas along with the Sikh states of Phulkian, etc. will give to the Sikhs a cultural home. The boundary line between the Muslim Punjab and the adjoining non-Muslim cultural region comprising the 12 tahsils shown in the table, the Sikh states, the Kangra district and the Ambala division, will run as shown in the map at page 191. We have not touched upon the question as to whether these areas after their exclusion from the Punjab should form part of the United Provinces or constitute a separate province with the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi, as it is not our business to discuss it.

The total area thus excluded from the Punjab (British as well as States) will be 38,878 sq. miles and the Punjab as left without these areas will comprise 74,328 sq. miles.


The community-wise population of these areas is Hindus 4,654,962; Sikhs 2,358,351 and the Muslims 2,924,408. After their exclusion from the Punjab the community-wise population of the province will be as follows:—

Hindus	....	 2,324,172
Sikhs	....	 1,664,557
Muslims	....	 11,105,093
Others, about	....	 700,000
Total	....	 15,793,822

In case a purely Muslim province is considered desirable, exchange of population between the Punjab as constituted after the exclusion of the said areas and the same Hindu and Sikh areas will extend to 2,924,408 Muslims of the latter areas and 3,988,729 Hindus and Sikhs living in the former. In other words exchange of population will involve about 6,913,137 people and their property. And in case exchange of population is not effected between them the population percentage of each community in the Punjab will be Muslims about 70·31 per cent. Hindus 14·71 per cent. and Sikhs 10·53 per cent.

Now if we compare these population percentages of the communities with those which will prevail in the case of keeping the ten tahsils other than Una and Garhshankar of Hoshiarpur district (as shown in the table) within the Punjab, we find that the results achieved by their exclusion along with Ambala Division, etc., is not very substantial, and will not effect the communal problem materially. Hence it will be much better either to let these ten tahsils remain within the Punjab and only exclude the above-mentioned Eastern Hindu tracts along with the non-Muslim States from it as urged

MAP SHOWING THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE PUNJAB AFTER EXCLUSION OF THE PROMINENTLY NON-MUSLIM TRACTS FROM IT



in the chapter relating to the eastern boundary of the Punjab, or to effect their exclusion with complete exchange of population between them and the remaining Muslim province of the Punjab.

IV

INDIAN STATES OF THE INDUS REGIONS AND SEPARATION

IT may be enquired what attraction there would be for the Indian States of the Indus Regions in joining the proposed federation of the North-West? The question will have to be answered from two points of view, firstly from the point of view of such of the Indian states as are Muslim and secondly from that of the Hindu states. So far as the Muslim states are concerned, their position is exactly the same as that of the Muslim provinces of the Punjab, Sind and N.-W. F. P. Their cultural and economic interests are common with these Muslim provinces. They are as much open to the economic as well as cultural dangers at the hands of the Hindu industrialists and communalists, respectively as the said provinces are. A protectionist duty of the Federal Government of India, as contemplated in the Government of India Act of 1935, will affect these Indian States and the provinces equally. They are also open to the pervasion of the Hindu cultural influences to the same degree as the Muslim provinces are. As explained in the case of the provinces, the

industrialization of Hindu India will not leave any scope for their industrialization also.

As regards the inclusion of non-Muslim States in the Indusstan Federation, they are only two and they cannot be left out as they have overwhelming Muslim populations. They are Kashmir and Kapurthala. From the point of view of the interests of their population, industrially as well as culturally, their position is exactly the same as that of the said Muslim states and Muslim provinces, with only this difference that their Heads are non-Muslims. On account of this latter fact, it is possible that the Rajas of these two States may refuse to join the Indus Regions' Federation on communal considerations. But their geographical situation is such that it will make it exceedingly difficult for them to make any such decision.

Then there is the question of the political relations between these States and the Federal Government of the Indus Regions. The decision of this question depends upon three parties, the States themselves, the British and the public of the British provinces. We cannot say what would be the wishes of the British in this matter. Perhaps they may want to exercise a greater control over the State units than is exercised at present. We are not in a position to say anything about the policy, the British would wish to adopt towards them. But so far as the people of the provinces are concerned, it would be advisable for them to assure the

States, whether Muslim or Hindu, of an attitude of complete non-interference in their internal matters and of their moral support in case if the British tried to adopt a policy of greater control over them.

It may be asked whether advocating a policy of least interference in state matters will not amount to leaving the States' population completely at the mercy of their rulers, who may or may not undertake the work of their uplift and amelioration? The States if they wish to exist will have to keep pace with the advancing times. In their own interests they will have to become beneficent autocracies. If they lag behind the times, none will be able to guarantee them their future.

Here we may also mention that it is not only in the interest of these states alone to join the proposed Indus Regions' Federation but also to the advantage of some other states of the Punjab to be included in it as they also equally share the economic dangers, along with the other Indus Regions, from Hindu India. It is very likely that states like Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Chamba, Mandi, etc. may exert all their influence to be included in the Indus Regions' Federation on account of the fears of industrial exploitation at the hands of the Hindu industrialists. But our advantage lies in avoiding them. We want separation to simplify our politics and with their inclusion, complications in our politics will continue as before.

V
NORTH-WESTERN MUSLIM UNITS AND SEPARATION.

THERE may be an objection against separation on the ground of mutual jealousies and the spirit of provincialism which the Muslim units exhibit towards each other in the North-West Muslim Block. The Sind, Bahawalpur, Kashmir and N.-W. F. P. all complain against the Punjab on account of its dominating their services to the detriment of their own people. It is a very flimsy objection because such complaints are always transitory and do not last after talent becomes locally available for filling the departmental services. There was a time when the Punjab people had a great heartburning against the Bengal Hindu and U. P. and C. P. Muslim element in their services. They complained that these people come over from their provinces and acquire the jobs which should go to the Punjabees. And it is on account of this heartburning that even to-day, when this outside element in the Punjab services has become very rare, we find that in this province the terms "Bengali baboo" and "Mir Sahib," are sometimes used in a contemptuous sense. It is significant to see in this connection that after educated Punjabees became available for the various services of their province, the Bengali Baboo and Mir Sahib element in the departments was automatically eliminated, and with it disappeared the complaint which the Punjab had against them. Similarly when qualified men

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became available locally in the Muslim units mentioned above for their various services, the complaint against the Punjabees would also cease to exist. Besides by the time talent became locally available in the said units, the Punjabees in their services would have retired. All the various complaints which these units have against the Punjab are mainly due to their grievance regarding the Punjabees filling their posts. It may not be out of place to mention here that under the Sikhs the Punjab, N.-W. F. P. and Kashmir were under a single government and mutual good-will and understanding prevailed among them. Even under the British, after the sale of Kashmir, the Punjab and N.-W. F. P. continued to remain under a single government up till 1901 when they were separated and constituted into independent provinces. All these regions are predominantly Muslim and there is no reason why they should show jealousy towards each other. The addition of the predominantly Hindu Ambala Division to the Punjab after its passing under British rule in the first instance and then the exclusion of N.-W. F. P. from it, resulted in a balance of communal powers, for this artificial re-adjustment of provincial boundaries and territories reduced the numerical strength of one community in favour of the other. So long as a community remains numerically weak it seldom shows communal tendencies and the majority community also treats it with generosity. The distur-

bance of the numerical proportions of the communities in the Punjab in the way described above, has resulted in a decrease of self-confidence on the side of the Muslims and an increase on that of the non-Muslims. Perhaps this is why the Punjab has increasingly become the centre of communalism. The maintenance of the communal balance in the Punjab in respect of numbers of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities may at any time cause a disturbance to the federal government of these regions if constituted, but the mutual jealousies referred to above, can never become a source of anxiety for it. Bringing the various regions of the North-West of India under a new central political control, independent of the present Government of India, will establish good-will and mutual understanding among them. All the factors which go to make a nation are already present among them. Only a central political control is required to create in them the feeling of oneness. If a federation of these regions is established, instead of forcing them into a "single Hindu-Muslim nation" where they will always feel out of place, it will make them a nation and greatly enhance the opportunities of their development. The feeling of "closeness" which can develop among the people of these regions can never develop between them and the Hindus of the rest of India. The warmth with which two Muslims belonging to two different regions of Sindistan can greet each other, they can never show to a Hindu belonging

to any Hindu province in India. They are already a nation while the Hindus are not. The establishment of an All-India Federation to create a United India, as has been attempted in the Act of 1935, is in reality a superfetation which always results in the birth of twins, the death of the mother or the death of all three.

VI

SEPARATION AND MUSLIMS IN GENERAL

ORDINARILY the formation of the Indusstan Federation may constitute a very attractive idea for the Muslims but perhaps it would be shorn of all its attractiveness if we were to explain to them all its implications and consequences.

A Muslim state may not mean a state in the Western sense of the word to which the Indian Muslims have become accustomed. It may mean a state governed by the Islamic Law as contained in the Holy Quran. It may mean the purging of the Indian Muslims of all the un-Islamic influences which they have contracted on account of their close contact with the non-Muslim communities in India. It may also mean the establishment of a Bait-ul-Mal and regular payment of Zakat into it. It may as well require the Muslim agriculturists to forego the protection which the Land Alienation Act provides to them in the Punjab and the N.-W. F. P. against expropriation at the hands of the non-agricultural

tribes. It may require some Muslim communities of Sind like Khojas and Kachi Memons to give up the Hindu Law and instead be governed by the Muhammadan Law, and of the Punjab to discard customary law and instead apply to themselves the Muslim law of inheritance. It may mean many other things to which the Muslims may not be accustomed and for which they may not be prepared. By mentioning this aspect of the proposed federation we do not mean to terrify the Muslims at its prospects. We refer to it simply in the interests of honest presentation of the subject and to point out to them the fact that they have considerably wandered away from Islam, otherwise there are Muslim states which have set up precedents in respect of adopting some useful practices and laws of other countries which are not Islamic. In case Indian Muslims, especially those who are saturated with Hindu and Western influences, did not think it worth while to have such a state and succeeded in creating an opinion against it, it will not be politic to give it up simply on account of the fears *re.* discarding Hindu and European influences. So long as Muslims are not able to appreciate Islam in its true sense, the practice set up by some other Muslim countries of borrowing foreign laws, can also be followed here. Turkey has adopted the German Commercial, the Italian Penal and the Swiss Civil Codes.

We may also draw attention to the fact that already Muslim opinion on separation shows ten-

dencies to become divided into two schools of thought, one believing that separation can be used as an effective threat to make the Congress and the Mahasabha yield to the demands of the Muslims as presented on their behalf by the All-India Muslim League and the other believing it to be the only practical solution of the deplorable Hindu-Muslim problem. This latter may again become sub-divided over the question of the eastern boundary of the Federation of the Indus Regions as we shall show in the chapter dealing with it.

Another interesting point that is sometimes raised by some persons to terrify the Punjab Muslims at the prospects of separation is that the Army will cease to be their monopoly. No doubt at present the Punjab representation in the Indian Army is 83,000 against 30,000 from rest of India which also includes some number from the Sind Regions other than the Punjab and that the Punjab will "suffer most financially as well as in military service" in case its monopoly of the Army breaks. But the question is how long the Punjab is going to have this monopoly and in what way it is assured against all future dangers in the All-India Federation? Hindu India is already clamouring against this Punjab monopoly over the Army. The more Hindu India secures political power, the more it will exert itself to deprive the Punjab of its advantage in this respect. The question is already engaging the attention of the Hindus and it will not take

long before the Punjab is driven out of its present position in the Army. By the time separation comes the Hindus will have broken this monopoly. Hence, the Punjab peasant need not be disturbed over this question. Why should a great benefit be denied for the sake of a small advantage which cannot be retained permanently or even for a long time.

VII

MUSLIM POPULATION IN HINDU PROVINCES

THE total Muslim popuplation in the Indus Regions after excluding the Hindu areas of the Eastern Punjab, is about 25,714,657. The establishment of the Indus Regions' Federation will mean shelter for this number of Muslims only while 51,963,343 Muslims will be left at the mercy of the " accentuated Hindu majority " in Hindu India. On the basis of this fact relating to the position of the Muslims in the Hindu provinces there may be enquiries as to whether it will be in the interests of the Muslims as a community that 2½ crores of Muslims of the North-West should enjoy Muslim Raj while more than double their numbers should be allowed to suffer all the disadvantages of being tied to the Hindus in a federation sure to be dominated by the latter? The point is no doubt a matter for serious consideration. Our reply to it is that in the first instance we want to separate from India because we

are anxious to save as much of the Muslim population and their interests from the dangers of the domination of the Hindus in India, as may be possible by the method of separation, used as a measure of self-defence and not as an offensive step against the Hindus. In the second instance "separation" not only denotes separation of the North-West Muslim Block alone but also separation of all those parts which happen to be predominantly Muslim. It also implies exchange of population.

Let us first try to find out to what extent an exchange of population is possible between the various Muslim regions and Hindu regions. Exchange of population would not be impossible between the Muslim Punjab and the Hindu areas of the Ambala Division, etc., after the latter's exclusion from the Punjab province as at present constituted. The total Muslim population in the Ambala Division, Kangra district and Una and Garhshankar tahsils of the Hoshiarpur district, is 1,263,970. Out of 51,953,343 Muslims living in various parts of India other than the Muslim North-West, these Muslims living in the Ambala Division, etc., can be rescued, by exchange of population, from the Hindu domination in India.

The Muslim population of Bengal and Assam is 2,7810,100, and 2,750,000, respectively. No doubt if after the exclusion of the Muslim North-West from India, these Muslim parts continue to

remain within the Indian Federation, their position will become very precarious. To escape the dangerous consequences of being included in the Hindu Federation, the only course left open to them would be to follow the example of the Muslim North-West. Let us try to see how many Muslims living in the provinces of Bihar and Orissa and Assam can be withdrawn into Muslim Bengal. The total Muslim population of Assam is 2,750,000, while that of Bihar and Orissa combined is 4,264,790. By the separation of the Bengal and the Muslim areas of Assam and exchange of population between them and the neighbouring provinces of Bihar and Orissa and the Hindu tracts of Assam, a total number of 34,824,890 Muslims can be rescued in Eastern India, including the Muslim population of Bengal and Muslim areas of Assam. All this means that separation when used in its comprehensive sense can promise to ensure the safety of 61,803,517 Muslims out of the total Muslim population of 77,678,000 in India. There will remain 15,874,483 Muslims in Central and Southern Hindu India whose withdrawal into Muslim Regions is not a practical proposition. Prohibitive distances intervene between the far eastern Muslim province of Bengal and Sindistan in the North-West and the Hindu provinces lying in Central and Southern India from whence the said number of the Muslims will have to be taken out.

We have worked out the above figures not

because we subscribe to the view that exchange of population is desirable between Hindu India and Muslim India but because we want to give the reader some idea of the proportions of the stupendous task of exchange of population, the large numbers that it would involve and the position of the Muslims, which would be worked out after undertaking such a gigantic project the expenditure of which cannot be met out of the Indian revenues. We would prefer separation of the predominantly Muslim Regions from Hindu India without any exchange of population. Indus Regions minus the Ambala Division and other Hindu tracts of the Punjab in the North-West and Chitagong, Dacca and Rajshahi Divisions of Bengal with the Districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam in the East can be easily separated from India and constituted into two separate states. In this sense separation will help 25,714,657 Muslims of the Indus Regions and about 23,000,000 of the Bengal and Assam to escape Hindu domination while 28,963,343 Muslims will remain in Hindu provinces. We have seen that even if separation between Hindu India and Muslim India is effected with exchange of population between adjoining Hindu tracts and Muslim tracts 15,874,483 Muslims cannot be withdrawn into Muslim regions on account of the prohibitive distances, and in the case of its being effected without exchange of population, the depressed Muslim minority in Hindu India will be of 28,963,343. In view of these

results it would be better to be content with only geographical separation of Hindu and Muslim regions without entailing the inconveniences of exchange of population on such a large scale. It will help to restore balance of communal powers in India without denying to Islam the prospects of further proselytism.

A very curious notion under which the Muslims are labouring at present is, that the Hindu minorities living in Muslim provinces are held as hostages in the hands of the local Muslim majorities against the security of the Muslim minorities in the Hindu provinces. This prevalent notion is quite unfounded. The real position, as a matter of fact, is quite opposite to it. The Muslim minorities living in Hindu provinces can be treated at any time as hostages in their hands by the Hindu majorities of those provinces against the security and safety of their co-religionists in Muslim provinces. The *vice versa* is not true. The non-Muslim minorities living in Muslim provinces are numerically more or less equally balanced with the Muslim majorities and economically superior to them. The weightage which is conceded to them in Muslim provinces, in return for the weightage secured for Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces, helps to equipoise them with the Muslim majorities. The Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces are both numerically and economically too weak and the weightage given to them does not help them to the same extent as it

helps the Hindu minorities in Muslim provinces. The advantage which the Muslim minorities receive from weightage in Hindu provinces is, therefore, not commensurate with the benefit which the Hindu minorities derive from it in Muslim provinces. Whereas in Muslim provinces weightage results in an equilibrium between the communities, in Hindu provinces it does not produce the same result. Hence under the present scheme of things, the Muslims have nowhere in India any advantage over the Hindus. By separation so far as the question of minorities is concerned, the scales will be set even between the communities. In fact separation of the Muslim areas from Hindu India will be a counterblast to the Hindu provinces and will reflect the strength of the Muslims in their provinces equally as the strength of the Hindus is reflected in Hindu provinces, in contrast to the present weak position of the Muslims in their own as well as in Hindu provinces. A Confederacy of India would be safer for the Muslims than a Federation of India as at present contemplated. In a confederacy of Hindu and Muslim States, no community will have an undue advantage over the other. In the Indian Federation the Hindus will dominate the Federal Government as well as the local Governments whether of definitely Hindu provinces or Muslim provinces. The Muslims will have no voice in the Federal Government as also in the local Governments of Hindu

provinces. While in their own provinces they will have to remain continuously under the strain of seeking alliances with smaller groups of non-Muslims in the interests of forming stable Governments. They will be always hampered in their legislatures by the equally strong non-Muslim minorities having the moral support of whole of Hindu India at their backs. The Hindu minorities will play one Muslim group against another, as they have already begun to do, in the provinces of the Bengal and Sind.

We may once again repeat that we want separation in the interests of our own defence against Hindu India and also because it will constitute a counterblast to the Hindu provinces inasmuch as it will have some wholesome effects on them in making them treat their Muslim minorities with consideration. It is open to the other Muslim zones if they think that they will be insecure in Hindu India without us, to demand their separation from Hindu India and to join hands with us in agitating for a confederacy of India on a cultural basis or complete separation as the case may be.

It may be asked why we do not stress the need of the readjustment of provincial boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal under the Act of 1935, so as to give these provinces stronger Muslim majorities in place of the present marginal ones to restore equilibrium between Hindu India and Muslim India instead of once again putting everything in the melting pot? The answer is simple. Firstly, be-

cause we want to culturally isolate from Hindu India as much as may be possible by the separation of Bengal and the Muslim North-West, in order to turn these Muslim regions into cultural homes for the Muslims and to give every chance to Islamic culture to flourish here unhampered. Secondly, because we do not want to leave the tariff policy in the hands of the Hindus, who are both culturally and economically our strong rivals and who, with the help of their strong position in the Federal Assembly, would harm our agricultural interests and destroy all our prospects of industrialization. We have already explained these dangers in the previous portions of this book. In a federated India, the tariff policy would remain in the hands of the Hindus and our cultural isolation would also be impossible. Both these purposes, therefore, can only be achieved by a Confederacy of India and not by a federation of India.

VIII

THE PROBLEM OF MUSLIM BENGAL AND ASSAM

INSTEAD of trying to make a common cause with the Muslims of the Indus Regions, over some 2,000 miles, against the Hindus in a common federation, it would be better and at the same time more practical, for Muslim Bengal and Assam to stand on their own legs and demand their exclusion from the federated India of the Act of 1935. The Muslims have tried to live peacefully with the Hindus in a

common India for centuries but their attempts have failed. Now there is no use repeating such attempts over and over again. Those who can escape the general wreckage which is bound to overtake them, in the common federation, should not hesitate any further to seek their safety in separation merely because a few who cannot do so, will be left behind in the storm. Both the North-West and Muslim Bengal and Assam should hasten to take cover under separation. The position of Bengal and of such parts of Assam as are predominantly Muslim, is exactly the same as that of the North-West Muslim zone. Apparently there is no reason why they should not try to establish a state of their own, separately from Hindu India. Their case is almost analogous to that of the Muslim North-West, except that they lack contiguity with Muslim States, unlike the latter. But they are at the same time not bound on both sides by Hindu regions. They have a good sea-coast and a first class harbour. In minerals they are richer than the North-West. Burma, known all over the world for its petroleum, is their next neighbour.

The following sub-divisions are prominently Muslim :—

Dinajpur, Rangpur, Malda, Bogra, Rajshahi, Murshidabad, Pubna, Mymensingh, Nadia, Jessore, Faridpur, Dacca, Tippra, Noakhali, Bakarganj, Khulna and Chittagong.

Their combined area is about 50,472 sq. miles. The adjoining districts of Goalpara and Sylhet in

Assam are also prominently Muslim. The area of these two districts is 9,292 sq. miles. The above-mentioned Muslim areas of Eastern Bengal and the said two districts of Assam comprise an area of 59,764 sq. miles. A state consisting of about 60,000, square miles cannot be said to be a small state. Tripura, other Indian states in political relations with the Bengal States Agency, Eastern Bengal and the prominently Muslim Assam can set up their own federation. The total area of this federation, if set up, will be about 70,000 sq. miles. Its population will be about 31,000,000. The community-wise population of the provincial unit of Muslim Bengal will be about 20,500,000 Muslims and 10,100,000 Hindus.

In case it is found necessary to effect exchange of population between Muslim Bengal and the neighbouring Hindu provinces, it will not present any insurmountable difficulties because the distances which intervene between them are not prohibitive. This eastern Muslim region has some clear advantages, if it makes up its mind to separate from Hindu India. It will not lose anything by secession.

On account of our limited knowledge of the local conditions, we are not in a position to discuss at length the various questions relating to the separation of the above-mentioned Muslim areas. It is the business of the Muslims of those areas, who have first-hand information of the circumstances obtaining there, to explore the possibilities

of their exclusion from Hindu India.

We may state here that we are not led by any spirit of provincialism or motives relating to our local interests, in demanding separation of our regions from Hindu India. We are prompted to demand our exclusion from the coming Indian Federation only by the desire to rescue as much as may be possible for us, by the aid of such a defensive measure as separation. General destruction is bound to overtake the Muslims religiously, culturally, economically and politically in the all-India Federation (as at present contemplated to be imposed on all India indiscriminately), on account of the too sure Hindu domination in it. It would be a great thing if Muslim interests could be saved even in a part of the country. We hope that the Bengal and Assam Muslims, realizing the gravity of the situation, will try to stand on their own legs and themselves find the way of escape from Hindu supremacy. We can only suggest to them the way to escape and if it suits their purpose, as it does ours, we can both join hands and fight for it. Our salvation lies in separation and if the Bengal and Assam Muslims think that this can also help them to escape from Hindu domination, then like us they should press its necessity on the attention of those who happen to be in control there. Our separation will also be of immense help to the dispersed Muslim minority in Hindu India because it will establish an equilibrium between the communal forces and will put us communally on

the same plane with the Hindus. We also hope that our brethren living in the Hindu provinces will also understand the present situation and will not try to hang round our necks merely in order that they should be kept company in the vortex of a federated India under the domination of the Hindus, who are our rivals culturally as well as economically. They must understand the difference between the British rule and the nominal British rule combined with internal Hindu domination or complete Hindu domination. The British came and conquered the country from us and, when they were once assured of our complete submission, their persecution stopped. They had no past wrongs registered against us and no communal or political rivalries had continued between them and us from the past at the time they conquered the country. Naturally their persecution of the Muslims could not be continued and had to cease with our submission. Under Hindu domination, the same will not be the case. We and the Hindus have been rivals, culturally, politically and economically for ages during which they registered wrongs against us and we against them. Under Hindu domination we shall have to account for the wrongs which they justly or unjustly registered against us during the centuries of Muslim rule in India. The Muslims living in Hindu India must realize the dangers to the whole Muslim community and Islam in an India dominated by the Hindus. With them, in a common

federation, we shall be as helpless as they. While out of it, we shall be strong and able to exert our influence in their favour ready to exchange courtesy with courtesy and ill turn with ill turn.

IX

ATTITUDE OF THE NEIGHBOURING MUSLIM STATES TOWARDS SEPARATION

THE attitude of the previous Government of Afghanistan towards the grant of reforms to India, as we understand, was hostile. Their hostility was based on the fears that the more India becomes self-governed, the more the subsidies paid to them by the Government of India will be reduced. On account of such fears, it is said, they were against the grant of reforms to India. In case a new state is set up in the North-West and especially a Muslim one, the reason, if any, for paying any such subsidy to Afghanistan, will absolutely disappear. On account of this fear it is possible that they may not like the idea of Indusstan Fedaration. But as this new State will be a Muslim State it is also possible that the Afghanistan Government may sacrifice any such self-interest for the sake of the cause of Islam in India. Moreover, as there would be many other advantages which will accrue to Afghanistan by the materialization of the separation proposals, it is possible that the Afghan Government may not oppose it, rather it may

welcome it. As regards the Muslim population of Afghanistan we can say with certainty that they will be jubilant over the prospects of a new Muslim State in their close neighbourhood instead of the present non-Muslim one. Consequently they will lend their wholehearted moral support to its materialization.

In the tribal areas the Khans who have become habituated to receiving political allowances from the present Government of India may not like the idea of Indusstan and may adopt a hostile attitude towards it. But the Muslim masses in the tribal areas will surely welcome it.

The other Muslim States, like Turkey, Egypt, Arabia and Persia will regard Indusstan Fedaration as the first practical step towards the liberation of Asia from the hands of Europe. It will mean to them the dawn of the long cherished ideal of Pan-Islamism.

X

FINANCES OF SINDISTAN

MANY a critic has decried the idea of the separation of the Sind Regions from India as impracticable on the ground that financially it is an unsound scheme. Most of their contention is based on the fact that two of the units which form the Indusstan area, namely, Sind and N.-W. F P. are not self-supporting and that the Government of India has to give a cash subvention of Rs. 105 lakhs to the former

and of Rs. 100 lakhs to the latter to enable them to meet the excess in expenditure over their incomes. In the case of Sind we know that the aid has been granted for a period of ten years, at the end of which it will be progressively decreased. This period of ten years will expire after 1945. We also know that financial experts have calculated that by 1984 the province of Sind will become self-supporting and will not require any aid from the central revenues. Hence, the subvention which is granted to Sind is not a permanent liability on the central revenues.

As regards the deficit budget of N.-W. F. P. if it is found, even after making a sincere effort at national economy and retrenchment of unnecessary expenditure, that some excess over its income is unavoidable, it will not be difficult, as we shall show later, to grant a cash subvention to it. Even if the Province of Sind required some financial aid, it could also be arranged for from the central revenues of the Indusstan Federation.

REVENUES OF INDUSSTAN

IF we were to estimate the revenues of Indusstan from similar heads of receipts as those of the present Government of India, we should find that roughly they would be as follows:—

			Rs.
Karachi Customs* (1/4)†	...	...	10,00,00,000
Salt (1/4) ...	...	...	2,08,75,000
Central Excise Duty (1/10)‡	...	...	77,60,000
Corporation Tax (1/10)	...	...	15,50,000
Income Tax (1/10) ...	...	...	1,24,33,400
Opium (1/10) ...	...	...	4,49,000
Other heads (1/10) ...	...	...	10,65,000
	Total	...	14,41,22,400
N.-W. R. (net profits) ...	...	...	5,99,58,000
Posts and Telegraphs (1/10)	...	...	7,46,000
Debt Services (1/10) ...	...	...	6.63,000
Civil Administration (1/10)	...	...	9,99,000
Currency and Mints (1/10)	...	...	6,69,000
Civil Works and Miscellaneous Public Improvements (1/10) ...	...	...	3,09,000
Miscellaneous (1/10) ...	...	...	15,48,600
Defence Service (1/10) ...	...	...	55,96,000
Extraordinary items (1/10)	...	...	37,51,400
	Total	...	7.42,40,000
	Grand Total§	...	21,83,62,400

Now add to these approximate revenue receipts of Indusstan a few lakhs from the various heads of income which the state units will assign for the central revenues. We can roughly estimate the

*Customs' income from Karachi can be further raised by about 5 crores of rupees by the levy of heavy duties on goods imported into the Indus Regions' Federation from Hindu India over the land frontiers. It may also be noted that the Government of India's income from customs has in some years even risen to 54 crores per annum. And as some of the Regions in the Muslim North-West are the biggest importers in whole of India, it is expected, that income from Karachi Customs will be in no case less than one-fourth of the said figures.

†1/4 denotes one-fourth of the present income of the Government of India from the Head of Revenue, presumption being based on the number of sources of revenue under the Head.

‡1/10 denotes one-tenth of the present income of the Government of India from the Head, presumption being on the population basis.

§These figures are worked out on the presumption that the Indus Regions' Federation will not join the Confederacy of India.

total revenue receipts of the Sindistan Federation at Rs. 22,00,00,000 per annum.

EXPENDITURE OF INDUSSTAN

Now let us cast a glance at the expenditure side of the budget of the proposed Indusstan federation. Just to form an idea of the expenditure of the new federation let us find out the figures of expenditure under the new heads that have appeared in the Budget of Burma after its separation from India. They are as follows:—

	Rs.
Customs	10,74,000
Excise duties	65,000
Taxes on income	10,53,000
Salt	1,93,000
Miscellaneous Railway expenditure ...	1,04,000
Posts and telegraphs	5,54,000
Interest and Amortization of Debt	1,80,44,000
Audit	13,82,000
Ecclesiastical	2,10,000
External affairs	2,33,000
Scientific departments	7,81,700
Aviation	6,40,000
Defence	1,33,30,000
Frontier Force	53,96,000
Total	4,30,59,700

The population of Sindistan is about 35,268,603 and the population of Burma is 14,667,146, *i.e.*, Indusstan in respect of population is about 2½ times larger than Burma. A comparison between the

revenue figures of Indusstan as calculated above and such of those of Burma as have appeared in its Budget after separation, will show that the former are about four times more than the latter.

Now acting on the basis of the above facts as regards their population and revenue figures, we can say that the new state will be about three times bigger than Burma and that its expenditure as such can at the most be four times more than that of the latter, *i.e.*, about Rs. 17,22,38,800, If we add to these figures of expenditure Rs. 2,05,00,000 the full amount of cash subventions which are at present granted to Sind and N.-W. F. P. it makes the total expenditure of the Iudusstan Federation on similar heads as have appeared in the Budget of Burma after its separation, Rs. 19,27,38,800, *i.e.*, Rs. 2,72,61,200 less than the total revenue receipts as estimated at Rs. 22,00,00,000.

Now it may still be contended that the proposed federation will not be able to meet its expenses on account of the very expensive North-West Frontier problem which is not present in the case of Burma. If Indusstan is going to be a member state in a confederated India, the expenditure on the North-West Frontier will be equally shared with it by the other member states that will join the Confederation. It is also possible that the heavy expenses that are incurred on account of the North-West Frontier scare may ultimately be found to be due to Imperialistic motives only and not to any dangers

of foreign aggression to India. It is possible that the tribal areas in the North-West of India are being used as a training ground for the armies of the British Empire. These areas in the whole of the Empire constitute a zone in which there is permanently present a sense of danger as well as other conditions requisite for a military training ground, for example the ruggedness of the country and the wild tribes. The information on the point whether the British officers and British regiments after they have been for some time at the Frontier Military out-posts are sent away from India, will reveal how far it is true that the North-West Frontier is used as a military training ground for the British regiments at the cost of India.

Moreover, when we look to the past history of India, we find that all through the period of Muslim rule, as also during the time of the Sikh supremacy in the North-West, this problem had never assumed such proportions as it has now. It is expected that to a great extent this problem will disappear by the establishment of a Muslim state in the North-West. It is possible that the exorbitant expenditure borne on account of this frontier scare may ultimately be due to Hindu India alone and not to Muslim India. And it can also be possible that this scare may only be a hoax lacking all reality.

From the above facts and calculations regarding the revenue receipts and expenditure of Indusstan Federation as proposed to be established, we can

conclude that financially it will not be an unsound scheme as is often alleged by the Hindu anti-separationists. If Burma was expected to produce a balanced budget after its separation from India, there is no reason, why fears should be entertained regarding the finances of Indusstan.

XI

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF INDUSSTAN

THE Hindu opposition to separation, in order to discourage the formation of Muslim public opinion in its favour, often lays stress on the difficulties of the industrialization of Indusstan. They take their stand on the ground that these regions lack mineral products like coal and iron which are so essential for the industrialization of a country. No doubt it is a grave consideration if these regions really lack mineral wealth. The real facts are not as they are presented by Hindu Press propaganda. Regarding the economic resources of these areas the following quotation from a local weekly is of great interest:—

"............Though it is poor in coal yet it has a number of snow-fed rivers which descend from the mountains to the plains and form innumerable water-falls which can be utilized in providing cheap Hydro-electric power. Mandi Hydro-electric works, alone capable of generating more than 120,000 kilo-watts of electric energy, are sufficient for the

whole of the Punjab. With the development of such cheap electric power we shall be able to utilize the forest wealth and mineral resources of Pakistan which consist of iron, zinc, lead (Kulu Hills), beauxite, Fuller's earth, Kaolin, copper, talc, precious stones (Kashmir), chronite, limestone, tin, etc., (Baluchistan).

"Only recently oil has been discovered in Sind and Baluchistan and it is estimated that the new oil resources, if properly exploited, will be sufficient to meet the demand of the whole of present India, *i.e.*, India proper and Pakistan. Baluchistan is also a well-known fruit-growing centre and its Mekran coast is also famous for fish, both in respect of quality and quantity.

"So far as the economic condition of Sind is concerned the Lloyd Barrage can stand its surety. It is estimated that within ten years of the commencement of the Barrage, Karachi will be able to export 1,133,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 bales of cotton, 4,477,000 tons of rice, 295,000 tons of "Jewar-bajra" etc., 15,000 tons of pulses and 117,000 tons of oil seeds. These arresting figures speak volumes for the economic position of Sind.

"Pakistan, taken collectively, is in a position to develop to its great advantage herboriculture, floriculture and sericulture in the hilly districts. There is also great scope for the development of new industries based on agriculture, such as the manufacture of straw-board from wheat-stalks; paper

from rice-stalks; alcohol from potatoes; cellular and artificial silk from maize-stalks and sugar-cane refuse. It may be that an immense quantity of cotton stalks, unwanted in almost every district, may be treated so that they furnish the material for the popular dresses of Punjab women.

"If Japan with a total area of about 146,000 square miles with 1/6th of land cultivable and having practically no mineral wealth can rise to the position of a great industrial power, surely Pakistan with about 450,000 sq. miles of area and with vast economic resources can stand on its own feet and compete favourably in the world market."*

Attention may also be invited to the fact that there are very few industrialized countries in the world which are not dependent upon other countries for some or other mineral product. The Sind regions have natural affinity with the neighbouring Muslim states from where such of the mineral products which they lack can be imported. For example Afghanistan is our close neighbour and it is full of mines. An agreement can be made with her for the supply of mineral products required.

XII

MUSLIM MASSES

AFTER having said all this in favour of separation the question still remains to be answered as to who

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*_The New Times_, Lahore, 27 November, 1938.

is going to achieve this ideal for a community which is showing all signs of exhausted national energy and defeated outlook? No doubt the morale of the Muslims as a nation has become reduced and things as they stand do portend evil so far as an issue like the separation of their regions from Hindu India is concerned. But neither do the present circumstances assure us of the *status quo*, which is liable to be disturbed at any time by the hostile forces working against the Muslim interests in this country. The more important question, therefore, is whether the morale of the Muslims can be restored to them and they can be reclaimed as a people with all the qualities of a progressive nation? In order to answer this question we shall have to find out the causes of their national decay and also to know whether those causes can be removed.

If we were to turn to the political history of India of the last century and a half, we should find that no political movement started by the Muslims during this period was a success. The Vahabi movement of Syed Ahmad, which can be described as a splendid effort to bring about Muslim religious revival and to recapture political power in India, was a failure. The Jehad undertaken by Ismail Shaheed under the impetus of the same movement against the Sikhs to save the Muslims of the North-West of India from the religious intolerance showed by the former, was a failure. The Mutiny of 1857 was a failure. The Cawnpur Mosque

tragedy was a failure. The Khilafat movement and the Hijrat, which brought in its train the disruption of many a Muslim family, was a failure. The Mopla rising in the south was a failure. The agitation during and after the Great War in favour of the Turks was a failure. The Kashmir agitation, which could have easily been turned into a victory if its leaders had known when to call a halt, was a failure. Add to this list of our failures the failure of the Shaheedganj campaign and the all but sure failure of the pro-Arab agitation of the Indian Muslims on the Palestine issue. And we may add to this long list of our failures, the failure of the League-Congress Pact of 1916. We may be asked why we include the failure of this pact in the list of our failures when we were not responsible for it? No doubt we were not responsible for its failure but it has had a strong influence in spoiling our national morale. The Muslims profusely shed their blood during the Great War to earn the promise of the reforms of 1919 and when the promisers showed hesitancy in fulfilling the promise, they entered the arena of political agitation and made all kinds of sacrifices in order to get the terms of the said promise implemented. The reforms were introduced and when the time for sharing the benefits of the reforms (as was agreed upon in the League-Congress Pact) arrived, one of the parties to it quietly walked out of it and started an agitation against the Muslims' getting their share and actually did not

concede anything to them, notwithstanding the fact that everything was due to their efforts and sacrifices. No leader could get them their due share of the reforms. This unpleasantness, for which the Hindus were responsible, created a bad impression upon the Muslims, namely, that every sacrifice and every effort which they make in India, whether to improve their individual lot or the lot of the whole country, is of no avail. It meant pessimism and loss of confidence in themselves. The immediate effects of a defeat are not of so great a consequence as the national stagnation which follows it later and which lasts for years together.

We find that during all these movements which ended in failure, the Muslim masses always made a splendid response to the call of their leaders, supplied funds which they could ill afford, sacrificed their comfort and courted imprisonment and death. Generation after generation, the Muslim masses willingly helped in every cause their leaders took up and never failed in their duty towards them. This speaks highly of them as a people and also shows the vast possibilities of their development. A people who could show such fortitude in bearing the strain of a series of failures with magnificent courage cannot be said to be decadent and past all hope of reclamation. What is required for the efficient working of their latent abilities as a people and a nation is a less complicated political situation —an atmosphere in which their national energy may

work unhampered in moulding their destiny in the way best suited to their national genius. In order that they may go forward new paths in Indian politics must be discovered and old ones abandoned. The heterogeneity of interests which a common India creates must be removed in order to release the national energy of the Muslims for the prime need of the times—the moral and material well-being of the Muslims. The countless baffling problems relating to cultural, political and economic interests like preservation of languages, community-wise representation in services, the clash between agricultural and industrial interests, labour and capitalists' friction, separate and joint electorates, reservation of seats on a communal basis, etc., which automatically arise on account of the multiplicity of provincial units and state units with heterogeneous populations and interests require to be reduced to a minimum. This can only be done by separation. And to achieve separation it is necessary that the Muslim leadership should be overhauled and that it should spring from amongst the people instead of being thrust upon them from above. They should have no personal interests as distinguished from public interests. They should be able to lead the Muslims from success to success in all issues whether communal, social or economic, to give them courage to fight bigger issues and causes. It is necessary that they should be able to nurse the feeling of self-importance in the Muslim masses so as to get

them out of the pernicious effects of the oppression from which they have been made to suffer during the last few centuries. They should be able to form a habit-of-success in the Muslims.

We have shown how under the present scheme of things, the trade and industrial interests of the Muslims have no chance of flourishing and that these interests can only be promoted by the acquisition of political power. To acquire political power the Muslim masses will have to be trained, thoroughly organized and disciplined. Also such of the Islamic institutions as were set up to make Islam a living force and a successful social, political and economic system, will have to be revived. The leadership should be able to effect and achieve all this.

In other words the leadership should be able to achieve the separation of the Muslim zones from Hindu zones so that by rectification of the fundamental error of a single Hindu-Muslim nation, a simpler constitution and a less entangled political situation can be achieved. As we have already shown separation is the only solution of our complicated problems. This is the only way in which politics and religion can be assigned equal places in a state, and the division of allegiance between a country and a faith avoided. Up till now the Muslims have been divided over this question Some have been holding the preservation and propagation of Islam, and others the freedom of their

country, as their ideal. And this clash between their loyalty to their religion and fealty to their country has been responsible for a good deal of confusion in Muslim politics, dissipation of their national energy and disruption in their ranks. Separation will make possible a happy compromise between these two ideals which have so far remained opposed to each other. The new leadership should be able to present this new ideal to the Muslim masses with all the possibilities of their development it promises.

We may also add here that notwithstanding all the discouraging circumstances of the present, a new dawn has appeared. The dark clouds which had appeared on our national horizon are showing a silver lining. The Muslims have realized the complicated situation in which they are at present involved and also show a desire to get out of it. There is a strong desire among them for a saviour. The economic forces are already working to prepare a ground for his appearance. The continuous increase in the number of Muslim intelligentsia and the lack of avenues of employment will in a few years' time force them to shift their residence to the rural areas from the towns and cities so as to make living possible. This will lead to the salvation of the rural masses. The very presence of an educated element among them will not only raise the standard of culture among them but will also facilitate their organization and reform. Even our present circumstances are not so hope-

less as they appear to those who do not want to help themselves. The more the time passes the more the factors, mostly economic, which have not yet appeared, will make themselves felt, in bringing home to the Muslims the need of separation. When these economic factors begin to work even those who are sceptics among us will have to modify their views about separation. Let us help the economic forces to release themselves earlier so as to work and promote our ideal of separation from Hindu India. The incrassate crust of the lava of erroneous notions of a common country and a common nation with the Hindus, holds under it the soul of the Muslim nation. It is high time that this crust should be torn asunder to release their volcanic energy and to enable them to mould their destiny in the way Islam enjoins upon them.

The present demoralization of the Muslim masses, which we have shown to be due to the various failures enumerated above, is no doubt disheartening. Even leaders of such eminence as the late Sir Fazl-i-Husain were disheartened by it. But it was more due to the fact that they did not take a sympathetic view of the position of the Muslim masses. In answer to a letter in which his choice of lieutenants had been criticised and his attention was drawn to the urgent need of discovering promising men among the younger generation in order to give them a chance of serving their community, the Late Sir Fazl-i-Husain wrote

as follows :—

"....If there is no younger generation of workers, it is no fault of mine. I gave everyone a chance; I could have done no more. I have no means at present of ascertaining the views of the Muslim community. *In all probability it has no views.* I do not know any others who are any better than the group you complain of."

No doubt this is a very severe and sweeping statement but at the same time it is an admission and also an apology. The new leadership should not be dismayed at the decadence of the Muslims even if it happens to be a fact, for their decadence is not their fault but is the inevitable result of antecedent circumstances. Help them to change their conditions and a marvellous change will come over them. The soul of the Muslims as a nation is not dead. It is alive and is only a little exhausted. Resuscitate it and you will find its volcanic energy returning to it. In their circumstances no nation could have done more than they did. Organise them, discipline them, stage little triumphs for them to encourage them and then you may lead them to the toughest fronts and they will not fail. In the past they never failed. It is their leaders who failed them.

CHAPTER V

AN ANALOGY DRAWN FROM THE CASE OF BURMA

THE case of Indusstan is almost similar to that of Burma so far as the question of its separation from India is concerned. In addition to the religious, racial, linguistic, and economic differences, on account of which Burma was excluded from India, the other grounds which were alleged in support of its separation were as follows :—

(1) that sufficient consideration was not given to the special circumstances and needs of the province of Burma by the Indian Legislature and the Government of India ;

(2) that the representation of Burma in the Indian Legislature was too weak to exercise any influence in the Legislative Assembly and that Burma could never have any effective voice in shaping policy in the Indian Legislature ;

(3) that Burma's interests sometimes diverged considerably from those of India and protection of the Indian industry was often to the disadvantage of Burma ;

(4) that caste is one vital structure of Hinduism

and it is the negation of everything that constitutes a nation and the difficulties which caste system presents in India do not exist in Burma;

(5) that the Burmans in fact approximate far more closely to the ordinary conception of a nation than the Indians and the constitutional problem if separated from India would at once reduce itself to manageable proportions and become far smaller;

(6) that so long as Burma was tied to the apron strings of India her material and administrative development was impossible;

(7) that public opinion in Burma favoured separation and even those who believed that by maintaining the connection between India and Burma, Burma would get self-government more quickly than if it stood alone, desired merely to postpone the question of separation; and

(8) that Burmans were racially different from Indians and that a large majority of them belonged to the same race.

We will now take all these grounds one by one and show how they apply also to the case of the Indus Regions to favour their separation from Hindu India.

(1) The Central Bureaucratic Government as at present constituted is benevolent to the interests of the agricultural North-West, for it is always to the advantage of the exploiting countries to maintain the paying capacity of the exploited countries. Moreover, the manufacturing countries enter upon a

keen competition among themselves, by which the countries who produce raw material gain considerably, for it raises the prices of their commodities. As we have shown elsewhere the coming federal government and legislature are neither expected to show solicitude towards nor to accommodate the North-Western Muslim agricultural tracts. They will seek protection from foreign competition behind high tariff walls, resulting in high prices for the manufactured goods of the Indian industrialists and low prices for the raw material produced by the agricultural North-West. The passages quoted from Mr. Calvert conclusively prove this point and form a warning to the Indus Regions. We need not repeat his arguments over again. We have also shown in the foregoing chapters how the religious and cultural interests of these areas will suffer in a common federation with the Hindus.

(2) The Muslim North-West with about 12% representation in a house of 375 cannot be expected to have any voice or hand in the shaping of the policy of the federal government. Both their numerical strength and financial position is too weak to help them against the rich Hindu industrialists.

(3) The interests of the agricultural North-West and industrial Eastern and Southern India will naturally diverge and the protection of the Hindu Indian industry would be of great disadvantage to the agricultural North-West. The passages

quoted from Mr. Calvert amply show how these dangers are bound to appear under the coming Federation.

(4) The caste system does not exist in Islam and the Muslims can be easily united. They conform more closely to the ordinary conception of a nation. Their union with the Hindus on terms of equality is unimaginable and preposterous. The difficulties which stand in the way of nationalism in Hindu India on account of the caste system do not exist in the Muslin North-West. The Muslims of the North-West are already a single and separate nation from the Hindus. Their union with the Hindus is physically as well as spiritually impossible.

(5) After the separation of the North-West from Hindu India the communal problem will automatically become far less acute than it is at present. The constitutional and administrative problems will also be reduced to manageable proportions. The present constitution of India is too complicated in its nature. Separation of the North-West will help a lot to simplify the constitution of the North-West, as well as that of Hindu India. Moreover, the clash of various loyalties between which the North-West is at present torn will cease to exist and all of them will find a happy compromise in a common ideal which will be at once religious, cultural, political and economic.

(6) Under a benevolent bureaucratic govern-

ment the North-West could expect fair treatment but under a government dominated by capitalist interests, its excessive exploitation at the hands of the Indian industrialists will take the place of the benevolence and concern which the present bureaucratic government shows in order to maintain their paying capacity. In a federation dominated by the Hindu industrialists for years to come the North-West will not be able to industrialize, as we have shown elsewhere in this book.

(6) The Hindu capitalists will stand in the way of the industrialization of the North-West and try to reserve the raw material produced here for themselves at as low prices as will be possible in the absence of any competition for it. They will also try to keep the market in the North-West for their own manufactures. The Muslim North-West could never hope to develop if it continued to remain in the Indian federation. We have already referred to these dangers before.

(7) We admit that at present there is no large volume of vocalized opinion favouring separation in the North-West but as time passes this idea will gain ground. Already we see that the Muslims have begun to devote their serious attention to it. A good number of articles on Pakistan have already appeared and are still pouring into the Muslim press to urge the necessity of separation. Although the Muslims had until now given little thought to it, yet within a very short time it has developed and

gained quite a large number of friends. If the Muslim public did not take up the idea of separation earlier, it was no fault of theirs. The Muslim leaders did not explore its possibilities and present them to the Muslims. Perhaps the vast possibilities of separation never occurred to them. The more time passes the more this idea will awaken a response among the Muslims. Only a lucid treatment of the subject of Separation and its presentation in a consistent form is required to make the Muslims adopt it as their politico-economic ideal. Some of the economic forces which are already working but which have not so far appeared effectively, will in a few years' time, produce results which will be of far-reaching consequences and will draw the pointed attention of the Muslims to the need of the separation of their regions from Hindu India. Even at present if the question is put to any Muslim whether he likes the idea that the Muslim regions should separate from Hindu India he answers, that without doubt he likes the idea of separation but, he fears that by it the Muslim regions may remain under the British rule for a longer period than Hindu India. The objection against separation on the grounds of apprehensions that it may not elongate the period of enthraldom of the Muslim regions means, in other words, the same thing as saying that by maintaining the connection between the Indus Regions and India, the Indus Regions would get Self-Government more quickly than if

they stood alone and desired merely to postpone the question of separation to some later date when India gets Independence. We have shown elsewhere that so long as the communities will remain tied together within a common India, on account of the fears they entertain towards each other, no one would like to see the British depart from India. Hence separation will bring the day of freedom earlier and its postponement will extend the period of British rule.

(8) The racial question does not exist between the Muslim North-West and Hindu India. But its place has been taken by the still serious questions of religious and cultural differences. The North-West is not only economically but also culturally, religiously and linguistically different from Hindu India. The majority of the Muslims inhabiting these regions are converts from Hinduism and zealously desire to maintain their identity as a separate and independent community from the Hindus. They are unanimously against apostatising and reverting to Hinduism. The Hindu-Muslim differences are not of recent origin but, as we have shown elsewhere, have existed for at least centuries and are not likely to be eliminated in the future. In the case of Burma and India no political rivalries existed between them in the past but so far as the Hindus and Muslims are concerned very acute differences, religious as well as political, have existed in the past and they continue to exist

at present as acute and strong as ever. The memories of both the communities are fresh as regards their past differences and they keep them apart. We have referred to past and present Hindu-Muslim rivalries and differences in the previous portions and have shown how they form an unbridgeable gulf between them.

In Burma the total number of minority communities is five. They are Kereans, Indians, Chinese, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. In the North-West Muslim Block also the number of minority communities is five, namely, Hindus, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians' and Scheduled classes. In Burma the minorities' representation in the Legislature is about 23 per cent., *i.e.*, 13 in a House of 132. In the Federal Assembly of the proposed Muslim Federation, the representation of the minorities can in no way exceed 20 per cent. The advantages of having a Muslim majority constituted by a solid block of 85 per cent. Muslim representatives in a central legislature of the North-West Muslim Block are numerous. Their overwhelming majority will give them confidence in themselves and even enable them to treat the minorities with generosity. And after the present numerical balance between the Muslims and the non-Muslims is broken, communalism will die a natural death. Much time, energy and attention that are at present being taken up by the communal question will be spared for internal development and works of nation building.

In Burma, along with the minorities' problem, other problems like foreign emigrant labour, etc., also exist. In the North-West Muslim Block no other problem except the minorities' problem exists and even it will be reduced to manageable proportions by separation. A federation of the Sind regions will remove, the necessity of having a complicated constitution like the present one of India. The present All-India Federation is composed of territorial as well as communal units. No constitution anywhere in the world can be more complicated than the present Indian constitution. Under the present constitution there are three claimants to a citizen's allegiance, the territorial unit in which he lives, the federation of which the territorial unit forms part and the religion which he professes. Separation will simplify the constitution inasmuch as in the new states into which the present unwieldy India will be partitioned, the nature of allegiance will become simplified. The partitioning of India between the communities will end the clash between the religious and political ideals which is at present witnessed among the Muslims as well as the Hindus. The state of hesitancy in which we find the Muslims to-day, to which is due their stagnant condition, will end with the ending of the clash between their patriotic and religious sentiments. In a purely Muslim state the question of giving precedence to religion over politics or *vice versa* will never arise.

Fidelity to religion and allegiance to territory will align themselves imperceptibly in a purely Muslim nation, resulting in a relief from the present morbidity and the release of many a natural faculty which lies dormant at present. This will also be true in the case of Hindu India.

It is feared that a protectionist policy of the federal government will be dangerous for the agrarian interests of the North-West Muslim Block, for a discriminative tariff often changes the channels and courses of trade. No doubt the fear of a discriminative tariff policy of the federal government, which necessitated the separation of Burma from India, also urgently calls for the secessation of the Sind Regions from Hindu India. In some Muslim quarters doubts and fears may be entertained that separation would reduce the North-West Muslim Block permanently into a territory subject to the British. Such fears and doubts are quite baseless. If once by the devolution of some sort of political power the national energies of the Muslims of the North-West are released from such of the side issues and communal matters as are artificially propped up every now and then, they will not rest at anything but the transference of the full quota of sovereignty to themselves. They are a vigorous and virile people, ready to suffer and sacrifice. Responsibility will bring into action faculties which are at present dormant. Power will give them prestige and the advantages which the restoration of prestige will bring in its train will

continuously intensify in them a desire to maintain it and to enhance it. They will become a wide-awake people soon after separation and would desire and have what would be beneficial for them, whether dominion status *de facto* or complete independence. They have suffered in the past on account of the complicated nature of the political situation in India. The constitution as embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, instead of presenting a solution, has made it all the more confusing and bewildering. Their politics must be simplified and they should not be allowed to wander aimlessly in a political wilderness like the one created by the present Indian constitution. As already explained before, this end can only be achieved by the separation of Muslim regions from Hindu India. Separation is the only solution.

CHAPTER VI

EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE PUNJAB

Exclusion of the Eastern Hindu Tracts from the Punjab

THE question of the eastern boundary of the Punjab constitutes a matter of great importance and it is possible that Muslim opinion may, at some time, become divided over it: Some regarding the River Jumna or the Ridge separating the plain of the Indus from that of the Ganges as the natural boundary between this unit of Sindistan and Hindu India in its east and others believing that the said boundary should be so fixed as to exclude all the Eastern Hindu Tracts of the Kangra District, some portions of the Hoshiarpur District and the whole of the Ambala Division from the Punjab. Taking the former view first we can say that no doubt the River Jumna or the aforesaid Ridge would form a geographically natural boundary between Hindu India and the Punjab unit of Indusstan but as the underlying motives of the formation of the Indus Regions' Federation are, to reduce communalism by reducing the Hindu element in it and to safeguard the agricultural, industrial and cultural interests of the Muslims, the fixation of the eastern boundary at

the River Jumna or the Ridge which runs in a south-eastern direction passing from Delhi to Aravli Parbats, will not help in the achievement of these objectives, for it would bring in our territories the overwhelmingly Hindu areas of the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi and the Ambala Division, etc., leading to the increase of the Hindu percentage in our population, a thing which would be detrimental to our own interests. Such a boundary will not allow us to seek cultural isolation from Hindu India. It will also increase our difficulties on account of the natural affinity of a large Hindu population within our territories, with the Hindus of the Hindu India. Their sympathies will always remain with their caste-brethren of Hindu India. In view of this one weighty consideration, it would be safer for us to accept the second opinion according to which no overwhelmingly Hindu tract should be included in our territories.

Now let us consider at some length the question of the exclusion of the Eastern Hindu Tracts from the Punjab and its bearing on Indusstan in general.

If we turn to the first part of the *Secretary of State's Evidence before the Joint Committee on the Indian Constitutional Reforms*, we find the following passage on page 23:—

"5765, Mr. Cocks: 'Sir Samuel Hoare, you know the proposal which has been made by Pandit Nanik Chand to divide the Punjab so as to allow the Muhammadan part to join up with the North-

West frontier and the other part with the United provinces. Do you agree with that?' "Sir Samuel Hoare: 'This is a very old proposal that has been made now as to whether the Punjab should be divided, taking off the more predominantly Hindu tracts and leaving the part of province that is more definitely Muslim. As Sir Malcolm Hailey will no doubt say this is a question that has been discussed over and over again. We discussed it at the First Round Table Conference and *although there may be good arguments to be made in favour of it, one very strong argument to be made against it is that it has got very few friends and we came to the conclusion that whatever might be its merits or its demerits it was not a question of practical politics at the present time.*' "

This reference is full of meanings. Redjustment of provincial boundary between the United Provinces and the Punjab was rejected not because it had no merits but because it had few friends. The question is did anybody try to find friends for it? It was not even mentioned to the Muslim public although it would have been of immense benefit to them inasmuch as it would have established provincial autonomy *de facto* in the province forever excluding the possibilities of inroads upon it by the communal-minded Hindus who, under the present scheme of things, form a strong minority and do all that is possible for them to do to injure the majority rights of the Muslims. Readjustment of provincial boundary between these two provinces as suggested in the

above passage would have considerably reduced the non-Muslim minority and given an overwhelming majority to the Muslims instead of the present marginal one. The gentlemen who were selected to represent the Muslims at the Round Table Conferences, it appears, did not devote serious attention to its possibilities and did not press it on the attention of the Muslim public in the Punjab to get their support in its favour. But the Parliament, perhaps foreseeing a future demand for such readjustment of provincial boundaries between the various provinces, has provided in Section 290 of the Government of India Act of 1935 for the readjustment of provincial boundaries. The Muslims must, to begin with, press for the readjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab and stress the great need of excluding the aforesaid Eastern Hindu Tracts from it.

The same point was stressed by Pandit Nanik Chand over and over again at the Round Table Conferences. A reference to his speech would not be out of place here. On page 112 of the Indian Round Table Conference's Proceedings he says, " The Punjab province as it is constituted to-day consists of areas and people which have no natural affinity. If there is to be an All India Federation, if provinces are to be self-governing units in that Federation, then the Punjab will be so constituted, its territories so readjusted and arranged that people of one religion may not be subjected to the hardship of living with others of different religion and of different language. My

Lords and gentlemen, the Simon Commission saw the dangers of an All India Federation based upon union of provinces which will not work with one another. Therefore, they recommended the formation of a boundary commission with a neutral and impartial chairman to go into this question. I claim an inquiry with regard to the Punjab. Do not refuse this demand. You will be able to satisfy the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs if an impartial inquiry is made."

The above passage from the speech of a gentleman who was a front bencher of the Mahasabha group then in the Punjab Legislative Council, shows that even the Hindus do not like to be included in the Muslim Punjab. On the face of it the demand which the Pandit made on the question of the readjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab was quite reasonable and just. It would certainly have satisfied all the communities in the Punjab. The Muslim public are already convinced of it and do consider that their provincial autonomy has been mutilated by the presence of a minority which, as at present constituted, is numerically almost equal to them and economically superior to them, merely because a large Hindu area, which ought not to have been included in their province, has been unnaturally linked up with it. Before the occupation of the Punjab by the British, the Ambala Division never formed part of this Muslim province. If "the Punjab is constituted of areas and people which

have no natural affinity" (and we must admit the truth of it) then why not have a redistribution of the provincial territories between the Punjab and the United Provinces or the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi? Why keep together communities, who are hostile to each other, lack affinity, and keep alive the canker of communalism which wastes so much time and energy on both sides? Often unpleasantness is created all over India between the Hindus and the Muslims by the communal question in the Punjab. Readjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab so as to exclude the Eastern Hindu Tracts from it, would break up the balance of communal powers in the Punjab and will reduce the communal question to manageable proportions.

We cannot say where Mr. Nanik Chand would like to place the eastern boundary of the Punjab. The eastern boundary which would help to solve the communal question in the Punjab is none else than the one which separates the Kangra district, Una and Garhshankar Tahsils of the Hoshiarpur District and the Ambala Division from the rest of the province and which also forms the frontier between the Punjab and the Patiala State.

The restoration of a really overwhelming majority to the Punjab Muslims will produce wholesome results so far as communalism is concerned. On the one hand the majority which is secured by a community by a small excess over the percentage of the minority community in the total population,

always keeps it suspicious of the minority, while on the other hand it gives a perpetual hope to the minority, of some day overthrowing the majority successfully.

If the Muslims want security and peace in their own parts of the country and the All India National Congress also desires that the Punjab should no longer be the "Ulster" of India, then the communal balance which is artificially maintained by the make-weight Ambala Division should be destroyed at once. So long as this is not done, the Punjab will continue to be an arena for communal conflicts. The eastern boundary of the Punjab and, for the matter of that of Indusstan, should be so fixed as to leave out the Hindu Tracts of the Ambala Division, etc., from its territories.

At the time of the Round Table Conferences at least the readjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab, if not the exclusion of the Indus Regions from India, could have been easily secured. But unfortunately no one saw the wisdom of it or pressed it sufficiently on the attention of 10, Downing Street. We cannot say whether the Muslim representatives to the said Conferences realized the simple fact that communalism is more rampant in all those parts of India where the communities are more or less evenly balanced as compared to other parts where one of them happens to be in an overwhelmingly large majority. If this fact did present itself to their minds, we do not know why they did not press it to

secure readjustment of the provincial boundaries of the Punjab. If they had made even a small attempt in this direction, certainly it would have succeeded. By such readjustment of provincial boundaries of the Punjab, communalism could have been reduced by the mere raising of the present marginal majority of the Muslims to an overwhelming one. Perhaps in view of the then coming provincial autonomy they thought that by maintaining the present Punjab boundaries, they would be keeping the local Hindus as hostages in their hands for the safety of the Muslim minorities in the Hindu autonomous provinces. If so, they were very much mistaken. In all the Hindu provinces the Muslims are weak both economically and numerically and can never raise their head against the Hindu majorities. While in the Muslim provinces the position of the non-Muslim minorities is not the same as that of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces. The non-Muslim minorities in Muslim provinces are not only numerically strong but are also economically superior to the Muslim majorities. Consequently the non-Muslims in the Muslim provinces could never be treated as hostages against the security of the Muslim minorities living in the Hindu provinces. They can only be treated as strong rivals of the Muslim majorities in the Muslim provinces. Exclusion of the Eastern Hindu Tracts from the Punjab will make the position of the local Hindus in the Indus Regions to some extent similar to that of the Muslim minorities in the Hindu

provinces.

The more the time passes the more the Ambala Division will become a menace for the Muslim majority in the Punjab. The bulk of opposition in the Punjab Legislative Assembly will come from the Ambala Division and the Kangra district. The present support which the Unionists draw from the Ambala Division, is due more to the commitments of a few individuals who cannot continue to hold the field against their opponents for all times to come than to any natural affinity between the Hindus of the said areas and the Muslims of the rest of the province. Communal relations between the Ambala Division Hindus and the Muslims of the Punjab are strained on account of the religious intolerance which the former often show towards the local Muslims. Hence, the support which the Unionists draw from the said Division is not natural and cannot last long. Then we have also to see how long the individuals to whose commitments is due the support which the Unionists draw from the Ambala Division will live and whether similar men would be forthcoming afterwards to ally themselves with the Muslims against the Urban Hindus? How long will the Congress or any other Hindu organization sit still and look unconcerned at their joining hands with the Muslims against their own community? We have not only to look to our short-lived present advantage but also to keep in mind the interests of our coming generations.

For their sake we must, as much as we can, try to purge Muslim politics of all conflicts of loyalties, reduce Hindu opposition and secure our present agricultural and future industrial interests. Even from this point of view the failure of the Muslim representatives to the Round Table Conferences, not to press for the readjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab as a preparatory step to complete exclusion of the Indus Regions from Hindu India, was a great mistake. In running after the shadow of paper concessions they lost the substance and proved their bankruptcy as statesmen and politicians. They lost an opportunity for which the future Muslim generations will never forgive them. Now there is only one course left and it is to create a similar opportunity again and to grasp it. Section 290 of the Government of India Act of 1935 does provide for redistribution of territories and readjustment of provincial boundaries between various provincial units. The Muslims should at once move the authorities to take steps under this section of the aforesaid Act.

According to the Census Report of 1931 the total Hindu population in the Punjab is 5,763,164 out of which 3,171,004 live in the Ambala Division, Kangra district and Una and Garhshankar Tahsils of the Hoshiarpur district. Against these figures of Hindu population of these areas, the Muslim population figures for the same are 1,262,970 out of a total Muslim population of about 14,000,000 One great

effect of the exclusion of these areas from the Punjab will be that whereas the population percentage of the Muslims will increase from the present 56·7 to about 66, the population percentage of the Hindus will decrease from the present 24 to about 14. The rise in their population percentage will give to the Muslims a much stronger majority than the present marginal one, which necessitates the formation of political parties on the economic basis alone. Moreover its wholesome effects will be witnessed in every aspect of the life of the province. With the exclusion of the said Hindu tracts from the Punjab a small population of the Sikhs will also be excluded but it will not affect their population percentage. Their population percentage will rather rise from the present 12·9 to about 15. This small rise in their population percentage will not be of any grave consequence to the Muslims while it may be of tremendous good to the Sikhs.

At present the area of the Punjab is 99,265 sq. miles. The area of the Eastern Hindu Tracts is as follows:—

	Sq. miles.
Ambala Division	15,113
Kangra district	3,882
Una and Garhshankar	1,201
TOTAL ...	20,196

AFTER the exclusion of these Hindu areas from the Punjab, the province will comprise an area of 79,069 square miles.

All gerrymandering and unfair fixation of the provincial boundaries of the Punjab, by which the majority claims of the Muslims suffer, require to be undone. No Muslim unit included in the Muslim North-West, should include such of the non-Muslim areas as could be easily excluded. The inclusion of such areas in the Muslim tracts adversely affects the rights of the Muslim majority. With the exception of the Punjab, all the other units in the North-West Muslim Block are predominantly Muslim. The Punjab Muslim majority has been unfairly reduced by unnaturally linking with it the Hindu tracts which are in its East and South-East. One effect of this unnatural linking is that the Punjab has become the arena of communal strifes. The Ambala Division Hindus form the numerical counterpoise which maintains the communal balance between the non-Muslims and Muslims in the Punjab in respect of their numbers.

The question of advisability of re-uniting the N.-W. F. P. with the Punjab was taken up by a committee in 1922. The Hindus demanded its union with the Punjab or at least placing of its judicial administration under the Lahore High Court. They argued that "a separate Pathan province will cause a dangerous sentimental division in the rest of India with leaning towards the allied racial elements outside British India." In answer the Muslims said that "a contented North-West should be a valuable buttress against the hostile feeling across the border."

This question was almost a communal contest. The Congress's present attitude towards this province and its anxiety to remain in favour with its people can be traced to the fears which the communal Hindus had expressed in support of its union with the Punjab in 1922. At that time the Muslim ought to have defended not only its exclusion from the Punjab, but should have also stressed the need of the exclusion of the Ambala Division, etc., from their province, in order to maintain their majority strength which has become reduced after the exclusion of the N.-W. F. P. from the Punjab.

It may be added here that it is possible that the exclusion of the Ambala Division, etc., from the Punjab may be followed by any of the following two accessory demands whichever may happen to suit the occasion and the interests of the Muslims:—

(1) exchange of population within the Ambala Division, etc., to be excluded; and

(2) the Hindu areas proposed to be excluded from the Punjab should form part of the present Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi.

Let us consider these two accessory demands separately to find out which one is more suited to Muslim interests.

Exchange of population within the Ambala Division means that the Muslim population of these areas may be withdrawn from there and settled on some suitable areas adjacent to the Punjab boundaries to be taken from these Hindu parts in exchange for

the land and property owned by the local Muslims in these areas. Such an exchange of population will save the Muslims of these areas from the Hindu domination. Another effect of this exchange will be that the percentage of Muslim population in the Punjab after the exclusion of these Hindu areas, will rise still further, *may be* from 66 to 70.

The alternative accessory demand to it, namely that these areas may be joined to the present Chief Commissioner's province of Delhi to form the new province of Delhi, it is possible, may be pressed if the Muslims found that it will raise the population percentage of the Muslim minority in the new province considerably, say to about 25. And if the inclusion of these Hindu tracts in the new province of Delhi is found to be of no avail so far as raising the percentage of the Muslims is concerned, they may stress the need of exchange of population within the Ambala Division, etc., as above explained. We may state here that exchange of population is not in the interests of Islam and, therefore, we are not in its favour.

We should be content with the readjustment of provincial boundaries of the Punjab on the lines suggested above. It will also help in allaying the suspicions of the Muslims of other units in the North-West, to the effect that since the Punjab Muslims are locally oppressed by the non-Muslims they want separation in their own interests and drag them into it merely to strengthen their own case.

Exclusion of the Eastern Hindu Tracts from the Punjab will restore a predominant majority to the local Muslims in the presence of which the Muslims of other Muslim regions in the North-West will not attribute any ulterior motives to the Punjab Muslims.

An objection may be made to the fixation of the eastern boundary of Indusstan in the way as suggested above on the ground that it would leave Muslim historic buildings in the Delhi area in Hindu India and that it is also a defective policy from the point of view of expansion. Although we would very much like to have the Indusstan territories extended right up to the banks of Jumna, as suggested by some separationists, but it would be disastrous from the point of view of internal consolidation of the Muslim North-West. All these areas are overwhelmingly Hindu and their inclusion in the Indusstan Federation, as already pointed out, will have the effect of making the Hindu minority too strong, a thing which is so undesirable from the point of view of Muslim interests. With such an extended boundary the Punjab and the Chief Commissioner's province of Delhi will continue to form the arena of communal strifes to distract the attention of the Muslims from works of internal consolidation and nation building. The communal strifes in these areas will have repercussions both in Hindu India as well as in the overwhelmingly Muslim tracts in the extreme North-West of

Indusstan. This would keep the position exactly the same as at present so far as communalism is concerned, and the real purpose of separation will be lost. It will be knowingly accepting a constant menace to disturb our peace as well as the peace of Hindu India. We have suggested the exclusion of the Eastern Hindu Tracts from the Punjab in order to secure a strong central Government as well as a strong local Government in the Punjab and to reduce the chances of the local Hindus of intriguing against the Muslims. It is much better to forego our claims to Delhi and its suburbs than to accept such an evil with it as may lead to dire consequences. Moreover, many other buildings of world renown like the Taj cannot be included within our boundaries and for their sake we cannot agree to delay the fulfilment of Islamic ideals. For the sake of a few historic buildings we should not try to weaken our majority and consequently our power at home. Moreover, the care-taking of such buildings can be entrusted to an archæological department under the control of the confederal authorties. As regards our expansion, it suffices to say that separation is a defensive measure and not an offensive step against the Hindu aggression.

Exchange of population between the united provinces and the tracts lying on this side of the river Jumna, Delhi, ect., may be suggested by some to keep the Delhi area within Indusstan without allowing the Hindu minority to become strong

locally. Exchange of population is not a matter which could be achieved so easily as some people think. Notwithstanding all the modern means of communication and transport, exchange of population is not an easy affair. The exchange of population which was effected between Turkey and Greece involved a few lakhs of people and it was effected by the League of Nations who had such vast resources and means at its disposal. We in India lack all those means and any such attempt on our part will only result in the disruption and ruin of many families. Moreover, exchange of population is not in our interest.

UHL RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEME

IT may be pointed out that the Punjab has invested a large amount of money on the Uhl River Hydro-Electric Scheme, which is in Mandi State and that the area covered by it cannot be left out of the Punjab. When redistributing the provincial territories this point can be taken into consideration and amicably settled. Separation does not mean hostility to Hindu India. It only implies security against Hindu domination. This matter, as also other matters with respect to use, distribution and control of water from natural sources of supply, can be left to the confederal authorities.

BHAKRA DAM PROJECT

THE Punjab Muslims should also take care that their Government should not create complications

to make separation a difficult affair by undertaking such expensive irrigation schemes as the Bhakra Dam Project, to afford irrigation facilities to the Ambala Division at their cost. The provincial debt will increase by many crores if this scheme is undertaken and its burden will ultimately fall on the people of the Punjab. The present estimated cost of this scheme is Rs. 12 crores. But past experience shows that the Government estimates of expenditure on such schemes are always low to begin with, but by the time the preliminary stages are covered, unforeseen difficulties arise to increase them considerably. Even if we admit that the said scheme will cost exactly Rs. 12 crores, will it not put difficulties in the way of redistribution of provincial territories between the Punjab and the neighbouring province on whose shoulders the debt of this huge amount will have to lie in addition to at least 3/5th part of the Division, which under all circumstances will continue to be a liability rather than an asset? It is quite possible that as these Hindu areas are not self-supporting, the neighbouring province may hesitate to accept them, more especially with such a heavy debt as will be incurred by the materialization of the aforesaid scheme to afford irrigation facilities to the Hissar and Gurgaon Districts. The Ambala Division is a notoriously famine-stricken area and at least once in a decade the Punjab Government has to spend a lot of money on test works and other relief

measures. The total amount intended to be spent on the Ambala Division for the year 1939—40 to give relief to the famine-stricken people is Rs. 1,85,00,000. And this is not an unusual expenditure. It has rather become a permanent feature of the Punjab Budget. It is more reasonable that these Hindu areas should form part of a Hindu province than to burden the poor Muslim tax-payers of a Muslim province. They are a liability and there is no reason why the Punjab Muslims should be made to shoulder it. Their remaining within the Punjab cuts both ways, by causing undue expenditure to the Muslim tax-payers and by weighing down the communal scale unjustly against them on the side of the Hindus.

It may be said that by the materialization of the Bhakra Dam Project, at least 2/3rd part of the Ambala Division, will become an asset instead of a liability as at present and will pay more than what is spent on the whole Division. But the question is how long it will take before the debt incurred in connection with the Bhakra Dam Project is discharged? Moreover, their remaining within the Punjab will not serve the purpose for which separation is necessary. Communal balance in the Punjab has to be destroyed at any cost, in the interests of the Muslims. The Ambala Division Hindus are notoriously orthodox. As already pointed out, there have been many communal riots in the Ambala Division. It is feared

that the Bhakra Dam Project which is under survey at present or any other alternative scheme, will not only fertilize two of its districts, but will also quicken the growth of the already existing Hindu fanaticism and float it over its waters to all parts of the province, poisoning and perturbing the life of the Muslims everywhere. Keeping these areas within the Punjab means maintaining the communal balance to which are due many of the complications in Muslim politics.

CHAPTER VII

SOME HISTORICAL FACTS ABOUT AND GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF INDUSSTAN

INDUSSTAN is constituted by the following regions:—

(1) *The Punjab*: Excluding the Eastern Hindu Tracts the total area of the province is 79,069 square miles and its population is about two crores. The budgeted income of the province is about Rs. 11,00,00,000 annually.

(2) The *N.-W. F. P.*: Its total area is 36,356 square miles while its total population is 4,684,364.

(3) *Sind*: The total area of Sind is 46,378 square miles and its population is 3,887,000.

(4) *Baluchistan*: The area of British Baluchistan is 9,476 square miles while the area of Agency territories is 44,345 square miles. The area of the State Territories of Kalat and Las Bela States is 80,410 square miles, their annual incomes being Rs. 15 lakhs and Rs. 3,70,000, respectively. The total population of Baluchistan is 868,617.

(5) *Kashmir*: Area, 84,258 square miles; population, 3,645,000; and annual income, Rs. 2,70,00,000.

(6) *Bahawalpur*: Total area, 7,117 square miles; population, 984,612; and annual income, Rs. 35,63,000.

(7) *Khairpur:* Area, 6,050 square miles; population, 227,183; and annual income, Rs. 15 lakhs.

(8) *Amb, Dir, Swat and Chitral States:* Amb is a very small State, almost a village. The area of Dir is 3,000 square miles and its population is 250,000. The area of Swat is 4,800 square miles and its population is 300,000. Chitral comprises an area of 4,000 square miles and its population is 99,000.

9. *Kapurthala:* Area, 611 square miles and population, 316,757 (Muslims being 179,256; Sikhs 72,177 and Hindus 32,448). Its annual income is Rs. 36,00,000.

10. *Malerkotla:* Area, 116 square miles; population 83,072 (Muslims being 31,417; Sikhs 28,982, and Hindus 12,590); and annual income, Rs. 16,00,000.

Excluding the Eastern Hindu Tracts from the Punjab, the Indus Regions comprise an area of 398,838 square miles. Its population is about 33,000,000 (community-wise population being Muslims about 82 per cent., Sikhs about 6 per cent. and Hindus about 8 per cent.). The total length of these regions North-East to South-West is about 1,400 miles and greatest width is about 700 miles South-East to North-West: The smallest width being about 300 miles in the same direction. The

coastal line of Sindistan stretches about 900 miles.

The following quotation is of interest in respect of some of its geographical features and histotical facts :—

" The structure of the Indus region and the flow of its rivers are both differnt from that of Hindustan proper. The Indus river and its tributaries, as does the Ganges, emanate practically from a common source but they take quite a different turn........ The climate of the Indus region as compared with that of Hindustan is severer and less humid, and its soil is less alluvial and poorer in humus. These geographical distinctions become all the more striking when we find that the climatic conditions of the districts bordering both the banks of the Jumna river, which separates Pakistan from Hindustan, vary considerably. These natural features and so many others, the details of which we omit for brevity's sake, cannot be safely dimissed as superficial.

" Turning to the history of India we find that Pakistan has always maintained its separate existence. Excavations at Mohenjo-daro, Harappa and in the N.-W. F. P. give conclusive evidence of the fact that the Indus Region from the very time when it was only an island possessed its own separate civilization and culture. Its people have always sought their national salvation along their own lines and cherished their own religious and spiritual ideals. Before the advent of the British, Pakistan had never been

regarded a part of Hindustan. A study of the *Rig Veda* and *Memoirs of Babar* would reveal that the name 'Bharat Versha'—or 'Arya Verta'—and afterwards Hindustan—was applied to the land lying on the east of the Indus region. True, the Muslim rulers in the Mediæval period and Asoka, Marsha and Bikramajit in the Vedic era ruled both these countries from one centre, but it is *non sequitor* to assert that Pakistan was a part of India, just as the British rule in India does not mean that India is a part of Great Britain. The kingdom of Asoka also included Afghanistan, but does it follow that the latter was a part of India?

From history we pass on to culture. Viewed from this stand-point both the countries stand wide apart. The habits, customs, manners, social customs and traditions of one country differ radically from those of the other. And it is interesting to note that even the dress and features of Pakistanies are unlike those of Hindustanies. Coming down from Peshawar to Delhi no such conspicuous difference strikes the eye of a tourist. But proceeding beyond Delhi to Calcutta and turning to Madras make the whole difference. People differ fundamentally despite their religious and in many cases racial affinities. These discrepancies are eternal."*

* *The New Times*, 27th November, 1938.

APPENDIX

PROGRAMME

WE have realized the importance of separation for the Muslims and have also noted the difficulties that lie in the way of its achievement. There is no denying the fact that the difficulties which the Muslims will have to overcome in order to establish their separate states are very many. We have also seen that their existence in India as an honourable and self-respecting people is impossible without separation. In its absence they will have to sacrifice all that is dear to them. And to achieve separation they will have to fight for it and not be dismayed by the difficulties that stand in the way of its realization.

To achieve this ideal the Muslims must organize themselves strongly under the ægis of a political party who should lay down a policy with a double bias, the first bias being directed towards the safeguarding of the present position of the Muslims, whether economic, cultural or religious and the second bias aiming at the establishment of a federation of the North-Western Muslim block consisting of all the provincial units and state units therein.

The main items of this latter part of their programme should be (1) popularizing the idea of separation among the Muslim masses by lectures, speeches, debates, and literature; (2) establishment of various centres all over the Sind Regions to undertake the work mentioned in (1); (3) assist the Muslim separationists in England to carry on the propaganda of separation there, for the constitutional battle of our separation from India has to be fought more in the streets of London than here in India; (4) agitate for the readjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab so as to exclude from it all the Hindu tracts which lie in its east; and (5) after the idea of separation has been popularized at home and a good volume of opinion has been formed in its favour to demand separation from Hindu India in the form of a federation in all respects similar to the federation of Hindu India and in order to promote this purpose to send deputations to:—

(*i*) all the governors of the British provinces in Sindistan;
(*ii*) Governor-General of India;
(*iii*) His Majesty the King;
(*iv*) Heads of various Indian states situated in the North-West of India to stress upon them the great necessity of separation of the Muslims' regions from Hindu India;
(*v*) all the Muslim countries in the world to get their moral support, etc.; and
(*vi*) Japan and other non-Muslim countries of

> the world who may be pro-Muslim. Japan has been showing more inclination towards Islam and the Muslim World than it did during the pre-war days. It may be due to certain motives. But we are not concerned with them at the present time. We must snatch at all opportunities which may come our way.

This programme of achieving complete separation may be carried out only when we have failed in our efforts to convince the Hindus of the desirability of having a confederated India instead of a federated one.

If the Bengal Muslims agree to the necessity of separation, they can join hands with the Muslim North-West to carry on a similar programme in respect of themselves too.

It is necessary to make it clear that the separation of our regions from Hindu India is not an end in itself, but only a means for the achievement of an ideal Islamic state. The proposed separation will undoubtedly lead to our emancipation from the economic slavery of the Hindus. But as our object is the establishment of an ideal Islamic state, it also denotes complete independence. After independence has been achieved it would be impossible for us to maintain, for long in an un-Islamic world, our ideal of an Islamic state. As such, we shall have to advocate a world revolution on Islamic lines. Consequently, our ultimate ideal is a world

revolution on purely Islamic lines. Separation, emancipation from the economic slavery of the Hindus, and freedom from the constitutional slavery of the British, are only some of the means for the achievement of our ultimate ideal of a world revolution on completely Islamic lines.

In a fast moving world it has become difficult for people with static habits to maintain an honourable existence. The expansionist powers of Europe are unwilling to remove the iron frame-work of their political dominance from over the weaker nations. All the Eastern nations are fully alive to the need of throwing off the yoke of Europe. But it is to be deplored that this consciousness is seriously lacking among the Indian Muslims. While other backward nations are burdened with only political slavery, the Indian Muslims are suffering from two-fold slavery, *viz.*, political slavery to the British and economic slavery to the Hindus. In addition they are suffering from intellectual backwardness and the evils arising from the domination of higher classes over the others. Muslim masses are backward, ignorant, impoverished. They cannot keep pace with the advancing world so long as the middle class does not give serious attention to their social, economic and intellectual uplift. Half a century back we were unlucky in not having a middle class which generally undertakes the task of freeing the masses from different kinds of slavery. Thank God that this middle class has now come into existence.

It has revived the expiring embers of hope in the hearts of those who were despairing on account of the successive failures of the Muslims on account of which they have touched the very bottom of demoralization. The masses who constitute the bulk of our nation cannot be dragged into line with other nations with a jerk. They have to be raised little by little and it is only with great perseverance and patience that we can come within hail of success. The first requisite for this purpose is their intellectual awakening which can only be brought about by imparting sound political education to them. Muslims have so far neglected this all-important means of national development and it is high time that we should devote all our energies to producing literature of the right type and disseminating it among the Muslim masses. This can be done by organizing a band of selfless political workers imbued with a crusading spirit.

This band of political workers should not depend upon public funds but each of its members should earn his own living—so to say they should form an order of political ascetics. All the money required for the publication of literature for purposes of free distribution among the Muslim masses and meeting the expenses of their tours should be arranged for by them raising contributions among themselves. In no case they should be a burden on the Muslim masses.

This order of political ascetics can be divided

into three groups,

(1) writers,
(2) preachers, and
(3) organisers.

The first group should produce literature. The second group should disseminate it among the Muslim masses. The third group should organize the Muslim nation and make it healthy by fighting against national decadence removing it and taking steps to safeguard against its reappearance. This brotherhood should live and die for the Muslim Community. Every other wordly pursuit of its members should be subservient to the ultimate object of creating an intellectual revolution among the Muslim masses and evolving a healthy body politic out of them. It is always the work of such patriots that regenerates people and rescues countries.

THE END

گر ز یك تقدیر خوں گردد جگر
خواه از حق حکم تقدیر دگر
تو اگر تقدیر نو خواهی رواست
زانکه تقدیرات حق لا انتہا است

اقبال

ERRATA

Page	*Line*	*for*	*read*
20	3	trusts	trust
36	23	soical	social
70	11	One	" One
90	3	necks	neck
90	24	come	become
233	23	is	are
237	1	desired	is desired
238	13	Anglo-Indians'	Anglo-Indians, Christians
272	9	decadence	decadence,

Folio Heading pp. 33—41 " AN ANALOGY " and not " QUESTIONS RELATING TO SEPARATION."